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ABSTRACT

The monograph, presenting a history of cultural exchanges between the United States and China from 1942-49, focuses upon the effect of Department of State cultural programs on international cooperation and understanding. Based upon primary source material in the form of reports and daily correspondence between Washington and the American Embassy in Chungking, the report is presented in 10 chapters. Chapter I reviews establishment of the China Program in 1942, with allocation of $150,000 from the Emergency Fund for the President. Chapter II examines political decisions and actions relating to development of the China Program in Chungking and Washington. Chapter III discusses contributions of individuals and private organizations to cultural exchange with the Chinese. Chapter IV identifies individuals and media (such as microfilm collections of learned journals) which conveyed information between the two nations. Chapter V describes locations, approval, appointment, and conveyance of American technical and cultural leaders to China. Chapters VI and VII appraise visits of Chinese educators, artists, and students to the United States. Chapters VIII and IX discuss the phase-out of war emergency programs at the end of World War II and the transition to the Fulbright program of international exchange. The final chapter presents a history of the Fulbright Exchange Program from 1948-49. Included in the appendix is a directory of Chinese and American individuals who participated in the cultural exchange program between 1942 and 1949. (Author/DB)

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Cultural Relations Programs of the U.S. Department of State

Historical Studies: Number 1

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

CHINA IN THE 1940's - LOCATING PLACES CITED IN THE TEXT

America's Cultural Experiment in China 1942–1949

by

Wilma Fairbank

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Foreword

THIS VOLUME is one of a series of monographs which recount the history of the International Educational and Cultural Exchange Program of the U.S. Department of State.

Recognizing the need for a comprehensive history of the role of the Department in international cultural relations, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU), on the initiative of Assistant Secretary of State John Richardson, Jr., established the CU History Project in the fall of 1972 to coordinate the preparation of these studies. In view of the many dimensions of the Department-sponsored program to increase mutual understanding and cooperation between the people of the United States and other peoples through constructive patterns of two-way communication, numerous aspects of which have not been fully studied in historical perspective, it was decided to approach the task through a series of separate monographs.

In planning and developing this series, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs has consulted with three scholars and educators long associated with the program for advice and guidance: Ben M. Cherrington, first chief of the Department's cultural relations program, and for many years director of the Social Science Foundation of the University of Denver; John Hope Franklin, Professor of American History, University of Chicago; and Frank Freidel, Charles Warren Professor of American History, Harvard University.

Though these studies are being published under the sponsorship of the Department of State, they do not in any sense embody official U.S. Government views or policy. The author of each monograph is responsible for the facts and their interpretation as well as for the opinions expressed.

J. MANUEL ESPINOSA
CU History Project
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U.S. Department of State

Preface

CHINESE-AMERICAN GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS in the 1940's have been the subject of a number of interesting books in recent years. A well-known example is Barbara Tuchman's study of General Stilwell's vain efforts to lead the Chinese armies into renewed action against the Japanese.* Another is the publication of the astute despatches to the State Department written by China language officer John S. Service, for which he was subsequently victimized in the McCarthy era.†

Both Stilwell and Service were men of long experience in China who were deeply attached to the country and the people. Like those other American officials assigned there at the time who had similar backgrounds and sentiments, their motivation was to press for whatever constructive moves could be made by our Government to help the Chinese people. But despite their hopes, the necessary fundamental changes could not be accomplished from outside. Their efforts resulted in frustrations, failures and, for some, ruined careers. Perhaps it was inevitable that these should be the corollaries of the profound collapse of American governmental relations with China in 1949 as the Communist-led revolution defeated the Nationalists with whom we were persistently allied.

In this context, however, attention must be drawn to the little-known fact that the U.S. Government did conduct for eight years in the 1940's a constructive program aimed directly at offering assistance to the Chinese people in education, public health, sanitation, agriculture, engineering, and the like. Such was the U.S. program of cultural exchanges with China, initiated by the Department of State in 1942, administered by the Division of Cultural Relations, and continued up to the 1949 severance of relations.

This program was a pioneer effort in several ways. It was, first of all, an experiment in the unaccustomed field of governmental cultural activity. It was also the first such official program to be tried outside the Western Hemisphere. It was a direct forerunner of the present-day technical assistance programs, and many of the experiences recounted here will, I dare say, be found to be still relevant. It

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* Barbara Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China 1911–1945* (New York: Macmillan, 1971).

† Joseph W. Esherick, Editor, *Lost Chance in China: The World War II Despatches of John S. Service* (New York: Random House, 1974).

included the first Fulbright program of educational exchanges anywhere. Most important, it involved relations of a special kind with our longtime friend, recent enemy, and current concern—China.

The period 1942–49 was one of almost unremitting warfare in China. The program was initiated just after the Pearl Harbor attack had catapulted us into World War II. It was terminated seven years later by the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war and the establishment of the People's Republic of China which excluded the American presence for more than two decades. Between the end of World War II and the resumption of the civil conflict, only a few months of uneasy peace had intervened. There was never a quietly "normal" stretch of time in which cultural relations might be expected to flourish. Whatever was accomplished had to be achieved between crises or in the face of harassing obstacles.

What was undertaken and—more important—what was achieved? The attempt to get at the truth of a 25 years is not easy. The documents now in the National Archives in Washington are the principal source but they have two deficiencies. They are lamentably incomplete; and they tell only the bleaker side of the story. The incompleteness is apparently due to inexpert or couldn't-care-less culling before the cultural relations files were sent from the State Department for permanent storage at the National Archives. (See Appendix I.) The bleakness was generated by the circumstances of the day-by-day administrative correspondence between the Embassy and the Department regarding the program—correspondence inevitably directed to coping with problems. Operations which proceeded smoothly were not worth mention. Good news was no news. At the other extreme from this bleakness were the contemporary presentations to the Bureau of the Budget and to congressional committees (seeking further support), as well as the *Monthly Reports* of the Division of Cultural Relations. They described the program in confident generalizations, happy anecdotes, and eye-popping statistics. These were not fabrications; they constituted the view from Washington. They represented the prideful display of accomplishments by hard-working Departmental staff who had devoted their energies and ingenuities to locating, processing, and shipping off needed persons and equipment to a faraway and little-known terminus, China.

Between these two extremes in the record, the bleak and the bright, the truth must be sought. What was undertaken is concrete and can be learned from the Washington end. But what was accomplished is more subtle and less easily assessed. It involves determining what happened at the Point of Contact. How, for example, did Americans react to the Chinese scene or Chinese to the American?

Were the ideas flowing in both directions absorbed or rejected by recipients at either end? Effectiveness at the various Points of Contact is the only effectiveness, in my view. Consequently, at the cost of only perfunctory attention to administrative history, and the fiscal and statistical aspects of the program, I concentrate as fully as the record allows on providing the reader with specific examples of cultural contact between Chinese and Americans effectuated by the 1942–49 program.

The researching and writing of this book has led me to retrace a memorable part of my life. Like many other American women, I experienced during World War II a preliminary phase of women's liberation. I was hired as a "Divisional Assistant" in the Division of Cultural Relations of the State Department in January 1942, the first employee taken on for the China program. In May 1945, after three and a half years in the Department, I was sent to China to be the Cultural Attaché (then called "cultural relations officer") of the American Embassy in Chungking. In the spring of 1946 I moved with the Embassy to Nanking for an additional year before returning home. Consequently I was a participant in the program described here for all but the last two years.

Naturally, memories of my first-hand experiences with the operations of the program both in the United States and China reverberated in my mind as I read through the record. This is not a personal memoir, but the fact that I was a participant has given me certain insights which augment and, I hope, illuminate the historical record. Yet no surviving memory can convey the actuality of those days as effectively as contemporary documents. I have quoted liberally from such State Department telegrams, instructions, despatches, and reports as still exist in an attempt to recreate the atmosphere as well as the events of this early and halting move toward what must be our present wider goal of truly international cultural cooperation.

WILMA FAIRBANK

Cambridge, Massachusetts,
March 1976.

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Patricia Dowling at the National Archives and Wilmer P. Sparrow at the Foreign Affairs Document and Reference Center of the State Department assisted me in locating documents. The CU History Project's files provided basic materials. Interviews in person or by telephone with some of the participants in the program—Derk Bodde, the late W. Walton Butterworth, Shirley Duncan Stout, George and Elaine Harris, Esther Haviland Farrior, John F. Melby, Chih Meng, Frederick Mote, Ralph W. Phillips, and John T. Tripp—were particularly helpful.

Individual chapters were read at various stages of drafting by some of the persons named above as well as by David Arkush, Marybelle Bouchard Hanna, Ben M. Cherrington, Alfred Harding IV, Immanuel Hsu, Barbara J. Walton, and Wango Weng. Extensive reading of the manuscript was done by Robert and Ai-li Chin, social psychologists; Frank Freidel and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., American historians; Ross Terrill, specialist in Chinese Government; L. K. Little, former Inspector-General of the Chinese Customs Service; Anne Keatley, administrator of present-day Chinese-American exchanges; and John K. Fairbank, historian of modern China. Their criticisms and suggestions from varying points of view have greatly improved my presentation.

I am especially grateful to my family. Three of my sisters, Linda Cannon Burgess, Helen Cannon Bond, and Ellen DeNormandie Cannon, read my first draft. Their kindly praises and criticisms spurred me on at the outset. My daughters, Laura and Holly, helped me immeasurably throughout. My nieces, Sarah Holden and Jananne Cannon, typed first drafts of certain chapters. As for my husband, the

fact that he had been an unofficial but vital participant in the program 30 years ago was a priceless asset to me. I profited from his understanding of its purposes and his memories of its early development. Meanwhile he had the wisdom to keep his hands off my research and writing. Instead of trying to make a historian of me, he supported me with unwavering encouragement. I thank him with all my heart.

Terms and Abbreviations

The northern capital of China, *Pei-ching*, has been Anglicized as "Peking" ever since English-speaking people first reached it, and continues to be at present. In the period covered by this book, Chiang Kai-shek had changed its name to *Pei-p'ing*, "northern peace," from the time in 1927 when he established his capital in Nanking, the "southern capital" on the Yangtze River. Although in faithfulness to the original wording, "Peiping" will be retained in quoted documents, the familiar and enduring "Peking" will be used everywhere else.

Another departure from the contemporary usage is the dropping of the word "National" from the constantly cited names of universities, e.g., National Wuhan University, National Tsinghua University, et cetera. Only the Christian universities and one or two others were supported by private funds, and all such non-national universities are so identified in the text.

The reader is reminded that Chinese names are written with the surname first, e.g., SUN Yat-sen—Dr. Sun.

The superior figures in the text refer to Notes at the end of each chapter or section. The following is a guide to abbreviations and documentary sources used in the Notes and Appendixes.

Amcongen	American Consulate General
Amemb	American Embassy
CU	Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs
CU/BFS	Files of the Secretariat of the Board of Foreign Scholarships, U.S. Dept. of State
CU/H	History files, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State

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CU Monthly Report	Monthly and semimonthly report of the Cultural Division of the U.S. Dept. of State, which appeared under the following titles during the period 1942–49: *Report of the Division of Cultural Relations; Report of the Science, Education, and Art Division; Monthly Information Bulletin of the Division of Cultural Cooperation;* and *The Record.* Copies in NA, RG 59, WHB, Box 56, and NA, RG 353, SCC, Boxes 23–24, and CU/H.
Dept	Department
Desp	Despatch
Foreign Relations	*Foreign Relations of the United States,* documentary series, published by the Historical Office, U.S. Dept. of State. The official record of the foreign policy of the United States.
H. Doc	House Document
Inst	Institute
Instr	Instruction
NA	National Archives, National Archives Building, Washington, D.C.
NARS	General Archives Division, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland
O/FADRC	Foreign Affairs Document and Reference Center, U.S. Dept. of State
Prof	Professor
publ	Publication
RC	Division of Cultural Relations. Title, 1938–1944, of the first office in the Dept. of State responsible for its cultural relations program. Referred to in the text as CU, the present symbol of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.
RG 59	Record Group 59, General Records of the U.S. Dept. of State, NA
RG 84	Record Group 84, Records of Foreign Posts of the U.S. Dept. of State, NA
RG 353, SCC	Record Group 353, Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation, NA

Secstate	Secretary of State
Tel	Telegram
Univ	University
WHB	"War History Branch Studies," War History Branch, Division of Research and Publication, U.S. Dept. of State, NA, RG 59

The documentary sources for this account are cited in full in the Notes. Published sources consulted, also cited here, do not seem sufficiently numerous to warrant a formal bibliography.

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Introduction

CONTACTS among nations take place in many spheres of human activity of which trade, diplomacy, and warfare are the most commonly recognized. As ancient as these, however, and as widespread, are international contacts in what Britain's eminent scholar and poet, Gilbert Murray, called "the great region of art, letters, science, imagination, the discovery of truth and the creation of beauty." [1]

Professor Murray's poetic phrase encompasses in a few words the wide range of human creativity which has been hungrily sought, and spread from person to person and people to people time out of mind. Even in the sparse remains from neolithic times we find technologies and patterns which have traveled over vast distances. Through the ages since, the carriers of new discoveries and inventions have been, like their forefathers of those ancient times, for the most part anonymous. As for the creators and discoverers themselves, we must assume that the majority remain unidentified if we look back over the long reach of man's life on earth. It is the ideas, the techniques, the creations which live on, sometimes discrete, more frequently as contributions merging with the evolving creativities of later generations.

The flow of these ideas, techniques, creations from person to person, place to place, nation to nation has been continuous wherever communications existed. People and handicrafts must have been the first carriers, but after the invention of writing and, centuries later, printing, these latter became prime means of spreading ideas. Among the wonders of our times, live pictures of world events instantaneously transmitted by satellite are merely further giant strides in this direction. New ideas now move fast; worldwide participation is here.

To designate the foregoing "international cultural relations" is to resort to an awkward mouthful of words for a fascinating topic. An analogous flow from country to country goes by the simpler name of "trade." The analogy is close in certain ways, remote in others. The two flows are close in that almost inevitably both exchanges are two

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way; they are remote in that ideas and techniques are not created intrinsically for financial gain.

Men of imagination must, nonetheless, earn a living and have opportunity to develop their skills. In past centuries the institutions of power—the church, rulers of vast empires and of petty states—have sought to enhance their prestige by employing gifted painters, musicians, architects, scientists, and craftsmen. Not infrequently the employee came from a foreign land. Francis the First in the 16th century brought Leonardo da Vinci to France (as a scientist and engineer rather than a painter) and China's Ch'ien Lung Emperor in the 18th century depended on highly skilled European Jesuit priests as architects, painters, and astronomers at his court in Peking. In each case the foreign influence left its mark. But these royal patrons fostering international cultural contacts at their courts were only a beginning.

In the last two hundred years cultural exchanges have multiplied and spread with unprecedented rapidity in conformity with the successive revolutions in communications. Beginning in the 18th century, men of learning and talent in the Western world organized their own academies and through them made contact with their fellows in other countries who shared the same interests and pursuits. To whatever extent wealth and power long held a monopoly of cultural patronage and cultural benefits, this has been swept away by the spread of literacy and education in subsequent years.

In fact, the democratization of cultural contact has been a principal feature of the changes that have taken place in this field in our time. To return once more to the analogy with trade, the "demand," domestic and foreign, for access to education; for books; for music, art, and drama; for knowledge of new developments in science and technology and of new thinking in all fields is now worldwide. The educated may still be few, and the highly educated fewer, in proportion to the billions of the global population, but they are increasing rapidly and are scattered everywhere. They are now inevitably "consumers" of and participants in a culture which, with all its national variations, is essentially global. This fact has long been recognized in science. It is increasingly true in other fields.

If indeed cultural diffusion, like trade, has been in recent centuries increasingly a function of individuals and organizations in the private sector, we may well ask: What is the role of the various governments which have taken up sponsorship of international cultural relations in the 20th century? There are varying answers to this question depending on both the domestic situation of the particular government and its world status. But there is nothing ba-

sically mysterious about it. The following is an attempt to clarify it by a schematized arrangement of certain self-evident truths:

1. Cultural relations across national boundaries are a normal part of human intellectual and emotional life. In modern times in the West these normally constitute "laissez-faire" trade; that is, new ideas and techniques move about on the basis of supply and demand through the agency of cultural private "free enterprisers." As a byproduct of this international cultural "trade," the "consumer" normally has friendly feelings and new understanding toward the "supplier" who has met his "demand." But cultural exchange at this level does not take place for such ulterior motives. It happens, unforced and free, wherever ideas and techniques can be communicated from one individual or people to another.

2. International relations are a primary concern of national governments. A simple and obvious requirement is that nation states must make friends abroad with whom to live and trade in concord in peacetime and to whom to turn for support in war. In this respect, their national interest is closely connected with the byproduct mentioned above—they seek whatever course will help to achieve peace and friendship with foreign countries through mutual understanding. They find cultural relations useful to this end.

3. International cultural relations used as a tool of government policy are subject to manipulation through an entire range of motives dependent upon the good or evil intentions of the power concerned. They can be made instruments of propaganda or otherwise exploited by governmental machination to aid political, economic, or military aggression abroad. They can be interrupted by war or by governmental controls attempting to seal off a citizenry from outside influences. On the other hand, they can be employed in countermoves by the target governments to defend themselves against misrepresentations or threatened subversion.

The French Government was apparently the first one in Europe to undertake large-scale official support of binational cultural relations to enhance its image abroad. In the latter part of the 19th century the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs spent some 20 million francs on "a program of religious, educational and philanthropic activities carried on in the Near and Far East by the French Catholic teaching missionaries." [2] The motive in this case was presumably to sweeten the contemporary impact of French political and economic imperialism in those areas.

However that may be, in the early 20th century the French Government shifted the emphasis of its cultural relations activities to lay education and established in 1910 the first French Institute in Florence, Italy, to "give to university youth abroad a knowledge and

a taste for the finest in French culture." By 1933 such institutes and French primary and secondary schools had multiplied until about 10 percent of the entire budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was devoted to support for both official and private programs. This proportion had increased to some 20 percent by 1936.[3] French cultural distinction was a reality—the creation of great French men and women. French Government sponsorship facilitated the spread of its influence throughout the world and by so doing served both an international public and its own nationalistic ends. This open and beneficent collaboration of government and private forces set an example later emulated by other governments in establishing their own official binational cultural programs.

The active, hostile, and lavishly financed international cultural programs of the Axis Powers, Germany and Italy,[4] finally led the British to establish their quasi-official agency for international cultural relations, the British Council, in a small way in 1934 as a means of "presenting the British case abroad."

The United States was the last of the major powers to take official cognizance of the great international tide of ideas and related intangibles. The U.S. Foreign Service had, of course, been habituated from its inception to fostering U.S. participation in the international trade of marketable goods, but up to 1938 the parallel international flow of ideas, skills, and artistic creations had been left to the initiative of American private citizens. Beginning in the 19th century pious Americans joined in the notable private dissemination of Christian missions abroad, and the 20th century saw the worldwide expansion of the activities of American private agencies and individuals, philanthropic foundations, and educational institutions active overseas for cultural and humanitarian causes. As in trade, private initiative came first.

The fact that these international exchanges were carried on by private agencies without recourse to Government aid beyond the normal consular protection afforded American citizens abroad can be attributed to several factors. The most important was undoubtedly the traditional American suspicion of governmental interference with freedom of thought and expression. Looking back from today when Federal support for domestic as well as international educational programs is so taken for granted and, in fact, actively sought by the public, the earlier apprehension appears greatly exaggerated. Or should we say that in this field, as in business and many other private occupations, the policy of laissez-faire has been outdated by the changing circumstances of modern life?

For whatever reasons the U.S. Government had hung back, it finally took the initiative in 1936. At the Inter-American Confer-

ence for the Maintenance of Peace held that winter in Buenos Aires, certain cultural agreements, notably the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations, were signed. As a consequence, the Department of State established in 1938 a Division of Cultural Relations "for the purpose of encouraging and strengthening cultural relations and intellectual cooperation between the United States and other countries." The ultimate purpose was broad, but the immediate goal of the newly established Division was to inaugurate cultural exchanges with the other American republics. That such a move was in the immediate national interest had become clear. The Axis Powers, and particularly Nazi Germany, were trying to stir up Latin America and attempting outright political subversion in certain areas. These ominous warnings forced us, like the British four years earlier, to make the experimental and small-scale countermove of establishing an official program to keep open and expand the two-way flow of cultural contact between ourselves and our neighbors to the south.

The Department of State's experience in carrying on a program of cultural relations was confined to Latin America until 1941. Then steps were taken to extend the program outside the Western Hemisphere—to China. The Department's Division of Cultural Relations had meanwhile developed certain habits of thought and performance and reached certain conclusions from their work in Latin America which were inevitably passed on to the planners and administrators of the China program. Some proved useful there, some were misleading, and some were downright mistaken in the new context. Let us turn to them briefly before setting forth on the China story.

Two fundamental principles were established at the outset to guide the developing program. In the words of the original Division Chief, Ben M. Cherrington:

> ". . . first, cultural relations activities of our country would be reciprocal, there must be no imposition of one people's culture upon another; second, the exchange of cultural interests should involve the participation of people and institutions concerned with those interests in the respective countries, that is, the program should stem from the established centers of culture. . . . The Department of State's primary responsibility . . . should be to act as a service agency to the cultural institutions spread across the nation." [5]

The decision to leave the operations in the main to existing cultural institutions proved basic. The Division allocated its limited funds to promoting and extending activities already initiated by private enterprise instead of building up an expensive bureaucracy within the Department to administer and finance programs which would compete with those of the private sector.

This decision naturally aroused the interest and enthusiasm of the private cultural institutions throughout the country. The Department turned to them for guidance as its plans developed, and this relationship was soon regularized by the formation of a General Advisory Committee to which outstanding cultural leaders from public and private agencies were appointed annually by the President.

A wide sampling of experience and advice in specialized fields was achieved by the calling of four conferences on inter-American cultural relations in the fall of 1939. More than a thousand representatives of private educational and cultural activities came to Washington at their own expense from all parts of the United States to attend one or another of four conferences on music, art, publications and libraries, and education. Existing and proposed projects were presented, special advisory committees were appointed, and the conferences resulted in enlisting nationwide support and the cooperation of important leaders for the Department's pioneer efforts in this field.

Certain private organizations in the United States played very important and lasting roles in association with the Department's cultural activities not only in Latin America but also in subsequent programs elsewhere. These were the Institute of International Education (IIE), the American Library Association (ALA), the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS), and the American Council on Education (ACE). In establishing its Latin American program, the Department made grants to the IIE for administration of student exchanges; to the ALA for selection, purchase, and shipment of books, and the administration of American libraries there; to the ACLS for supervising binational cultural centers and other projects; and to the ACE for administration of assistance to American schools in the various countries.

Private agencies also participated to some degree in other of the Department's cultural relations projects in Latin America. These included the exchange of language teachers in both directions, the sponsorship of reciprocal art exhibits, the establishment of 20 music loan libraries in various capital cities, the bringing of Latin American leaders on travel grants to the United States for two or three months, the sending of a few American professors to teach or research, and a few American specialists or experts to make surveys or act as consultants to agencies and institutions in the other American republics.

The program with Latin America was originally limited in the main to such traditionally cultural subjects as music, art, literature, and history. The program planners presumably concentrated on these

fields in order to compete with the European cultural programs which appealed to the Latin American elite. The same group or class tended, we were well aware, to regard the United States as rich in material things but poor in "culture." The first U.S. programs were to some extent designed to disprove this superficial view. But the narrowness which resulted from this policy was pointed out by a new member of the General Advisory Committee, Vice President Henry A. Wallace, at a meeting of the Committee in September 1941.

> "The Vice President urged that cultural relations activities be extended to reach the lives of the middle and lower levels of society. At present our cultural relations, such as in music, and literary exchanges, have been largely directed towards the *elite* of the Americas. However, it is also necessary that we establish helpful relations, with the remaining 90 percent of the people, who are for the most part engaged in agriculture. Unless we help them to improve their economic lot, thus making it possible for health and education to develop, there will be no dependable basis for democracy." [6]

This wise advice helped to set the policy guiding our official cultural relations on a broader path in which the traditional contributions of "high culture" to the human spirit were balanced by scientific and technical contributions to the physical well-being of ordinary citizens. The American involvement in World War II, so unexpectedly imminent at the time the Vice President was speaking, was to heighten worldwide demands for scientific and technical aid from the United States, and, in fact, to weigh the balance heavily in that direction.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. Gilbert Murray, "Intellectual Cooperation," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 235 (Sept. 1944), p. 7.
2. Ruth E. McMurry, "Foreign Government Programs of Cultural Relations" in *ibid.*, p. 55.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 58, 59.
5. Ben M. Cherrington, "Ten Years After," *Association of American Colleges Bulletin*, 34 (Dec. 1948), p. 2.
6. "Minutes of Meeting of General Advisory Committee of the Division of Cultural Relations," Sept. 17–18, 1941. Cited in Helen R. Pinkney, "The Division of Cultural Cooperation," p. 9, NA, RG 59, WHB, Box 10.

CHAPTER ONE

Establishment of the China Program

THE China program was conceived in the late spring of 1941 when the hard-pressed Chinese were about to enter the fifth year of their struggle against the Japanese invaders. Though the United States was not yet at war, American public opinion was very strongly on the side of the Chinese. President Roosevelt had extended lend-lease aid to China on May 6, 1941. In the circumstances it was hardly surprising that shortly thereafter the idea of providing further U.S. Government assistance through a program of cultural relations with China should begin to take form in the Department.

Letters urging just such a step had, in fact, been received by the Department from time to time ever since the inception in 1938 of the cultural exchange program with the other American republics. As early as March 1939, Roger S. Greene, a "China hand" who had been a Consul General in the U.S. Foreign Service there and later for 20 years Resident Director in Peking of the Rockefeller Foundation's China Medical Board, wrote to Ben Cherrington, then Chief of the Division of Cultural Relations (CU*), to recommend that Cultural Attachés be added to our diplomatic staffs abroad to provide the political officers with an understanding of the significant persons and events in the cultural field. One sentence is a sharp reminder of the Axis moves in South America mentioned in the Introduction:

> "The attention devoted by the Japanese army to Chinese educational movements and institutions in peacetime, and the evidently purposeful way in which such institutions have been sought out and destroyed in war time, are merely two of the many examples that might be cited of the political importance of the educational and scientific part of the modern state." [1]

*The initials "CU" (abbreviated from "cultural") are used within the Department to refer to the present Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. In subsequent years the headquarters in the Department for administering U.S. Government programs of cultural relations went through various reorganizations designated by different initials. To prevent unnecessary confusion, the abbreviation "CU" will be used throughout this text to represent the Department's cultural relations home office, whatever its then-current designation. The Department's program of cultural relations with China will frequently be referred to, for convenience, as the "CU China program."

By 1941 Professors George Cressey (Asian Geography, Syracuse University), and Woodbridge Bingham (Chinese History, University of California at Berkeley) had written separately to the Department to advise the establishment of a China program. On June 16 of the same year the Embassy in Chungking forwarded to the Department a memorandum written jointly by J. Lossing Buck, the well-known agriculturalist of the University of Nanking, with three American colleagues on that faculty, Professors Lewis Smythe, Frank Price, and William Fenn, which spelled out in some detail a program of technical training and assistance to China to be undertaken by the Department.

The Buck memorandum happened to reach Washington at a time when Willys Peck, for many years Chinese Secretary and most recently Counselor of the American Embassy in China, was in the Department awaiting departure for his new assignment as Minister to Thailand. Peck had no inkling that in a matter of months he himself would head the CU China program after his repatriation from Bangkok in the wartime exchange of diplomats. Unaware of his future involvement, he was devoting much time to persuading various officers of the Department by conversations and memoranda that aid should be extended to China along cultural lines.[2] The detailed suggestions of the Buck and Peck memoranda were apparently sufficiently concrete and forceful to persuade the Department that the extension of the cultural relations program to China was an idea whose time had come.

Officers of CU took the precaution of consulting the Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Hu Shih, in July 1941 and again in September, as to the acceptability of such a move. Hu, as a leading Chinese scholar well aware of the significance of educational and cultural exchanges, needed to hear no justification. At the first encounter, he "expressed his hearty belief in the utility of sending a few outstanding American intellectual leaders to China." At the meeting in September with Charles Thomson, then Chief of the Division of Cultural Relations, and two of his associates, Hu discussed the possibilities of certain lines of action which might be undertaken.

The Americans presented for Hu's comments the categories of activity they had been developing in Latin America. Hu explained the impracticality under current conditions of certain projects, such as the proposal to reach the Chinese public by shortwave radio or to get students out of remote and beleaguered Free China to study in the United States (he suggested aid to those already here). But while continuing to favor sending outstanding Americans to China, he "specifically stated that it might be more desirable to have the visit of an American authority on constitutional law than that of a technician"

and that with the current "emphasis on the technical . . . many branches of liberal learning were being neglected." This recommendation, while it represented the predisposition of an eminent professor of the humanities, also implied an understanding of the need to counter the reactionary political forces which were becoming increasingly dominant in Chungking.[3]

The internal political developments in China which concerned Dr. Hu were overshadowed in American minds by a deepening foreboding at Japanese expansion and a commitment short of war to support continued Chinese resistance. By midsummer the first step had been taken to establish a China program in the Division of Cultural Relations. An experienced Foreign Service officer, Stuart E. Grummon, was detailed to the Division on July 31, 1941, to organize and head such a program.

Grummon, then 40, was a Princeton graduate who had been most recently First Secretary in the Tokyo Embassy after a career which had taken him from Mexico City to The Hague, Madrid, Port-au-Prince, Dairen, and Moscow. He had had three years in charge of the American Consulate in Dairen, from November 1934 to September 1937, but this port at the southern end of the Liaotung Peninsula in Japanese-occupied "Manchukuo" was more suited to observation of political, economic, and military maneuvering among the Chinese, Japanese, and Russians than for contact with the Chinese cultural scene. What Grummon lacked, however, in specialized knowledge of the language and culture of China should be weighed against the skills he brought to bear which were of particular value in the tedious six-months' time span required to get approval and funding for the new program. He had worked in Government for nearly 20 years, he knew his way around in the bureaucracy, he was a skillful and indefatigable drafter of memoranda and he took up his new assignment with a gusto which endured throughout his term. This was the more remarkable in that he was already suffering from a physical handicap which increasingly crippled him and would finally necessitate his retirement in September 1942.

The China program did not become a reality until January 14, 1942, when the modest sum of $150,000 from the Emergency Fund for the President was allocated to the Department to be spent for this purpose through the balance of the current fiscal year.[4] Grummon had devoted the previous months to framing the projects to be undertaken. During this period he was working on his own but in daily consultation with others of the CU staff, all of whom at that time were involved in directing the pioneer program with the other American republics.

It was probably inevitable that any extension of the Department's program of cultural relations to another area would have been

based on and closely imitative of the pattern of activities already worked out with Latin America. In the case of the China program this outcome was assured by the fact that Grummon was unfamiliar both with this new field of Government operations and with the current political, psychological, and material strains affecting the Chinese educational world. His preliminary proposals were to be modified by many factors unforeseeable in the autumn of 1941.

The first test of the proposed program was presentation to the members of the General Advisory Committee of the Division of Cultural Relations for discussion November 5. It was barely a month before Pearl Harbor, yet the tone of draft memoranda prepared for this occasion reflected the desire to assist war-torn China from a safe and uncommitted position on the sidelines. "Now that China and the United States are drawing closer together in the world-wide struggle for the democratic way of life, it is the opportune time to deepen and to direct into definite channels the traditional friendship between the two countries," was the start of one paper which then listed projects believed "feasible . . . in the light of (CU's) experience with the Latin-American countries." In brief, these were: a *conference* of American private organizations and individuals engaged in cultural relations with China, travel scholarships to bring *Chinese students* to the United States, coordination (with private organizations) of the sending of *equipment* to Chinese colleges and universities, distribution of educational *films* and use of *radio* broadcasting, exchange visits of *Chinese and American scholars and artists* in the two directions, exchange exhibits of Chinese and American "*classical and contemporary art*," a "historical, statistical and documentary *survey* of Chinese-American cultural relations."[8]

The proposals as presented to the Advisory Committee were already modified from the draft summarized above. Ambassador Hu's warning of the impracticality of bringing Chinese students from West China in the prevailing circumstances was finally recognized, and for this item was substituted aid to needy Chinese students already in the United States who were cut off from support. The all-encompassing survey was dropped altogether and the conference retained but moved to the end of the list where it assumed a rather tentative air: ". . . consideration is being given to calling a moderate-sized conference in Washington to discuss cultural cooperation with China similar to the ones held under the Department's auspices in the field of inter-American relations in the autumn of 1939." A bizarre suggestion was put forward, but must have been struck down at once since it never appeared again, ". . . that an outside organization be interested in presenting to all (*sic*) Chinese troops comfort kits of small bulk but containing objects highly prized by the Chinese soldier

and difficult and expensive to obtain, such as pocket knives, notebooks, pencils, buttons, thread and needles, as well as a message of encouragement in English and Chinese." [6]

The Advisory Committee, consisting mainly of administrators in American cultural fields, had been augmented for the occasion by the addition of two specialists in the promotion of Chinese studies, Dr. Arthur W. Hummel, Chief of the Division of Orientalia of the Library of Congress, and Mortimer Graves of the American Council of Learned Societies, as well as two Government officials intimately associated with current Chinese-American relations: Dr. Stanley Hornbeck, Political Adviser in the Department of State, and Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to the President, who had headed an economic mission to China in 1941 and was charged with supervising the lend-lease aid to China. It was a regular member of the Committee, Professor James Shotwell of Columbia University, however, who, according to the minutes of the meeting, emphasized a difference to be kept in mind between the Chinese operation and the Latin American. He pointed out that in general Chinese intellectuals were familiar enough with the culture of the United States so that presentation of American culture and "the American way of life" should in the circumstances yield to emphasis on "practical administration" of a program of assistance. Currie described the lend-lease aid that had been provided during the previous six months, stressing its limitation to military purposes. This left wide open the matter of assistance to civilian activities of the sort outlined by Grummon, though Currie urged that training offered to Chinese should be in technical fields, mentioning in particular engineering and medicine. Charles Thomson countered by citing Ambassador Hu Shih's stress on the need for training in the humanities and the law, and Currie added that persons skilled in business management techniques and in financial and governmental administration were in demand.

Part way through the discussion Grummon brought it down to earth by pointing out that the appropriations requested from the President's Emergency Fund—$150,000 to June 1942 and $200,000 for the fiscal year 1942–43—had still not been allocated. This delay apparently inspired the Committee to defer the question of a general conference but to recommend immediate action on a suggestion put forward by one member, Beardsley Ruml, and developed by another, Carl Milam of the American Library Association, that a "survey of governmental and private agencies' activities (concerned with China) should be undertaken at once." [7] Such a survey was in fact initiated

within the same month, November, by the American Council of Learned Societies at the request of the Department.

Clearly, the Advisory Committee intended that the basic policy already laid down for Latin America should apply also to China, namely, that the new CU program must make every effort to cooperate with and supplement the widespread cultural activities already being carried on by other American organizations in relation to China.

The attack on Pearl Harbor found Grummon still awaiting the allocation of funds for the CU China program, although he had by this time managed to obtain the necessary approval of the interested divisions and officers of the Department. This new situation was changing everything, from the day-by-day plans of individual citizens to the policies of the nation itself. Grummon, true to his training, responded by drafting a new memorandum which argued: ". . . China has become an ally of the United States, the program should receive even greater emphasis. It is now not merely a question of keeping China fighting against Japan but becomes an important contributory element in our own struggle against Japan."

As we were to learn later, China was bitterly aware that we, safe in our neutrality, had been urging them to keep fighting against Japan through four years of frightful losses and a 1,500-mile retreat into the western fastnesses. In the war years to come, they learned to manipulate us skillfully by letting word get around that unless further U.S. aid was forthcoming they were considering making a separate peace with Japan, a move that would never have been to their advantage and was probably never anything more than a threat.

The impact of this possibility on Department officers may, however, have been already felt, judging by two further quotes from the Grummon memorandum: "the exchange of technical and cultural leaders may well have an important bearing upon the continuance of China's will to fight . . ." and, further, "If it was deemed important before the outbreak of hostilities with Japan to develop a radio program directed to the Chinese people to encourage them in their resistance against Japan and to emphasize certain phases of American life which might contribute to strengthening their morale, the need is now clearly greater and accordingly greater emphasis should be put upon the radio program." The same considerations applied, he wrote, to the proposed sending of educational motion pictures and he argued that the plans for sending laboratory equipment, textbooks, et cetera, should go forward with special emphasis on materials of wartime value such as books on first aid, emergency dressing of wounds, and practical mechanics, adding that a "purpose

of this phase of the program is to emphasize American good will, as appropriate publicity will follow these gifts, and thus contribute to maintaining the morale of the intellectual classes in China, whose influence upon China's continued participation in hostilities is of great importance." [8]

This memorandum was sent on December 13 to Hornbeck, Currie, and officers of the Far Eastern Division of the Department. Their responses, if any, have not turned up.

After the CU China program was at last funded, a long telegram drafted by Grummon was sent to the American Embassy in the wartime Chinese capital, Chungking, on January 29, 1942, listing in detail the proposed projects for the Ambassador's views. An introductory sentence expressed a grandiose purpose underlying the pioneer program:

"During the past year the Department has given increasing attention to the desirability of supplementing the aid which this Government has been extending to China, along the lines of what may be conveniently termed cultural assistance, designed, during the emergency, primarily to bolster morale and secondarily to assist China in many different ways in which American scientific, technical, social, educational, industrial and other experience may be of use to China in raising its standard of living, improving the condition of its rural population, assisting in the development of educational, social and administrative programs and thus contributing to China's war effort.

"In view of the new developments during December," it continued, in a notable understatement apparently referring to the Pearl Harbor attack and U.S. entry into World War II, "the Department intends to emphasize especially those aspects of its program which will be of the most immediate benefit to China, in strengthening civilian morale and in pursuit of the aims outlined above." [9]

The information in the same telegram that this ambitious program was funded with "a modest initial allotment of $150,000 from emergency funds (which) has just been made for this purpose available until the end (five months later) of the present fiscal year" may have inspired the somewhat contemptuous tone of the Ambassador's comment (drafted by the Counselor, John Carter Vincent) on the presentation quoted above:

> "Having in mind Chinese sensibilities, it is desirable to avoid any suggestion of 'cultural' missions to China. The proposed program would do little toward bolstering morale and the least said publicly in that direction at the present time the better." [10]

Outright expressions of intent to bolster the morale of the Chinese by the CU program were immediately abandoned by Grummon

after this cutting advice, but the negative effect of the word "cultural" was not so easily dispelled. It was, after all, the official designation, and here at the very outset of the program it was proving itself a handicap. These difficulties were to persist and worsen during the ensuing long years of war. "Cultural" aid to China had very low priority to those American military and civilian wartime administrators in the China-Burma-India theater on whose assistance much of the success of the program depended.

The "proposed program" as conveyed to the Embassy listed the items approved by the Department after the long months of planning and discussion:

1. *Exchange of technical and cultural leaders*, $80,000. Intention: to send a number of American specialists to "familiarize themselves with problems in China relating to their field of study; discuss these problems with officials and scholars there; give advice, if desired, regarding short and long term assistance in these fields; submit an exhaustive report of their findings upon their return, together with recommendations; and be available to the Department for consultation for a reasonable period thereafter." Certain proposed fields of specialization were put forward, presumably suggested by the numerous "China hands" in the United States whom Grummon had consulted during his preparatory months. These were medical science, public health, vocational instruction, agriculture, library science, physics, chemistry, engineering (hydraulic, communications, mining, industrial, and engineering education), paper industry, regional planning (like the Tennessee Valley Authority), and public administration, fiscal policy, social security, and rural credit. It was proposed that not more than 10 Americans be sent to China and that in exchange the Department should invite, transportation permitting, "a few outstanding Chinese to lecture widely in this country for the purpose of acquainting Americans with Chinese customs, institutions and objectives."

2. Aid to certain *Chinese students* studying in the U.S.A., $20,000.

3. Development of a series of educational *radio programs* in Chinese for broadcast by shortwave from the United States or transcribed for local broadcast in China, $5,000.

4. *Motion pictures*, $15,000. This sum to cover cost of sending to China "two light trucks together with projection equipment for each" to display motion pictures on "American life, institutions and war effort" and U.S. Government educational films on agriculture, hygiene, et cetera.

5. The donation of urgently needed *textbooks*, *microscopes*, and other *scientific equipment* to refugee universities, $20,000.

The Embassy was instructed to discuss these proposals for a CU program with the Chinese Government, to inquire whether they would welcome such a program and "would be prepared to give full facilities to persons sent to China for its execution," and, if so, which type of specialists would be most urgently needed. The Ambassador was urged to give his "frank and considered views regarding (the proposed program's) probable effectiveness . . . and where major emphasis should be placed." [11]

After its opening blast, already quoted, the Embassy continued its comment on the CU proposals in a more avuncular vein. The "specialists" program for sending 10 American technical experts in various designated fields to China to study Chinese problems, advise, and on their return report, recommend, and consult elicited this reaction:

> ". . . there is no substantial benefit to be derived from the proposed technical or expert surveys and reports to be made by American specialists. Such surveys could readily be made by qualified Chinese specialists and experts, and also, in many lines, by American specialists connected with American mission universities which have for years been doing work along the lines envisaged in the program. The needs in China at present are sufficiently well known; the primary concern is how to meet those needs so far as possible in the face of the limitations on financial support, of inflation, and of the virtual impossibility because of transportation difficulties of receiving material assistance from abroad. It should be borne in mind that the Burma Road is seriously threatened and in any case must be reserved almost entirely for military purposes. Communication with and within China is now largely restricted to air transport; these facilities are extremely limited and expensive; and there is no present prospect of an early improvement in the transport situation." [12]

The bleak picture of the transportation situation, so difficult for CU officers at the other side of the world to understand or accept, did in fact mean that proposals to send to China textbooks, microscopes and scientific equipment, and educational motion pictures, and "two light trucks together with projection equipment" had to be deferred indefinitely.

The Embassy countered with two proposals which required little or no transportation space. The first was a recommendation which was quickly adopted by the Department and became the subject of strenuous and long-continued efforts, namely, that microfilms of current scientific and cultural publications be sent for use in Chinese universities.

The second urged financial grants-in-aid to faculties and perhaps to promising students in universities and certain colleges in Free China as an action "which would contribute substantially toward maintaining China's educational front during the war." This too was a conclusion based on a realistic understanding of the depressed economic conditions and widespread ill health of the teachers and students who had made the long trek westward with their refugee universities. Many teachers were, as a result, abandoning their professions for other employment. But the scope of the problem was enormous. Dr. Tsiang T'ing-fu, then Chief of the Political Affairs Department of the Executive Yuan, was reported to have commented to an Embassy officer "the number of persons to be aided is virtually equivalent to the number of persons comprising the faculties." [13] Though there was a relief aspect to the assistance eventually given by CU to promising Chinese students stranded in America without funds to continue their educations, direct relief to faculties in China was too huge and amorphous a problem, too impossible to administer equably, and too far outside the purposes for which the program was established to be taken up by CU despite the Ambassador's recommendation.

Though the Embassy had shown no enthusiasm for American technical experts because of the difficult conditions in Free China, the Chinese Government responded more positively. By the end of March the Embassy radioed a list of 10 scientific and technical experts desired by various ministries.[14] The search for properly qualified individuals willing to undertake these assignments received top priority in the months to come. It will be the subject of a later chapter.

Responsibility for organizing the search was handed to a new member, added to the staff in February 1942. This was Haldore Hanson, a young graduate of Carleton College who had gone to China as an exchange student sent under a well-established Carleton-China program. After the Sino-Japanese war broke out he had traveled widely as a journalist reporting on developments in China for the Associated Press. His book, *Humane Endeavor*,[15] the outcome of his five years' experience, was a personal account of the first two years of the Japanese invasion.

Hanson was an invaluable addition to the CU China program. He brought not only his firsthand knowledge of China and China-at-war but also what appeared to be innate skill at drawing up budgets and, equally important, defending them before the Bureau of the Budget. His honest, straightforward, and informed manner won the confidence of higher officers in the Department and in other

Government departments with whom he had to deal in seeking specialists to go to China. With the specialists themselves, he was congenial, and authoritative both about the intricacies of Government red tape and about the tasks ahead of them so far as they could be foreseen from Washington.

Hanson's skills were the more appreciated and, in fact, were discovered to be vital to the successful development of the program when Grummon's worsening physical condition forced him to withdraw from active participation in May though his retirement was not official until September.

The China section of CU was without a head throughout the summer of 1942. Hanson and I as the sole officers were extremely busy with the continuance of all the projects that Grummon in his enthusiasm had generated. It was not until the end of September that a new chief was installed and the staff enlarged to cope with the business at hand.

Willys R. Peck, already mentioned as one of the principal proponents of the CU China program, had just returned on the repatriation ship, SS *Gripsholm*, from his diplomatic post as Minister to Thailand. To move, at the end of a 35-year career in diplomacy, from presiding over the U.S. Legation in Bangkok to being an Assistant Chief of Division in the Department was a decline in rank that could best be described as a plummet. Furthermore, the section with which he was charged consisted at the time of only Hanson and me, two young people some 30 years younger than he, who were totally inexperienced in the diplomatic skills of which he was a lifetime practitioner.

I never knew, but I suspect that Peck asked for the assignment. He obviously enjoyed it enormously from the first. He enjoyed his role as teacher; he devoted much care to teaching us to draft clearly and succinctly. The "great region of art, letters, science and imagination" was his homeland and he relished the daily association with others in the Division and elsewhere who felt as he did. He joined wholeheartedly in the enthusiasm and idealism that was the spirit of that time and place.

A gentle, kindly, and quietly humorous master, Peck presided over the activities of the CU China program from September 1942 to December 1945. He was China-born and loved China and the Chinese among whom he had spent his life. Chinese was his second language. He spoke and read it with ease after his years as Chinese Secretary of the American Legation in Peking. Among the inner circle of his friends he was famous as a monologist doing witty

Chinese impersonations of his own invention. Even in the office, certain mannerisms betokened his Chinese background. As he sat at his desk, a handsome gray-haired, gray-mustached diplomat courteously concentrating on the concerns of a visitor, he would idly roll two balls of jade around in the palm of his left hand according to the traditional Chinese practice to maintain flexibility for writing beautifully with a brush.

Peck's first major contribution to the China section was the expansion of the staff. Roger S. Greene, retired Vice President of the Rockefeller Foundation in the Far East with many years experience in China administering private cultural exchanges, especially as Director of the Peking Union Medical College, was reappointed on a continuing basis as a consultant to the program. He had been one of the original proponents of the establishment of the program and had lent his expertise in the spring of 1942 to studying and advising on CU's most effective means of supplementing U.S. private medical aid to China. Although he came and went from his home in Worcester, Massachusetts, the role he played as adviser over the next three years cannot be overemphasized. He contributed mature wisdom as well as seemingly endless concrete knowledge based not only on his own personal experience in the Rockefeller Foundation's major cultural activities in China, but also on his long-term service as an American member of the board of the China Foundation established by the Chinese to dispense the Boxer Indemnity Funds remitted by the U.S. Government. His acquaintance with China's cultural leaders was wide, and his understanding of the motives and pressures that governed their actions and the blocks that hindered them was deep. In short, he was invaluable to the development of the program.

To handle the project of aid to Chinese students studying in the United States who were cut off from their sources of support, a young man who had been volunteering his services informally during the summer was added to the staff. This was William Dennis, a former resident of Shanghai, who threw himself wholeheartedly into his job.

Two members of the Foreign Service who had returned on the SS *Gripsholm* with Peck were assigned to the China section for temporary duty of an administrative nature: Paul W. Meyer, most recently U.S. Consul at Tsingtao after 18 years' experience in China, and Fong Chuck, a Chinese-American with 15 years as a Foreign Service clerk in various parts of the Far East. When to these were added appropriate secretarial help, the China section was at last adequately staffed for handling the programs initiated by Grummon in early months of the same year, 1942.

Notes

CHAPTER ONE

1. Greene to Cherrington, Mar. 29, 1939, enclosed in Greene to S. E. Grummon, Mar. 8, 1942. NA, RG 59, WHB, Box 53, Folder: RC-China #1.
2. Outline of Development of China Program, Cultural Relations Division, to Jan. 29, 1942, *ibid.*
3. Memorandum of Conversation, Sept. 22, 1941, between officers of RC and Dr. Hu Shih, *ibid.*
4. Allocation No. 42–61, NA, WHB, Box 55, Folder: Personnel Needs.
5. Memorandum: "Promotion of Chinese American Cultural Relations," Nov. 3, 1941, *ibid.*
6. Memorandum: Appendix I, Nov. 3, 1941, presented to the General Advisory Committee of CU on Nov. 5, 1941, *ibid.*
7. "Minutes of Meeting of General Advisory Committee," Nov. 5–6, 1941, pp. 8–13, NA, RG 353, SCC, Box 29.
8. Memorandum by S. E. Grummon, Dec. 10, 1941, attached to Dec. 13, 1941 memorandum to FE, PA/H and Currie, NA, RG 59, WHB, Box 53, Folder: RC-China #1.
9. Secstate to Amemb, Chungking, Tel. 55, Jan. 29, 1942, NA, RG 84, 842.
10. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Tel. 113, Feb. 12, 1942, *ibid.*
11. Secstate to Amemb, Chungking, Tel. 55, *op. cit.*
12. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Tel. 113, *op. cit.*
13. Memorandum for the Ambassador, Mar. 4, 1942; Enclosure No. 1 in Desp. 344, Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Mar. 31, 1942, NA, RG 84, 842.
14. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Tel. 280, Mar. 27, 1942, *ibid.*
15. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1939.

CHAPTER TWO

Washington and Chungking, 1942

THE development of the CU China program over the next several years was based on decisions and actions taken in the two capitals, Washington and Chungking. The operations themselves reached into the hinterlands of both countries, and will be the subject of the chapters to follow, but before detailing them it is necessary to examine, however briefly, the social and psychological attributes of the two cities since these conditioned every subsequent move.*

Washington, in mid-1942 under the leadership of President Roosevelt, was the power center of the Allied Nations. Even before Pearl Harbor it had been the headquarters of "the arsenal of democracy"; thereafter, it was catapulted into high-pressure military and diplomatic action. Most important, of course, it was the center for deployment of the American Armed Forces which, though they were experiencing heavy fighting and serious setbacks in their early battles against Axis enemies, both east and west, had a supreme confidence in eventual victory.

The romanticization of warfare, the concept of glory in risking one's life for one's country, had come to an end in the bloody massacres of trench warfare on the Western Front in World War I. But the Pearl Harbor attack aroused the American people to another kind of patriotism. Detesting warfare, reluctant to become involved, they finally recognized that totalitarian armed force could not be kept from our shores by lend-lease and other steps short of war. From December 7, 1941, we were a nation united in dedication to defeating the Axis. Beyond the draft, men and women in large numbers volunteered for the armed services, for war production, and other war-related activities. Rationing of consumer goods in short supply was

*This chapter is based on my personal experiences in the two cities during World War II in addition to my conversations and interviews with many Chinese and Americans who were in Chungking or elsewhere in China between 1937 and 1945.

accepted by the entire population as a measure for sharing the burden equally and fairly. President Roosevelt was skillful in his use of frequent radio talks to explain these wartime measures to the American public, person to person. On radio, too, if on a different level of discourse, the old-fashioned eloquence of Winston Churchill thrilled Americans with his defiance of the Nazi menace. In Washington where leaders from all parts of the nation were gathered, in uniform and out, to cooperate in the war effort, morale was high in mid-1942.

But it should not be forgotten that the American people lived protected by two vast oceans from the bombing of civilian populations which was the everyday experience of her wartime allies in Europe and Asia. It was inevitable that there should be gaps in our comprehension of what those peoples were enduring. We could hearten them by supplying war materiel and coming to fight side-by-side against the common enemy but, sheltered and privileged as we were, we had great difficulty in assessing the wartime strains which required assistance of another and more subtle order. Our cultural relations efforts to provide extra-military aid in World War II had necessarily to be of this order.

The CU China Section was made up of individuals whose experience of living in China varied in kind, length of time, and depth of insight. Yet the small group was knit together by a shared enthusiasm for the Chinese people and an idealistic belief that, in a world torn by the destruction and agony of war, we were involved in a task that was fundamentally constructive. This enthusiasm and idealism characterized not only the China Section but the whole Division of Cultural Relations and made it an exciting place to work.

Yet, looking back at that period, the gap between the strenuous efforts and good intentions of the CU China program administrators in Washington and the circumstances, material, psychological and, above all, political, of the recipients in Free China seems enormous. It was, in fact, so wide and complex that it can best be demonstrated instance by instance in the subsequent chapters as it affected specific programs. Meanwhile, however, a brief look at the wartime Chinese capital where the American Embassy was the center of our "field" operations will provide some inkling of the problems which lay ahead.

Chungking, the refugee capital of Free China in the far west, was not only on the opposite side of the globe, but also opposite in nearly every other way from Washington. A remote up-country river port on a steep-sided peninsula which jutted between the Yangtze River and its tributary, the Chialing, it had been the official wartime seat of the Chinese Government ever since late 1937. Heavy intermittent bombing by the Japanese air force had reduced much of it to rubble,

and the hasty rebuilding for emergency use had created a city where the new ramshackle office buildings and residences thrown up amid the ruins were not far superior to the mud-and-wattle slums clinging to the cliffsides. The extremes of climate added to the misery. Rain, penetrating chill, and slithery mud characterized the cold months. The summer heat and dampness were more ruthless than Washington's because there was no defense against them. Even water for washing was scarce and, for many households, it had to be carried up from the muddy rivers hundreds of steps below.

The people of Chungking and its scattered village suburbs, like the rest of the Chinese population, were showing the strain of having been at war for the past five years. The patriotic fervor which had marked the early furious and heroic military resistance to the Japanese incursion in the east had sunk to a passivity appropriate to long-term endurance of the military stalemate. This endurance involved new routines of working and living from day to day. It required learning to live with the Japanese bombings by taking refuge routinely on signal in the cave shelters dug in the cliff faces of the city. It also involved learning to live with the Szechwanese, or, from the other point of view, the Szechwanese learning to live with the "downriver people" who had "invaded" their territory.

The (literal) provinciality of China up to recent years was nowhere more evident than in the hostility between the Szechwanese (as well as the Yunnanese and peoples of other western provinces) and their fellow countrymen from the east coast cities who had come as wartime refugees 1,500 miles to the west. The Szechwan basin was rich, well-irrigated agricultural land dominated by conservative landlords. Its productivity could feed the sudden increase in population and its mountain walls abutting the narrow Yangtze gorges of its river gateway served as a functioning Maginot Line to keep out the Japanese Armies. The Central Government rightly regarded it as the ideal long-term refuge, proclaimed it the capital in 1937, and completed its withdrawal there in October 1938 when the Japanese advanced up the Yangtze to threaten the temporary seat of government at Hankow. Through the first year of the invasion, government bureaus, institutes, and universities had been moved from Nanking and other eastern cities to Szechwan or the neighboring provinces, Yunnan, Kweichow, and Shensi, beyond the reach of the Japanese. At the same time, a great flood of ordinary citizens moved westward as best they could by bus, rail, boat, or on foot to the western sanctuary or the guerrilla areas in the northwest. Industrialists from Shanghai and the inland river ports had been encouraged to dismantle their factories and take the machinery by boat up the Yangtze to Szechwan. Still, despite heroic efforts, the mass influx

from downriver managed to bring proportionately little in the way of goods or capital to the west.

It is understandable that the Szechwanese, remote from the realities of the Japanese Army invasion, quickly developed a resentment against these "foreigners" who spoke unfamiliar dialects, who arrived empty-handed to disrupt the tenor of their lives, and yet had the effrontery to regard them as country yokels.

The refugees from downriver, on the other hand, were driven to righteous indignation against such local attitudes by the fact that they had come to these parts as refugees from a cruel invasion and as patriotic supporters of their government. Refusing to collaborate with the hated and despised Japanese invaders, they had sacrificed much in the way of material possessions, status, and participation in the modern world to make the 1,500-mile westward trek into an agriculturally rich but industrially backward hinterland. There they arrived in various states of physical and emotional as well as economic exhaustion. Homesickness was endemic. As the years of warfare stretched onward to a seemingly endless total of eight, this nostalgia was to transform itself into a delusion that the return home would mark the end of all the miseries and life would resume unchanged from its remembered way.

This concentration on dreams of a better postwar life was, psychologically, a natural accompaniment of passive endurance. It affected not only the individual refugees, but, more significantly, the Central Government itself. Under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, the latter was sheltering behind its mountain wall in a carefully balanced stalemate with the provincial warlords and landlord-gentry to the west and south, the Japanese Armies to the east, and, the ultimate enemy, the Communists, to the north. It was prepared, after the United States entered the war, to sit tight awaiting the American defeat of Japan, and, as General Stilwell learned to his sorrow, to hoard soldiers and materials for use in the projected postwar defeat of Mao Tse-tung's armies.

Hoarding appears to be a universal human response to insecure situations. In Washington, housewives bought sugar up to the limits of pooled rations and hoarded what they did not eat. In west China, where so many material objects were in short supply, hoarding of *things* was almost universal; but the hoarding of *intellectuals* by the Chinese Government was a striking contrast between Chungking and Washington in 1942. The American war machine required advanced technological know-how for its operation, and in the United States the regular armed services' technical specialists were soon augumented by large numbers of educated draftees and volunteers. Intellectuals, particularly aware of the menace of nazism to

American democracy, eagerly offered whatever special talents they had to the national war effort. In China, too, the intellectuals were best equipped to understand Japan's imperial ambitions and their threat to Chinese sovereignty. But the shortage of goods in China, serious though it was, could hardly be compared with the shortage of educated individuals in the population. They were estimated not to exceed 20 percent of the total population at that time.

The Chinese Government was well aware that persons with education and advanced technical skills were a vital resource for the management of the postwar renaissance which shimmered in the unknown future. That scholars should not be soldiers but should be preserved as a class for continuing control of the state was a Chinese policy hallowed by centuries of tradition. Therefore students and scholars in Government universities were, with few exceptions, confined to their institutions while the actual fighting against the Japanese was left to unlettered farmboys and the urban proletariat, too often conscripted into the army by force. These were the ones who were killed, wounded, and separated from families with whom they had no way of maintaining contact.

Meanwhile the intellectuals who were being protected from loss of life and hoarded for future use were far from contented. Like other refugees they had suffered uprooting and associated deprivations. Yet the many among them who understood and deplored the national crisis better even than their leaders were enjoined to continue their research, teaching, and studying as though nothing had changed. Living as they were, researchers, teachers, and students alike, under Government control and dependent on Government funds for a bare existence, they had no option but to obey. Inevitably true patriots, denied a meaningful role in the war effort, experienced mounting frustration, guilt, and anger.

The mass mobilization of Americans in World War II whether in the armed services abroad or in arms production and other war-supportive civilian activities at home provided a catharsis, a vent for pent-up feelings of outrage, hostility, and fear toward the threatened world domination of Hitlerism.

The Chinese suffered similar feelings, though deeper, because of the terror and humiliation of the Japanese invasion of their homeland. But for refugees in the Nationalist areas there was no such catharsis. The stalemate which continued year after year was emotionally dulling and draining. Inflation reduced the entire population to various levels of poverty. Ill health was widespread among both the armed forces and civilians. The Americans who were expected to come as rescuers settled on a Europe-first military strategy and sent only token forces to China. They did, however, make huge

loans to Chiang and printed Chinese paper currency for him by the ton, all of which exacerbated the inflation. In the end China was outflanked; the defeat of Japan was achieved via the Pacific. The Japanese forces in China, still holding the eastern cities and lines of communication, surrendered *in situ*.

This brief account can make no pretense of covering the complex military events in China. But the reader is already aware that the anti-Japanese warfare from 1937 to 1945 and the civil war from 1946 to 1949 decimated whatever peaceful construction had been or could have been undertaken by Chiang and the National Government. As the Kuomintang finally lost the confidence and support of the Chinese population, the success of the anti-Kuomintang revolution was assured. Here we can attempt merely to suggest the wartime setting and emotional strains which affected the Chinese students, teachers, researchers, writers, artists, scientists, and professional men and women who were reached by the Department's program of cultural relations in those years. The related political situation, however, was so basic a component of that strain that it cannot be dismissed in the same manner.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Chairman Mao Tse-tung were leaders of two rival party dictatorships, the Kuomintang and the Communist respectively, both based on a Leninist-type organization. Communists as individuals had, in 1923, been permitted by Sun Yat-sen to join the Kuomintang and so cooperate in a United Front. But by 1927 this arrangement had eventuated in a coup by Chiang Kai-shek with the Kuomintang coming to power in the modern urban centers and the Communists taking refuge in the inland hills of Kiangsi. The future of Mao's small band of followers and even their survival appeared questionable in the succeeding years of unequal struggle with Chiang's Nationalist troops.

After a series of campaigns, Chiang drove the rebels out of their Kiangsi mountain fastness and harassed them throughout their famous Long March of 6,000 miles to the far west and north which ended when the Communist remnants reached a remote and primitive area in Shensi province in the northwest in 1936. Chiang, still wary, sealed off access to the Communists by stationing troops in Sian, the Shensi provincial capital. Meanwhile the Japanese military had not only taken over Manchuria in the northeast but were moving openly step by step southward into control of north China within the Great Wall. The articulate population was infuriated that Chiang chose to ignore the Japanese aggression to fight an internal enemy. This sense of outrage led to the famous kidnapping of Chiang at Sian in December 1936 and resulted in his agreeing to a second United Front—against Japan—in an uneasy truce with Mao.

The truce lasted through the years of World War II despite bloody "incidents." During most of this period, Chiang, taking no chances, maintained crack troops in a barricade to isolate Mao and his followers in the barren hills of north Shensi. But Mao built up his base at Yenan and waged guerrilla warfare against the Japanese in the occupied areas to the east. He developed not only the military tactics which would eventually win the civil war against Chiang but also the social and political relationships with the peasantry which won him the support of the people. Mao decisively defeated Chiang in 1949 and settled as the supreme leader in Peking which he proclaimed to be once again the national capital. Chiang and his followers withdrew to Taiwan.

For the first year or two after the outbreak of war with Japan in July 1937, Chiang Kai-shek had been idolized as the national leader of the entire population in resistance against the hated Japanese aggressors. But as a Chinese ruler with a traditional image of his role, Chiang could not tolerate a modern Western type of "loyal opposition." He believed in national unity and strength but not in the revolutionary social changes advocated by the Chinese Communist Party. He correctly saw the Communists as rivals for power and anticipated the renewal of the civil war once the Japanese were defeated, even though the United Front agreement was evidenced by the presence in Chungking of Chou En-lai and a small staff as official liaison between the two armies. He found liberal thought or expression threatening. Firm suppression, not adjustment to popular demands, was his countermeasure.

Chiang's style limited the lieutenants he could trust. Personal loyalty was the criterion; loyalty through two generations was preferable. Because they qualified in this respect, the Ch'en brothers, who headed the reactionary group of officials dubbed the "C–C (i.e., Ch'en-Ch'en) Clique," were given important responsibilities. The younger brother, Ch'en Li-fu, was made Minister of Education. Under his aegis, the number of schools and universities was expanded during World War II far beyond the availability of qualified teaching staff or equipment. Consequently, standards were drastically reduced. At the same time his controls over the educated youth in these Government institutions spread even wider and, with cooperation between informers and the ever-present secret police, exceptional, critical, or otherwise suspicious behavior among the students was punished by imprisonment or unexplained disappearance. With these means and a reputation for using them, Ch'en Li-fu was able to intimidate the academic world on behalf of Chiang. Only in a few locales, such as Kunming where a provincial warlord disputed Chiang's rule and the presence of an American air base further con-

fused the situation, was there a measure of freedom of thought and expression.

Thought control was a misery for those intellectuals who had received a liberal education at home or abroad and especially for those who were engaged as teachers in trying to pass it on to another generation. But, to be sure, these were a minority. For the majority the ever-mounting inflation, the deepening poverty, and the recurrent illnesses were the causes of universal suffering.

As the economic situation worsened throughout the war and finally fell apart in the last days of the Kuomintang regime, morale was utterly shattered and it was every man for himself. Official corruption began early and lasted to the end because officials had the inside information and the power to make deals on their own behalf. In general, the bigger the official, the more repacious the deal. With the collapse of public morality, underhand maneuvering by the common man for private gain to support his family in the critical situation assumed a morality of its own. By 1948, it is safe to say, most of the urban population, overwhelmed by the inflation, were forced to live by their wits.

In these circumstances and this setting, the American presence in Chungking was a constantly increasing factor in the political scene throughout the war years. But in the early 1940's the American Embassy was hardly more than an expansion of the prewar Chungking Consulate, situated on the south bank of the Yangtze River in a "suburban" enclave of foreign diplomats and businessmen. The American Ambassador was Clarence Gauss. His long career in the U.S. Consular Service had culminated in his previous assignment as Consul General in Shanghai. A conscientious and skeptical man, he did not have the special training and experience of the China language officers, many of whom were to serve under him. He and his small staff lived together in the Embassy in the early years after the move upriver. There they were safe from the Japanese bombs which they could see being dropped on the steep peninsula of Chungking across the water, sprouting fires and billowing smoke. Their lives, though not in danger, were far from easy. The transaction of business with the Chinese Government required a long and tedious journey down to the water's edge, across the swift-running river by ferry, a steep climb up the steps in the cliffside of the Chungking peninsula and a final lap on foot, or whatever other means of transportation were available, to the Ministry in question, where the official sought might or might not be on hand. Firsthand gathering of intelligence beyond the narrow contact with opposite numbers in the Foreign Office required extra energy as well as knowledge of the Chinese language, preferably including Szechwanese dialect. The Embassy

was fortunate in having for various periods in the early years of the war such able political officers as John Carter Vincent, O. Edmund Clubb, John S. Service, and Philip D. Sprouse. All were China language officers, trained for and preoccupied with political reporting. Yet the extra burden of handling details of the CU program devolved on each at different times because the Ambassador delayed more than two years, until March of 1944, assigning a member of his staff to the job on a full-time basis.

This delay was regrettable. The CU China program was initiated just as U.S. involvement in the war suddenly increased the pressures on the understaffed and overworked Chungking Embassy. The influx from Washington of military brass, representatives of wartime agencies and visiting emissaries or delegations, all needing housing, food, and attention, exacerbated an already strained situation. Development and supervision of the newly established cultural relations program demanded concentrated time and effort, neither of which the highly qualified China language officers could spare. There was an entire stratum of the Chungking community on which the CU program must depend—teachers, scientists, artists, writers, and members of other professions—whose lives were for the most part outside the circles of normal diplomatic contact yet whose acquaintance had to be cultivated.

Some of the shortcomings or outright mistakes of the CU program in China in its first years must be attributed to the fact that the enthusiastic activity at the Washington end was not matched in the Chungking Embassy by an energetic and single-minded Cultural Attaché charged with tending the Point of Contact where the program took effect.

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CHAPTER THREE

Cooperation With Private Cultural Agencies

It would be misleading to give the reader the impression that the CU China program was purely a matter of governmental administrative actions at the two ends of the Department-Embassy line of communications. True, it was along this line that suggestions and decisions were relayed to the two staffs who were principals in this Government program. But many other organizations, both private and public, were our associates in the undertaking.

I have already mentioned the private American cultural organizations which had in the first years of CU become mainstays of its program with the other American republics.

Undoubtedly the most active of these was the Institute of International Education with headquarters in New York. It had had two decades of experience in administering student exchanges between the United States and Europe. In 1941, at the request of the Department it had assumed the responsibility for administering the newly established program of U.S. Government travel grants to enable students from the other American republics to study in the United States. This involved not merely disbursing funds allotted by the Department but also handling such details as screening candidates already examined in their home countries, negotiating their placement in American universities, and, thereafter, counseling both the students themselves and the foreign student advisers at their institutions.[1]

The American Library Association (ALA) was another important private organization which cooperated very actively and effectively with the Department in international cultural affairs. In the early years, under Government contract, it had staffed and maintained three American libraries—in Mexico City, Managua, and Montevideo—and also selected, purchased, and shipped U.S. books and journals to Latin American libraries. In the first year alone, these went to between 400 and 500 university, school, public, and special libraries. The ALA's expertise proved to be a priceless resource for

CU. It was exercised in listing books for general or specialized readers, in purchasing and shipping publications, and, where feasible, in assuring that recipients knew how to sort, catalog, and care for them, not to mention, most important of all, to see that they were put to use.[2]

A third private organization long active in the field of international cultural relations which worked very closely with CU was the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS). Its headquarters were in Washington only a few blocks from the Department, and its Director, Waldo G. Leland, was a close counselor of CU from the beginning. CU depended on the ACLS not only for advice but also, from time to time, for administrative assistance. As one example, it handled Government funds under contract to support and supervise binational cultural centers in the other American republics. Such centers had been privately established before the war in eight cities as places for social gatherings of Americans and nationals and especially for studying English and the local language. Beginning in a small way with these limited purposes, the American cultural centers gradually became repositories for libraries of American books, and the appropriate locales for lectures, concerts, movies, and art exhibits sponsored by American public or private agencies. With these expanded functions and U.S. Government funding, they proliferated rapidly throughout Latin America until by the end of 1945 there were 27 independent centers and 20 branch programs.[3]

Federal funds had been transferred by the Department under contract to another important private cultural agency situated in Washington, the American Council on Education, to administer a program of assistance to American schools in the other American republics which had been established by U.S. groups in cooperation with local community leaders.[4]

In short, the Department had delegated to these four experienced private agencies the administration of four types of cultural relations programs: bringing students to the United States and, in Latin America, operating libraries, supervising cultural centers, and aiding American schools. Each agency had a functional expertise and an interest in international activity which were put to use in Latin America but could, theoretically at least, be applied to any society. All four were destined to be involved in one way or another with the China program. But general functional expertise aside, there were at hand in America clusters of specialized China knowledge and experience to which the Department could turn.

The many decades of close relationships between the United States and China had developed numerous and varied private groups deeply concerned with the welfare of the Chinese people. The Chris-

tian missionaries had been involved for the longest period, over one hundred years, and had been instrumental not only in introducing to China Western medicine, science, and education but also in informing the American public about China. Through the churches they built a widespread interest in and emotional support for China in this country. Numerous private organizations were formed here to harness this interest for various causes ranging from charitable aid for the Chinese people to promotion of scholarly study of the Chinese language and civilization. It was clear to Grummon, formulating the CU China program, and to other CU officers that the China expertise of these groups should be tapped and that CU must aim to collaborate with and complement whatever the private agencies were doing in 1942 to help China.

It was to locate these organizations and discover what they were currently doing for China, especially though not exclusively in the field of cultural relations, that the survey mentioned in Chapter One was undertaken by the ACLS in November 1941 at the behest of the Department. It was my good fortune to be selected by Mortimer Graves of the ACLS to make this survey under his supervision. I had lived in Peking and traveled widely in China from mid-1932 through 1935, spoke and read some Chinese, had published researches on Chinese art and had a rather wide acquaintance with Americans associated either organizationally or individually with China and also with Chinese scholars in the Peking universities where my husband had taught. All these experiences were valuable to me when I was later hired by the State Department in January 1942 to assist in the then newly inaugurated CU China program. The up-to-date information I had gathered in the preceding weeks on *Organizations in America Concerned with China*, as the published survey was eventually entitled, proved useful not only to me and my fellow officers in the Department but also to the organizations themselves and to others who needed to reach them.[5]

The presence of Roger Greene as consultant to the CU China Section afforded easy access to these private organizations. He was a true elder statesman of the unofficial cultural relations between the United States and China which had been built up over the previous century. A reserved New Englander, he combined rock-bound integrity with a wry sense of humor. Through his years as Director of the Peking Union Medical College, he had a wide acquaintance in both Chinese and American medical circles. He was responsible for organizing a conference with private agencies at the Department in the spring of 1942 to discover CU's most effective means of supplementing U.S. private medical aid to China. Doctors with China experience and representatives of the American Bureau for Medical

Aid to China, the organization which then dominated the field, attended as well as others with related interests. The conference was not only useful to the Department but made an occasion for the medical groups and individuals themselves to examine their priorities and discover duplications or gaps in their activities.

Dr. Ruth Guy who had been a pediatrician on the staff of the Peking Union Medical College for a number of years when Greene was heading it worked for several years during the war in the CU China Section. She was an extremely careful and competent scientist who eventually took over full responsibility for the American specialists sent to China in the latter stages of the program.

It was characteristic of the temporary personnel taken on during wartime in such Government agencies as the Department of State that, unlike career bureaucrats, they brought close private connections with them. This was very true of the CU China staff and was a great strength. Greene's wide Chinese cultural contacts, Greene's and Guy's medical acquaintances and know-how, Hanson's friends among journalists and prewar young American exchange students in China, my and my husband's associations with academic circles in America and China, and my recent exposure to a wide spectrum of American organizations aiding China were all germane to the accomplishment of CU's purposes.

The development of the program naturally involved us in close working relationships with various private agencies, some of which have already been mentioned. The China Institute in America, in New York, was one of the most important of these. Founded in 1926, its principal support came from the China Foundation and Tsinghua University for which it aided and oversaw Chinese students pursuing graduate studies in the United States. Its very able and well-informed Director, Chih Meng,* had been dealing with Chinese students' problems for more than 15 years when America's entry into World War II cut off those who were studying in U.S. institutions from further support from home. The subsequent collaboration between the Department and the China Institute to deal with this crisis is described in Chapter Seven. But here it is appropriate to note that Meng's wide knowledge of Chinese education and of its leading figures was an important resource to the CU China staff, and the hospitality offered by the Institute in New York to the Chinese professors and others brought to the United States by the CU program was much appreciated.

The direct American influence in Chinese higher education was principally channeled through 13 Christian colleges founded by

*Dr. Meng, living in the United States, followed the American custom of placing the surname last.

various Protestant mission boards and widely scattered through the provinces of China. Yenching University in Peking was generally conceded to have the highest standards, but Nanking University, Ginling Women's College also located in Nanking, and Lingnan University in Canton among others were very well considered. During the war many of the east coast Christian colleges refugeed on the campus of the formerly remote West China Union University in Chengtu, Szechwan, to which frequent references will be made.

The home office and fund-raising organization for these institutions was the United Board for Christian Colleges in China in New York. They also received support along specific lines from the Harvard-Yenching Institute in Cambridge, Massachusetts. CU kept in touch with both organizations. The colleges were granted Fulbright funds for Chinese student scholarships near the end of the period covered in this book, and in the first years of the CU China program they were visited for longer or shorter periods by many of the American specialists who were sent to China. Many Christian educators were helpful to CU personnel in west China during the war. If one may select one faculty member for special notice, M. Searle Bates, Professor of History at Nanking University, was a font of wisdom and judicious advice.

In addition to these (and other) long-established organizations deeply concerned with China, there were many individuals and groups who banded together to form new organizations to support the Chinese in their struggle against Japan several years before the United States entered the war. United China Relief (UCR) was probably the largest of these and raised the most money from the American public, but it worked very closely with other more specialized aid groups. It had eight participating agencies of varying political tinges through which aid was funneled to China.

Among these, the American Bureau for Medical Aid to China (ABMAC) has already been mentioned. It was very active, sending supplies, equipment, instruments, and books as well as American personnel and funds to Dr. Robert Lim and the Medical Relief Corps of the Chinese Red Cross and to the Chinese Government's National Health Administration. CU was constantly in close touch with its operations and, on a much smaller scale, attempted to supplement its activities. Another of the UCR participating agencies was Indusco which raised money for and sent supplies to the Chinese industrial cooperatives. These had been founded by Edgar Snow and his wife, Helen (pen name Nym Wales), and the well-known New Zealand engineer, Rewi Alley, to spread training for and establishment of decentralized small industries through poverty-stricken rural areas of Free China, particularly in the northwest. The China Aid Council was still another of the UCR participating agencies. It described

itself as "the only organization in the U.S. which has as its sole responsibility that of sending medical aid to the guerrilla hospitals," namely the four International Peace Hospitals in the Communist areas. It also sent baby foods, medicines, vitamins, and other supplies for the relief of war orphans. The remaining participating agencies were made up of church-associated groups which had been raising and distributing funds for China relief long before the outbreak of war with Japan.

United China Relief raised $7 million in its 1942 campaign; it had raised funds on a similar scale before and continued to do so throughout the war period. The CU China budgets of $500,000 for 1942 and $700,000 for fiscal year 1943 were therefore minuscule in comparison with the operations of UCR and its participants. Nevertheless, situations kept arising where cooperation could be very helpful to both sides; keeping in touch followed naturally.

As far as transportation of goods into Free China was concerned, these private agencies faced the same almost insurmountable difficulties that CU did throughout the greater part of the war period. CU, of course, had access to the diplomatic pouch for mail and small, lightweight items while the private organizations sent in a certain amount of material in the personal luggage of their traveling personnel or at high rates via the unpredictable Chinese airline, CNAC. But when at last in 1944 CU was fortunate enough to be allotted the empty cargo space on several airplanes carrying special Government envoys to China, there was no question in the CU China Section that we would take steps to share this space with the private agencies whose aims were so parallel to ours. We had been able to help them in various other ways, as they had helped us, but this was undoubtedly the most effective in providing immediate material aid to their programs in China.

Each of the private groups mentioned above had personnel at the China end, often committees made up of Chinese and resident American members, who disbursed the funds and equipment sent out from America and reported on further needs and other developments. Dwight Edwards, a missionary with long experience in China, performed this function for United China Relief. He presided over its headquarters in Chungking with the title of Program Director in China. The mutual interest of CU and UCR in cooperating was signalized in Chungking by his including the Embassy Cultural Attaché on his Board. It was an interesting vantage point from which to view the complexities of aiding China in this difficult period.

One of the constant problems was that the Chinese Government had fixed an official rate of exchange between Chinese currency and U.S. dollars which was unfavorable to the U.S. dollar to begin with and never changed in time to keep pace with the inflation. From the

point of view of the fund raisers this amounted to an oppressive tax by the Chinese Government on contributions donated for the welfare of its citizens.

Some indication of the progress of the inflation may be seen in the development of the "open market" exchange rate between Chinese and American dollars. In 1942 the official rate of exchange was CN$20 to US$1 but the open rate soon reached CN$300 to US$1. In 1945 it reached CN$2,000 to US$1. By January 1947 the rate had risen to CN$8,000 to US$1 and within the calendar year 1947 the "open market" rate soared to over CN$160,000 to US$1.

As for the organizations in China with which CU worked, none with the exception of the Christian universities could be properly considered private in a country where Government pervaded every sphere and there was no alternative to Government funding for the support of educational and cultural enterprises. The Ministry of Education headed by Ch'en Li-fu used this financial power, as already mentioned, to control the multitude of students and teachers it supported and to coerce them for reactionary political ends. Fortunately, the diversity of the CU China program involved us with not one but many Chinese ministries. At the same time, probably due to the special position of the American Government in relation to China at the time, CU representatives were never rigidly limited to dealing only with Chinese Government ministries or following only one path through the bureaucratic chain of command to reach the Chinese groups with which we wished to cooperate.

Our closest contacts in China were with the Chinese academic establishment, beginning with the China Foundation, which had been founded to disburse the Boxer Indemnity Funds remitted by the U.S. Government and had had years of experience in developing Chinese institutions and individuals during which it conscientiously followed the highest standards. Dr. H. C. Zen was its Executive Secretary in 1942. The most distinguished academic body was the National Academy, known as Academia Sinica, made up of China's leading research scholars grouped in institutes representing various fields. Dr. Sah Pen-tung was named Director-General on his return to China from a year in the United States as CU visiting professor from the University of Amoy. CU worked very closely with him and members of the Academy throughout the period of our operations in China. The Government-supported universities, both refugee and local, and the American missionary-founded and -supported universities were natural recipients of such aid as we could offer as well as sources of percipient advice. A cultural leader on whom the CU program came to depend was Dr. T. L. Yuan (Yuan T'ung-li), Director of the National Library of Peiping (Peking).

He had been intimately acquainted through his lifetime with the work of China's leading creative individuals, and combined tireless energy and pertinacity with this wide knowledge and the requisite political insights. It was a powerful combination and we were very fortunate to be able to turn to him for help and advice on numerous occasions.

The emphasis on higher and professional education in the organizations mentioned above (as well as others too numerous to list) with which we dealt stems from the fact that foreign contact with Chinese education had for various reasons been largely at this level. Here the scientist, technician, or other specialist was dependent on contact with the ideas and techniques of the West. He commonly knew a foreign language, usually English, because he had to use it in his studies and researches; he was therefore a channel for contact with foreign individuals and publications. We assumed also that whatever aid could be applied to Chinese higher education would have a maximum effect on other parts of the society. By transmitting knowledge to or helping develop skills and insights in selected Chinese men and women at this level, we hoped to benefit a far wider segment of the population through their influence. To be sure, certain programs such as the CU educational films dubbed in Chinese and the film strips provided by the Office of War Information (OWI) were aimed at a wider public, but even these tools of mass education were most useful when wielded and supplemented by Chinese educators.

In view of the many serious, hard-working, and impoverished agencies concerned with educational and cultural matters which cooperated with us generously in our years in Free China, it is embarrassing to recall that CU designated the Chinese-American Institute of Cultural Relations in Chungking to be the recipient of a contribution of $18,000 for the six months of January to June 1943, as well as subsequent sums thereafter. This move was first proposed to the Embassy by CU in an April 1942 telegram from Washington and defended in these words, "Our Government has already extended assistance of this nature to many such groups in Latin America, the highest single grant made to any institution amounting to $20,000."[6] In other words, Grummon, then in charge of the development of the CU China program and busily seeking out ways to encumber the original allocation from the President's Emergency Fund was adopting a precedent from the Latin American experience and suggesting that such an Institute might play the same role in Chungking as it had in certain large cities there.

The Ambassador noted in his reply that "It has existed under the presidency and domination of Dr. H. H. Kung, Minister of Fi-

nance [and brother-in-law of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek], its activities being limited principally to social functions on anniversaries and special occasions which have been indicated as representing the personal hospitality of Kung." He also intimated that party loyalty to the Kuomintang was a requirement for membership. Nevertheless he suggested that a grant of $5,000 toward renting and furnishing suitable reading rooms might encourage "the reorganization of the Institute on a more satisfactory basis." [7] The record does not make clear why it was decided to contribute not $5,000 but $18,000 despite the Ambassador's reservations. For a time this infusion of funds and a further one in the next fiscal year enlivened the Institute's program but always for the greater glory of its politically powerful founder-patron. Its greatest investment and accomplishment was the building and equipment of a hostel with an expensive restaurant attached, for which the only possible clients in the economic chaos of the day would be Americans and Chinese with access to lavish expense accounts. It never performed the services or reached the wider elements of the local community for which the Department had furnished it support. An obvious lesson to be drawn from this is that techniques of cultural cooperation suitable to one society are not necessarily transferable to another, and can be counterproductive if grants of U.S. Government funds are expended by their foreign recipients for unworthy ends.

A more important lesson goes to the heart of the aims the CU program was pursuing in China. Were we bent on winning from the Chinese allegiance to or at least solidarity with America? Or was our primary purpose the larger one of bringing to this isolated and beleaguered people renewed contact with the outside world and providing them with whatever American cultural resources—material, intellectual or spiritual—could meet their pressing needs? Finally, what was our attitude toward the importance to Americans of learning the contributions of China's great civilization?

The grant to the Chinese-American Institute of Cultural Relations was a false step, taken despite the Ambassador's disinclination, in the direction of buying friendship from Kuomintang bigwigs and hangers-on. Other mistakes were inevitably made in the years that the program continued but never so crass or on such a scale. The following chapters, each devoted to an aspect of the program, will show that whatever the successes or failures of the CU China program its aim henceforward was the unequivocal furtherance of mutual cultural exchange without nationalistic or other ulterior motives.

Notes

CHAPTER THREE

1. Helen R. Pinkney, "The Division of Cultural Cooperation," pp. 29–31.
2. Carl H. Milam, "Libraries, Scholars and the War," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 235 (Sept. 1944), p. 103.
3. Waldo G. Leland, "International Intellectual Relations," in *ibid.*, p. 90, and Pinkney, *op. cit.*, pp. 44–45.
4. Pinkney, *op. cit.*, pp. 21–22, and Lewis Allbee, *Education as an Implement of U.S. Foreign Policy: 1938–1948* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Edwards Brothers, Inc., 1948).
5. Wilma Fairbank, *Organizations in America Concerned with China* (Washington, D.C.: American Council of Learned Societies, 1942).
6. Secstate to Amemb, Chungking, Tel. 267, Apr. 9, 1942, NA, RG 84, 842.
7. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Tel. 403, Apr. 14, 1942, *ibid.*

CHAPTER FOUR

Delivering the Written Word in Microfilm and Print

THE Point of Contact, as a phrase, has been introduced to draw the reader's attention to the fact that the history of a cultural exchange program cannot be pegged to airy generalizations. The questions that properly concern us here are what persons or media conveyed what messages to whom, where, and when? What has taken place at the Point of Contact is all-important.

When the CU China program got underway in 1942, the first concrete evidence of it to reach the Point of Contact was the arrival in Chungking of microfilms of current American publications. Those first shipments were, necessarily, mere token gifts to convey to Chinese students and scholars American sympathy for their intellectual isolation and deprivation through the previous five years of the Sino-Japanese conflict.

When Chinese universities and research institutes, driven by the outbreak of war with Japan in July 1937, had moved from the east coast into the hinterland, many had tried to carry along boxes containing their fundamental books and equipment. The rapid Japanese military advances had forced these institutions westward in successive moves from place to place. In the best of circumstances, the safe and efficient transport of such heavy and bulky items as books and laboratory equipment would have been difficult; but these circumstances were among the worst. Overcrowded buses or trucks on primitive roads, overcrowded boats traversing inland waterways or bucking the Yangtze rapids upstream through the narrow gorges were needed for transport of the refugees themselves. With human lives at stake, baggage—no matter what it contained—had a lower priority. Even the institutions which managed to evacuate by rail to sea-going ships and proceed south to Hanoi and from there again by rail to Kunming in the relatively safe southwest of China had two transshipment points at each of which cases of books and equipment could be and were lost, stolen, scattered, or broken. Moreover, whatever the means of transportation, bombing en route by Japanese planes was a constant threat within China.

Thus the refugee universities when they finally settled into their new locations were desperately short of textbooks, reference works, and other teaching materials. At that time English language textbooks were used in higher education for much science teaching, and a reading knowledge of English was rather widespread among professors, some students, and also many university graduates in the professions. These individuals had also in prewar times been in touch with the outer world, following not only international news but also developments in their own professions or fields of study. But by 1942 they had been effectively cut off from the outside world for five years.

An understanding of the hunger for renewed contact with the worldwide flow of ideas on the part of the refugee universities in remote areas of Free China had been indicated by CU's initial proposal to donate to them US$20,000 worth of "urgently needed textbooks, microscopes and other scientific equipment." [1]

The Embassy in reply had agreed that such donations would fill an urgent need but raised the chilling problem of limited transportation—by air over the world's highest mountains—which was, in fact, to influence every aspect of the program throughout its duration. In proposing that microfilms of current scientific and cultural publications be substituted, the Embassy was recommending a means of transmitting the words without the weight and bulk of the printed pages.[2] The proposal had far-flung consequences.

At the beginning of U.S. involvement in World War II, photography, like so many other technical processes, was on the threshold of rapid new developments stimulated by the all-out mobilization of national resources in the war effort. Microfilm was in its infancy as an aid to librarians overwhelmed with storage problems. During the war it burst these narrow bonds to achieve unforeseen usefulness through the invention of "V-mail." Letters to and from American soldiers overseas and their correspondents at home were written on standard air-letter blanks, then microfilmed for transmission by air, and on arrival at central distribution points printed letter-size for delivery to the addressee. It was a procedure adopted to save airweight and speed delivery. It accomplished the first and, in time, the second aim. But in early 1942 microfilming as a technique was, to the general public, still at the stage of gadgetry.

The Embassy's initiative in suggesting microfilming current scientific and cultural publications contrasted markedly with its generally tentative responses to other aspects of the proposed program. Here was one channel into which we could direct our energies with reason to believe that it would not only be welcomed by the Chinese but would also receive warm Embassy support.

Since CU had no expertise in this new gadgetry, we turned for advice and guidance to librarians at the Library of Congress and the National Archives. The Library of Congress was already using this new technique in a major project of cultural relations with China. It was microfilming, for permanent recording and safekeeping, China's greatest bibliographical treasures which had been sent temporarily to Washington (then neutral) from the National Library of Peking to avoid their destruction or falling into Japanese hands during the wartime.[3] The librarians, there and at National Archives, found it a trouble-free means to preserve and/or miniaturize selected holdings, and the photographing page by page with fixed Leica camera and properly adjusted light was easily accomplished. But from our point of view the weak link in the process as we studied it was what might be called the recovery of information—how were the Chinese recipients to read the microfilms? The Spencer and the SVE (Society for Visual Education) microfilm readers were available for purchase but were far too bulky and heavy to be sent over the Hump* into China by air. Yet without adequate reading machines at the China end the microfilm would be useless. What to do?

At this point, Dr. Vernon Tate of the National Archives offered to design a lightweight modification of the Spencer reader and have 100 examples produced at State Department expense to be sent in small quantities by pouch to the Embassy in Chungking. Since no such reader was known to exist on the market at the time, CU accepted this offer gratefully. This was perhaps the first of a number of wrong decisions made in Washington in this and the ensuing periods from lack of firsthand knowledge of current circumstances in west China by the CU China staff. Hindsight makes clear that the better solution would have been to send the lightweight fundamental components of the readers, lenses, and (possibly) bulbs by pouch to the Embassy and have skilled Chinese engineers assemble them there according to blueprints or their own ingenuity. This was eventually done but only after many months.

At the China end the organization of microfilm reading centers in 1942 and 1943 and the distribution to them of the CU microfilms was a cooperative effort of a number of agencies, but there were two individuals whose daily exertions kept the program in operation. Dr. T. L. Yuan (Yuan T'ung-li), already known to the reader as Director of the National Library of Peking, was one. He had been separated by the war from the library which had absorbed his creative and constructive efforts, but not before, as already mentioned, he had taken steps to assure the safety of its greatest treasures. The other

*The wartime flight route over the Himalayas which linked India and Free China was nicknamed the "Hump" by the pilots who flew it.

was my husband, John K. Fairbank, on leave from Harvard University where he taught Chinese history, who had left Washington for Chungking in August 1942 on assignment from the Coordinator of Information as Special Assistant to the American Ambassador to collect Chinese and Japanese printed materials for the Inter-Departmental Committee for the Acquisition of Foreign Publications (INDEC). The relationship of the two men grew out of previous acquaintance in Peking and its closeness was inevitable in view of their mutual interests. It was also very natural to each of them to be concerned with opening and keeping open two-way communication between Free China and the outside world.

The INDEC materials collected in China were destined for final deposit in the Library of Congress. Meanwhile, however, selected currently important items were to be microfilmed in Chungking for air shipment to researchers in Washington. The parallels between the CU and the INDEC aims and means were obvious. For this reason it seemed useful to all concerned that one person should handle both. Fairbank arrived in Chungking in September 1942 and by October first an agreement had been reached that "In that aspect of the CU program which is concerned with microfilm Mr. Fairbank under the supervision of the Ambassador will assist the Embassy staff in carrying it out."[4]

A subsequent flurry of memoranda for the Ambassador from Fairbank unfolds the story of the organization of the CU microfilm program at the China end. Fairbank himself had brought in his luggage the first two projectors designed by Tate as well as five copies each of CU reel No. 1, *Publications on Postwar Planning* and of reel No. 2, *Current Scientific Periodicals for June 1942*. One copy each of reels Nos. 3, 4, and 5, *Selected Publications of the National Resources Planning Board*, had already reached the Embassy by pouch.[5]

Although these few items were simply a promise of more to come, enthusiasm among Chinese educational leaders ran high at the prospect of this impending breakthrough to current publications from the outside world. Before the end of October an International Scientific and Cultural Materials Supply Committee—later and better known as the International Cultural Service of China—had been established by the Ministry of Education to receive and distribute the microfilm, and its moving spirit, T. L. Yuan, had gone into action. He was using his formidable organizational powers to set up a system with a central film library in Chungking to keep track of the reels, and a network of reading rooms supplied with microfilm readers at campuses in the Chungking, Chengtu, Kunming, and Kweilin areas among which the five copies of each reel would circulate. Dean H. R. Wei of the College of Science of Nanking University was able to adapt Tate model machines as they arrived to make them more useful,

and his technicians were eventually building them from scratch on receipt of the necessary optics by pouch from the Department.

There were major drawbacks to microfilm as a medium of communication in Free China at that time. Not only were reading machines in their infancy, and those that found their way to or were assembled in China were makeshift at best, but—even more fundamental—the source of light, electricity, was uneven and undependable. The resultant strain on eyesight due to poor lighting and blurred images was harmful in the current state of health of the Chinese users. Furthermore, the effort of finding the desired place on the reel was irritating to them. Still their eagerness persisted and in the first month of its operation, the microfilm reading room of the National Central University Library on the outskirts of Chungking reported that "150 persons used the two projectors, each person being allowed the use of a projector for a period of two hours at one sitting. The projectors were usually completely signed up for during an eight hour day and often for more than a week in advance. Nearly all of the persons using the projectors were faculty members . . . studies on postwar planning have been most in demand." [6]

The Department was regularly microfilming, and sending out in five copies by pouch to the Embassy, some 60 learned journals recommended by the National Research Council in the following fields: physics, chemistry, general science, civil engineering, mechanical engineering, mining and metallurgy, geology, aeronautics, scientific instruments, architecture, nutrition, biology, phytopathology, physiology, psychology, sociology, political science, history, economics, Far Eastern studies, and the like. A fairly large number of additions were made on request; for example, "The *Quarterly Journal of Economics* is desired by almost every Chinese economist who had discussed the matter with the Committee, and in view of the large number of economists who will make use of the material the Committee had made a special request therefore. . . ." [7] In fact it was characteristic of the times that economics was the overwhelming first choice of students, preparing themselves, they hoped, for employment in Government or banking where there was a possibility of riding the inflationary tide instead of drowning beneath it.

As time went by, a grant of funds from the China Foundation financed the increasingly complex distribution of the microfilms and the Department made a grant to mimeograph an index of articles as well as digests of particular items from selected journals contained on the reels.[8] This attempt to draw attention to materials of special interest on the microfilms was laudable, but after the first year of its operation it was questionable how enduring the original hopes and enthusiasm for this difficult medium had proved to be. In

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Washington, however, the microfilming of the original list of journals plus requested additions had been firmly established on a regular basis, and by the end of 1943 a total of 1,071,000 pages of microfilm had been shipped to Chungking.[9] The "pipeline" was by that time regularly conveying the contents of current issues, yet George Cressey, visiting professor under the CU program, on his visit to the Southwest Associated University in February of 1944 reported that:

> "The university has four microfilm projectors, each in a tiny darkroom. There is also a considerable library of film. The service is politely welcomed, but is used only to a limited extent. The complaints were the usual comments as to poor focus, —with the edges not in focus with the center of the page—, eye strain, inconvenience, and the difficulty of finding the right articles or references on hand. There are no stencils with which to copy articles." [10]

In the circumstances, this slump was perhaps inevitable.

In the U.S., microfilm as a medium has proved its special usefulness through the years for two purposes, (1) to record in miniature bulky items such as newspaper files for library storage, and (2) to reproduce specific items available at a central repository and needed elsewhere by a researcher or other reader. In May of 1943 the Department approved a proposal similar to (2), namely, that the Embassy should forward to Washington specific requests for microfilm negatives of special articles; and arrangements were made with the Department of Agriculture Library to handle the search for and microfilming of them.[11] This personal service to researchers was used increasingly in 1944 and was deeply appreciated. As one example, a Chinese professor of botany who had received seven requested articles on microfilm wrote to the Embassy, "Without consulting these scientific papers, we would be groping in the dark in our researches," and he offered to repay the expenses.[12] Microfilmed special materials were also carried to China through these years by the American experts sent out by CU who needed them for reference or teaching. But still the reels of current journals continued their flow to China routinely in the "pipeline" at least until the autumn of 1944. The final reference to them that I have found reports that, in September and October of 1944, 17,000 pages of technical and scientific journals were sent out as well as 16,000 pages of medical books and 30,000 pages of medical journals.[13] The latter two may have been for the use of Drs. Tripp and Loucks in connection with their work with medical colleagues in various areas of Free China under the CU program at this period. (See Chapter Five.)

If, as seems apparent, the microfilming of current journals regularly and in quantity continued without interruption from June

of 1942 to the autumn of 1944 and the negative and five copies of each reel were sent to China and distributed there, it would be interesting to know where they are now. The basic use of microfilm as a convenient means of permanent storage of library materials could in normal times have assured that this wide range of American learned journals published over a period of two and a half years would be available for consultation for many years to come. But it is perhaps beyond the realm of possibility that the refugee universities and libraries, in the confusion of moving back to their original locations at the end of the war and in the subsequent revolutionary upheaval, should have retained copies of those microfilms which must have seemed to them wartime ephemera.

Microfilms at their best were certainly an awkward substitute for the printed originals. Chosen as a means of breaking through the transportation bottleneck, they were abandoned as the tonnage flown over the Hump increased. Meanwhile certain alternatives were tried on a limited scale.

Some printed copies of the overseas editions of *Science News Letters* covering various fields of science and published by Science Service, Inc., in Washington reached Chungking. In March 1943, for instance, the Embassy was distributing such newsletters "made up of extracts from magazine articles, scientific papers and the like . . . and highly technical in language" in the fields of medicine, physics, biology, astronomy, psychology, and agriculture-genetics.[14] A *Readers' Service* biweekly mimeographed publication was organized by Dr. H. C. Zen of the China Foundation and Dr. Han Lih-wu, Secretary of the British Boxer Indemnity Fund, in March of 1943 to reprint *in toto* articles of general interest from current American and British magazines to be circulated by subscription. The material was furnished by the two Embassies concerned.[15] In September of the same year, a mimeographed Chinese newsletter entitled *Industrial Chemistry* using articles from the CU microfilms began publication in Chungking by the Chung Hua Chemical Research Laboratory and the College of Science of Nanking University.

These, though they were printed materials, were mere stopgaps. The need continued for actual books, and particularly textbooks. The Department's efforts to get into the hands of Chinese students American textbooks on which many college science courses then depended had been deferred due to the transportation bottleneck. But the alternative possibility of reproducing in China by "a lithographic process" an edition of 5,000 copies from a sample copy was proposed to the Embassy as early as October 1942 by a representative of a Chinese commercial firm which claimed to have the necessary equipment and expertise. He pointed out that three difficulties were in-

volved, (1) obtaining the original texts of current books, (2) securing relinquishment of pertinent copyrights, and (3) getting the books into the hands of the students.

> "He went on to contend that most of the students were too poor to buy textbooks, and he made the proposal in somewhat veiled form that the books should therefore be provided gratis to the students. That appeared to be the important point of his proposal, because he went on to say that the Ministry of Education was itself without funds."

It was made quite clear through the veil that all three difficulties were to be solved by U.S. Government initiative and funds, to the exasperation of the Embassy official who had been approached.[16]

Nevertheless the matter was referred to the Department in January 1943. CU expressed willingness to negotiate with the book publishers concerned regarding temporary relinquishment of copyrights as a measure of wartime assistance and also to send two copies each of desired textbooks to Chungking for reproduction purposes. There the matter rested for months awaiting the desired list, which was finally furnished by the Ministry of Education on April 12, 1943. The Embassy, in forwarding the list, noted that according to several leading Chinese educators Chinese universities had not been consulted as to textbooks needed by them, and also that the Ministry was trying to unload on the International Relief Committee, the Chungking arm of United China Relief, responsibility for arranging and financing the reproduction of the textbooks in China. Y. S. Djang, Executive Director of the Committee, expressed the hope that the U.S. Government would furnish $300,000 for the purpose, but the Embassy discouraged him.[17]

Further traces of this already ill-starred project are lost in the gap of missing documents, with a few tantalizing exceptions.

More than a year later, CU reported that an agreement had been reached with the Book Publisher's Bureau in New York that with prior authorization from each publisher a number of recent textbooks would be reproduced in China and "about 20 have been sent to China to date. These include Holman and Robbins' *General Botany*, Fairchild, Furniss and Buck's *Economics*, Rayner's *Elementary Surveying*, and Holmes' *General Chemistry*."[18] Still another year passed before J. Hall Paxton, the Embassy officer then assigned to supervise the cultural cooperation activities, announced in March 1945: "Textbook reproduction is proceeding as planned. Over half the books ordered to be printed have already been delivered." (To whom? Funded how?) The final reference, in the report of his office for June 1945, shows the characteristic confusion there to the last:

> "The project for the reproduction of United States textbooks in China by the chemical process is nearing completion. Certain plates have occasioned so much difficulty in reproduction by this means that some of the volumes will have to be abandoned but those that have been completed already are filling a decided need. The matter of royalty payments for the volumes sold to non-students, who are not eligible to receive them gratis, is now under discussion."

There the record ends.[19]

By contrast, one of the more successful of the CU China programs in the field of exchange of ideas through the printed word resulted from the relatively small grants ($2,500 in June 1943, another $2,500 in 1944, and $7,500 for 1945) to the International Cultural Service for English translations of Chinese scholarly manuscripts. Its effectiveness was due to three smoothly meshing components. A subcommittee of 11 leading scholars in China actively sought out high quality manuscripts reporting scholarly researches that had been carried on by able Chinese individuals under difficult wartime conditions; the authors received from CU sums of money (U.S. $100 each) which were desperately needed in the circumstances, and the CU China staff in Washington, with the help of the National Research Council, placed a large number of the articles in the appropriate American journals thus bringing them and their authors to the notice of the outside world. Most of the articles had in fact been written in English by scholars who normally published in English language journals; even in China at that time many technical and scientific journals were published in English. The fact that they were translations by the author of his own thoughts was not permitted to raise a problem. "Any manuscript in English is regarded as a translation, as we formerly agreed, for reasons of simplicity."[20]

By the end of March 1944, 61 manuscripts had been transmitted by the Embassy and received in Washington and the Department commented to the Embassy that it was "gratified at the high quality of the Committee's selections and by the response on the part of the editors of professional journals here."[21] (See Appendix II.)

Small additional grants were made available in 1944 and 1946 for the translation of Chinese current literature into English and of American books into Chinese, but there is no evidence in the record that anything substantial was produced. The young Chinese writers to whom the Embassy turned, first in the Sino-Foreign Literary Liaison Association and later in the Chinese Writers League, were out of touch with contemporary American literature. By the time they had "completed [translation of] two [American] manuscripts and had two others nearly finished . . . current high printing costs

have impeded publication." In other words the inflation was already out of control by mid-1944 and "publication must be deferred." [22]

As for translating Chinese literature for publication in the United States, it would be interesting to see what was or might have been produced. The only relevant document seems to be a letter from Pearl Buck to T. L. Yuan, written at the instance of Willys Peck to guide Chinese who were writing for the American market. Not only was she herself highly successful in reaching the American reading public, but as the wife of Richard Walsh, publisher of *Asia* magazine and head of John Day Co., she was well aware of U.S. publishers' requirements. Her letter is reproduced here (see Appendix III) not only for its relevance to the CU program but also for what it reveals about Pearl Buck herself and her views of then current Chinese literary styles.

Meanwhile, throughout the war period books for China were being stockpiled in America by many organizations. As one example, the Library of Congress in August of 1943 notified the Department that representatives of Chinese educational institutions would be permitted to select books and journals from among duplicates in the Library's collections. These would be stored until the end of the war at which point the Chinese institutions concerned would be responsible for shipping them to China. During September and October, scholars representing six Chinese universities and two libraries devoted themselves to making the selections.[23]

But the arrival in China of actual printed materials in any quantity—currently published books, journals, and pamphlets which had been so long awaited—did not take place until nearly the end of the war. Priorities for air shipment over the Hump of heavy and bulky items such as books had not been made available for the CU China program as long as the transport of military materiel was the primary consideration. In fact it was through the use of space offered on the planes of special emissaries that CU was at last able to send to China these and other items much in demand for our activities there. Vice President Wallace's plane which left Washington on March 20, 1944, carried approximately 640 pounds for CU "including books, maps, motion pictures, art reproductions and laboratory equipment . . . ninety-four separate consignments to Chinese educational institutions in response to requests or to the Embassy for distribution." [24] Donald Nelson, Chairman of the War Production Board, and Major General Patrick J. Hurley, later to be named Ambassador to China, flew to Chungking in August 1944. Their special plane carried about 380 pounds of books, journals, small tools, et cetera sent by CU.[25] And in September General Stilwell's plane took 300 pounds of materials, chiefly books and medicines to

China of which half were sent for distribution to the so-dubbed "Dixie Mission" of American liaison officers at Yenan.[26] As already noted, space was allotted on each of these planes to the private cultural relations agencies with which the Department was constantly cooperating in its program of aid to China.

As the military situation eased in 1945 and tonnage flown into China by the Air Transport Command greatly increased, current books selected for CU by the American Library Association began to accumulate in the Embassy. The problem of transportation still hampered our efforts, but now it was transportation within China.

In November 1945 I had the experience of delivering a shipment of books to Wuhan University at its remote wartime location in Chiating, Szechwan. Two other Americans shared the driving of our small truck over the rough roads from Chungking and we had a Chinese professor as passenger in addition to our cargo of books. The university library situated in a Confucian temple was a scene of public rejoicing as the librarian held up each of the hundred volumes we had delivered in turn and called out, to a group of faculty and students crowding the reading room, the titles . . . "all published since 1940 and the first new books to reach the library in at least five years." The Dean of the Wuhan Science School remarked, "This is the greatest thing that has happened to Wuhan (University) in a long time." Two hundred sixty of the ALA-selected volumes were delivered to the cluster of universities in the Chengtu area at the same time.

Two months later others of the current volumes were presented to Yunnan University and the Southwest Associated University in Kunming. The president of the latter university "gave a large tea in honor of the occasion and invited for the purpose the heads of all departments of the university. The books were set out on a table and the professors, most of whom had seen no new books from America for 6 or 7 years became so absorbed in reading them that the President found it difficult to draw attention to the social occasion. This incident is mentioned purely as an example of the tremendous enthusiasm that has welcomed even small gifts of books to the universities in these comparatively remote areas." [27]

It is ironical that our many plans and stratagems to get books to the refugee Chinese universities in west China did not succeed on even a moderate scale until after the end of the war. To be sure most of the universities in question remained at their wartime locations for most of the following year. The publications were undoubtedly used and appreciated for this period but what became of them thereafter has never been clear. The logistics of moving the refugee universities from their scattered sites back to their original locations was of course far less complex than their flight westward under war-

time conditions. But books are books and awkward to move, especially heavy Western hard-bound ones. Presumably some at least of those late arrivals were left on the shelves of libraries in the far western provinces.

After the defeat of Japan and the opening of the east coast ports of China to commercial shipping, the many Government and private agencies which had been stockpiling books and journals for China or which had funds for purchase of books hastened to collect and despatch them to China. The American Book Center for War Devastated Libraries, situated at the Library of Congress, had shipped by the end of 1947, with financial help from various private and Government agencies, 1,700 cases containing approximately 220,000 volumes to China. The Chinese Government agency, Universal Trading Corporation, had earmarked $800,000 from a U.S. loan for books and equipment, and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was operating on the most lavish scale of all, designating $4 million for educational rehabilitation in the fields of industry, medicine, and agriculture for which textbooks and reference works would be indispensable tools. The Department's grant of $100,000 to the American Library Association in 1944 to purchase and ship books and periodicals for distribution to Chinese universities, technical and medical schools, and research centers seems small indeed by comparison. By December 31, 1947, from a selected list of nearly 10,000 titles, the ALA had shipped 20 copies each of the medical titles, 10 copies each of the other titles and over 1,100 1945–47 periodicals.

In addition to these various shipments there were many others from private organizations, churches, and individuals who had long been concerned with China's plight. But the comment of a responsible U.S. official in Shanghai was sobering,

> "Using American dollars to buy materials and ship them to China does not mean anything in terms of helping Chinese people until and unless the supplies are actually put to their intended use here in China. Materials in a warehouse in Shanghai are just as useless as materials which have never been bought in the first place." [22]

The reception and distribution of foreign purchased or donated educational equipment faced special difficulties in China for the entire period from 1945 to 1949 due to the continuing unsettled conditions, corruption, and deepening civil war. Chinese Government requirements for import permits and other red tape delayed arrangements for landing. Customs charges were sometimes levied on equipment donated for private institutions or persons. The overcrowding of the port of Shanghai and the chaotic conditions there resulted in

dockside looting of cases. Exorbitant charges for warehousing arose from the same causes. In particular, the breakdown of inland transportation retarded the movement of books and equipment out of the port of entry and rendered uncertain their delivery to designated institutions. It was not uncommon for shipments which reached China in two or three weeks by sea from the United States to take an additional six months to arrive at their ultimate destinations. The combined costs of warehousing and transportation during such long intervals, while inflation was escalating, often multiplied the cost of the original article many times. A Chinese Committee on Distribution of Books, with T. L. Yuan as Executive Secretary, was set up by the Chinese Government with a staff of 20 workers appointed by the Ministry of Education, but their task and the related problems were so vast in scale and ended in a period of such political chaos that we shall undoubtedly never know in any orderly fashion what happened to these shipments sent to China from abroad in this critical interval.

Notes

CHAPTER FOUR

1. Secstate to Amemb, Chungking, Tel. 55, Jan. 29, 1942, NA, RG 59, 811.42793/527a.
2. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Tel. 113, Feb. 12, 1942, *ibid.*, 811.42793/535.
3. They were, of course, returned to China at the end of the war.
4. J. K. Fairbank, Memorandum for the Ambassador, Chungking, Oct. 1, 1942, NA, RG 84, 842–AID.
5. J. K. Fairbank, Memorandum for the Ambassador, Chungking, Oct. 3, 1942, *ibid.*
6. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 987, Mar. 10, 1943, *ibid.*, 842–Microfilm.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*, and *CU Monthly Report*, Mar. 1943, p. 26.
9. *CU Monthly Report*, Dec. 1943, p. 6.
10. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 2203, Feb. 21, 1944, *ibid.*, 842–AID.
11. Secstate to Amemb, Chungking, Tel. 638, May 20, 1943, NA, 811.42793/1591, and *CU Monthly Report*, May 1943.
12. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 715, July 3, 1944.
13. *CU Monthly Report*, Sept.–Oct. 1944.
14. R. H. David to E. H. Lockwood, Chungking, Mar. 13, 1943, NA, RG 84, 842–AID.
15. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 1006, Mar. 18, 1943, NA, RG 84, 842.
16. O.E. Clubb, Memorandum for the Ambassador, Chungking, Oct. 23, 1942, *ibid.*

17. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 1092, Apr. 20, 1943, NA, RG 84, 842–AID.
18. *CU Monthly Report*, May–June, 1944.
19. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 278, Apr. 4, 1945, and Desp. 526, July 7, 1945, NA, RG 59, 811.42793.
20. J. K. Fairbank to P. D. Sprouse, Chungking, July 2, 1943, enclosure in Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 1634, Sept. 28, 1943, NA, RG 84, 842–AID. Also, earlier JKF to PDS, June 29, 1943, *ibid.*
21. Secstate to Amemb, Chungking, Instr. 584, Apr. 4, 1944, NA, RG 59, 811.42793/1634.
22. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Tel. 816, May 17, 1946.
23. Memorandum of Conversation, Aug. 5, 1943, between Library of Congress and CU China officials, NA, RG 84, 842.
24. Secstate to Amemb, Chungking, Instr. 674, May 31, 1944, *ibid.*, and to same, Tel. 754, June 1, 1944, NA, RG 59, 811.42793/1793.
25. *CU Monthly Report*, July–Aug. 1944.
26. Secstate to Amemb, Chungking, Instr. 890, Nov. 6, 1944, NA, RG 84, 842–AID. The "Dixie Mission" got its sobriquet from the fact that it was located at the rebel capital.
27. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 1086, Feb. 5, 1946, *ibid.*
28. H. Cleveland, Director, China program, ECA, in Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Tel. 1995, Oct. 26, 1948, *Foreign Relations, 1948*, VIII, p. 642.

CHAPTER FIVE

Sending American Experts to China

THE specific program which consumed the most time, energy, and money from the inception of the CU China program in 1942 through 1946 had been described to the Embassy under the heading "Exchange of Technical and Cultural Leaders." This was planned as a two-way operation, bringing Chinese to the United States as well as sending Americans to China. However, the immediate response of the Chinese Government to the proposal that American specialists could be assigned to various Chinese Government agencies for periods of a year and in fields designated by the agencies themselves was so positive that this aspect of the planned two-way exchanges became the primary concern of Haldore Hanson and the skeleton staff in the summer of 1942.

With the help of specialized agencies of the American Government as well as private agencies with long experience of operation in China, this program managed to locate, approve, and appoint for service in China 6 American experts in various fields before the end of 1942, 16 in 1943, 4 in 1944, 2 in 1945, and 2 in 1946. The decrease in numbers sent in the latter years was due to the changing situations in both China and the United States as the war came to an end. The Chinese Government became preoccupied with moving 1,500 miles back to the east and, shortly, with the resumption of civil war. Simultaneously, the American Government experienced major drops in wartime funding. The President's Emergency Fund which had sustained the various CU China programs terminated in fiscal year 1946.

China had made great use of foreign advisers since well before the turn of the 20th century, particularly in connection with the technical operations of Government. Fiscal, industrial, and agricultural advisers had played an important part in China's modernization in these fields. There had been some complaints that the Chinese Government had leaned too heavily on foreign advisers, and others that the foreign adviser was commonly attached to a Chinese ministry as a prestige exhibit or used as a scapegoat for unpopular innovations.

CU's selection of experts to send to China during World War II was both complicated and facilitated by the wartime emergency. The Department could not compete with the armed services for men needed for active duty, though in a few cases it was possible to have men already in uniform assigned to the CU program in China. On the other hand, considerations of patriotism, adventure, or professional zeal frequently led older men who were beyond military age to respond with enthusiasm to the opportunity to serve in a program of cultural relations with China. The qualifications of the ideal appointee were difficult to determine though the two qualities of optimism and adaptability were certainly basic. A common problem with the technical men sent out without previous China experience was that they left the United States confident in their skills only to find that the application of them was constantly complicated by the radically different society where they were to take effect. Even as late as the 1940's modern technology was an innovation in China, alien to the literary tradition of her educated class and beyond the untrained comprehension of her masses, and this was particularly true in the backward areas of Free China.

Common complaints of technical advisers were, "Chinese love to plan but don't know how to begin action," "The top technical men in the Ministry are desk bureaucrats and do not understand the field job," "Officials or men of any standing won't soil their hands with actual work and you can't run a field operation or train men on the job that way," "Chinese government administrators always want the most sweeping projects or the very latest gadgets and do not plan in terms of proceeding by orderly practical steps from where they are at the moment," "My Chinese colleagues are supersensitive to fair criticism, and considerations of 'face' control too rigidly their actions," and, finally, in some cases, "Modern equipment and facilities are inadequate here; my ability can be better used back home."

Commonly the American expert went through a cycle of feelings in his first months in China. He was fascinated with the unfamiliar people and surroundings, flattered by the round of banquets immediately following his arrival, disturbed that as time went on he was given nothing concrete to do, dismayed to discover that there was no definite plan for his work and apparently not much will to put his advice to practical use if given, and, in the end, if he was adaptable, elated to find that he could develop his own plan and work with a chosen few Chinese colleagues to good purpose. Often his greatest value was in adult education among and moral support for the able men he selected for his cooperation. But the frustrations and discouragements that characterized the early months were great. Only

persons of optimism, imagination, determination, and persistence survived them.

The experts sent out by the Department represented a wide variety of ages, backgrounds, and skills. In general they were able men though for a few the strain of long absence from their families and their accustomed milieu was shattering. One man died of acute alcoholism in China. Another was so ill-advised as to go big-game hunting in India en route home and got badly mauled by a tiger. With these two exceptions, there were no truly traumatic experiences, and a number of the appointees did a fine job in difficult circumstances. Not surprisingly, men with previous experience in China were in this category, but a not inconsiderable number of the newcomers were equally sympathetic, supportive, and effective insofar as it was possible in that crumbling society. Some of the most useful technicians were those who were able to improvise due to their understanding of an earlier and simpler technology. Rarest among the Americans were those who could grasp from the first the political significance of every move in Chinese-American relations and in the internal relations of ministries, cliques, and personal followings on the Chinese domestic scene. However, the experts learned fast when they felt themselves being exploited for political ends.

It now seems quite clear that the Chinese Government's alacrity in accepting the proffered services of American experts to be selected and sent out by the U.S. Government was not simply a matter of gratitude for wartime assistance from an ally but involved considerations of postwar resurgence.

In 1942 and subsequent wartime years, the presentations to the Bureau of the Budget in Washington stressed the relevancy of all the CU China programs to the winning of the war, and, in fact, the policies appropriate to a peacetime cultural relations program were for the time being shelved or at least subordinated to immediate military aims. But in Chungking the fighting spirit had lapsed through the long dreary years following the first heroic resistance. Staying alive was first priority, planning the postwar recovery and reconstruction of the northern and eastern provinces consumed the attention of the bureaucrats, and the huge wartime loans made by the United States naturally lent credence to the dream that even greater loans would be available from the same source to rebuild China when the fighting stopped.

The power holders in the various ministries, frustrated as they waited out the war in their remote western fastness, were already maneuvering for postwar power and prestige to command and be enhanced by the expected dollar loans. The Department's offer to send American experts, made in good faith as wartime aid, played directly

into their hands. They assumed that experts, selected and sent by the U.S. Government, if warmly welcomed by the Chinese and requested to investigate and draw up recommendations for future developments in their fields, would be the ideal channels for procuring the necessary funding on their return to Washington. As one perspicacious young American, Ralph W. Phillips, sent out by CU to the Ministry of Agriculture, wrote to the Ambassador at the end of his stay in 1943:

> "There is a widespread impression that the United States is ready to pour almost unlimited personnel and finances into China, now and especially in a reconstruction period after the war. The reasons for this are not entirely clear. One reason may be the way in which Lend Lease funds have been used. . . . Another possible reason is the rather widespread belief that the United States is deeply indebted to China and must meet her slightest desire in order to keep in favor. One highly placed official in the Ministry of Agriculture made the frank observation that Great Britain and the United States were competing for China's favor. . . . Some Chinese officials have assumed that I am working for them and have expected that their instructions be followed explicitly. If one is to be an advisor, he can hardly be one and at the same time have his activities dictated by those he presumes to advise. This has not been a serious problem in my case but the problem is here. . . . In earlier correspondence I have commented on a request that was made for 6 to 8 specialists in the field of animal husbandry, to work in the Northwest. . . . I felt obligated to express my opinion, since the proposed program would have constituted gross misuse of funds. The man making the request was not qualified to guide such a program, and did not have any organization or program of work in which the experts could have served efficiently. On the other hand, I feel that specialists in certain lines can do effective service in the immediate future. For example, animal transportation remains the chief means by which goods and war materials are moved in China, and there is great opportunity to increase the efficiency with which animals work and to prolong their useful life. A program of this type could yield immediate, useful results if the Chinese government is prepared to work on it." [1]

The proposal put forward in the last two sentences, that animal transportation was basic and could be immediately improved, brings to mind an ironical note of comparison. In the same year that this observation and recommendation were made, the Department filled a request from the Ministry of Education to send to China a professor of aeronautical engineering. The wartime need for such specialists in the United States was of course great, but, rather than turn down the request, the requisite efforts were made and a qualified specialist located who was willing to go to China. Within six weeks of his

arrival, however, the Embassy wired Washington that "he is convinced that his further stay in China in his professional capacity would be valueless, that the interest shown in his branch of engineering is negligible and that cooperation has been purely perfunctory." [2] Although he did remain in China for a total of three months and have some contact with "aeronautical research" groups in Chengtu and Kunming, he was involved in bringing skills of possible postwar value but no immediate relevance to Free China which had no aircraft industry, had never had one, and was in fact overwhelmingly dependent on animal power for transportation. Despite enormous advances, industrially and economically, in the last 25 years, China still has no civilian aircraft industry and is still basically dependent on animal transportation in the countryside supplemented by Government trucking to and from the railheads.

This fact underscores an important ex-post-facto judgment which must be made of the wartime CU China program. The Department's policy of acceding to Chinese Government requests for experts in specific fields, without careful questioning by an Embassy officer assigned full-time to the cultural program, made us prey to skillful manipulation by Chinese officials for dubious ends and led to the waste of money, time, and effort on our part. To quote again from the agricultural expert cited above: "Also, there is need for ascertaining the real need for a specialist and for obtaining exact information on the exact nature of the work he can perform before a request is sent to the Department of State for such a specialist." [3]

Even the criterion of "real need" was inadequate, for practicality was an even more important consideration. There was, for example, a real need on the part of the Chinese Government in November 1942 for massive printing of banknotes not only to replace those in circulation which were tattered or patched but, more urgently still, to finance the mounting Government expenditures which were already creating a galloping inflation. The Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote to Ambassador Gauss requesting "the services of an engraver who is capable of doing female plate engraving and who is, at the same time, competent to give training to Chinese engravers to do steel plate engraving. . . . he should be provided with the necessary equipment . . . brought along when he comes." As to the paper on which the banknotes were to be printed, the Ministry of Finance was quoted in the same letter as contemplating its production from "such raw materials as cotton and ramie" and [an almost off-hand addition] "it hopes that an expert may be found fitted for this work." [4]

The request was forwarded to the Department. It is tempting to visualize the two American experts who might have been sent to

China in response to this request arriving with their equipment and, aided by their faithful coworkers, producing otherwise single-handedly the blizzard of banknotes required in the wild inflation of the following years. In reality . . . . "After considerable search the Department became convinced that no one expert in engraving could perform all the types of work specified by the Chinese Government . . . and the request for an engraver was withdrawn." [5] The papermaker may have been just quietly forgotten, since soon thereafter the enormous problem was dealt with in a grandiose fashion. The banknotes were printed in the United States on American banknote paper and flown by the planeload in American planes half way round the world and over the Hump into China.

An equally needful but impractical request came from the Chinese National Health Administration (NHA) in March of 1942. A pharmaceutical chemist "with wide experience in drug manufacturing—general inorganic compounds, neoarsphenamine, vitamins and the sulfonamide group" was wanted to produce these newly developed wonder drugs in China.[6]

The Department turned for assistance to officers of the U.S. Public Health Service. They responded that it was "unlikely that any chemist capable of manufacturing neoarsphenamine could be persuaded to go to China at this time since there are only five such experts in the United States and all are engaged in emergency work." Regarding vitamins, they commented that ". . . a dietitian to assist in utilizing natural vitamins would be of greater service to China than a chemist to produce synthetic vitamins . . . ." [7] Finally, as for the sulfa drugs, they pointed out that "production of sulfanilimide requires about three pounds of basic chemicals for each pound of finished drug." CU, in wiring this news to the Embassy, gently inquired as to "the availability in west China of such primary chemicals and of the necessary laboratory equipment or the possibility of manufacturing them there." This inquiry was introduced with excessive tact bearing the stamp of Mr. Peck's delicacy in handling matters involving Chinese face in the wartime situation:

> "Without in any way wishing to suggest what course of action the Chinese Government should pursue in this matter the Department is forced to discuss the availability of suitable chemists." [8]

The Chinese NHA withdrew all three requests after a mid-May meeting with Embassy officers in which the Chinese staff doctors agreed on the impracticality of filling them for the reasons set forth by the U.S. Public Health Service. In doing so, however, the NHA Director diverged from his subordinates in expressing the opinion, though not insisting, that "such a man could give valuable advice

and make suggestions regarding the *preparation* [italics added] for the manufacture of these as well as other drugs." [9]

This case illustrates a problem that constantly recurred in the ensuing months and years, namely considerations of prestige. It was undoubtedly very human that the Chinese who had been cut off from contact with the outside world for five painful years should, when offered assistance by the U.S. Government, proudly request the latest and best. Questions of immediate need, of applicability to conditions in the backward region constituting Free China, of transportation difficulties, or, perhaps most important, of wartime priorities elsewhere in the world were left to the Americans to discover for themselves. Meanwhile, in Washington the CU China unit under Mr. Peck's leadership tended to uncritical response to Chinese Government requests within the limits of available funds and qualified experts willing to go. The Embassy, which acted as middleman between the Chungking and Washington officials concerned, was understaffed and overworked with wartime preoccupations. For the first two years of the CU program it had no officer assigned to full-time administration of the CU operations at the Chungking end. Consequently, requests were normally forwarded without critical comment, and, in fact, all too often without adequate indications of what was expected of the expert requested.

An extreme example of this was the case of that very able young animal breeder on loan from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Ralph W. Phillips, already quoted above, who went to China for the CU program in 1943.

"When I was approached by the Department of State to come over for my present work," he wrote to Ambassador Gauss,

> "I requested information on such points as where I would be stationed, just what type of work was needed, etc., but was told that such information could not be obtained because it would be embarrassing to ask such questions of the Chinese Government. On the basis of what I now know, this attitude was absurd. If someone in a position to judge had sat down with the Ministry of Agriculture officials and worked out in detail just what they felt their needs were and what type of program they hoped to undertake, I would have been in a much better position to undertake the work and the Ministry would have been in a better position to use my services. Some exchange of views would have been very helpful to both parties. As it was, if the program they had planned for me had been followed explicitly, as they expected it would be, my time in China would have been very largely wasted. . . . This is one example of the type of service a man could give if his entire time were devoted to the needs of the program. Also, if American money is to be spent on such a program, we certainly have the right to ask enough questions to assure ourselves that the money will be wisely spent." [10]

It seems preposterous that "embarrassing the Chinese Government" could have been put to him as a reason not to provide him the desired information. Mr. Peck's hypersensitivity to questions of face as they concerned our hard-pressed Chinese ally is the only explanation that comes to mind. Yet Phillips' second point, that there should have been, and should be, a skilled middleman to sit down with the Ministry officials and work out a meaningful plan of action went to the heart of the matter. We needed a cultural officer in the Embassy assigned full time to cope with the arrangements, plans, and information required by these specialists before and after they arrived in China, and to administer the many other aspects of the CU China program.

Perhaps most of all we needed a cultural officer to communicate to the home office the realities of the scene where the program was taking effect, including not only the hits but also the misses. As it was, we sent 16 American specialists to China in 1943 without such a representative in the Embassy. They were turned over to the Chinese ministries concerned which themselves bore the heavy responsibility for providing them housing, food, and transportation as well as a program, interpreter (if necessary), and coworkers. Phillips spoke for them all when he wrote,

> "Our instructions state that we are to be responsible to the Ambassador, but if this responsibility is to be interpreted merely as an occasional report of activities, the individual specialist and the program cannot function effectively. There is need for a greater feeling of responsibility for the specialist on the part of the Embassy and an effort to coordinate the activities of the various men and to supply their needs for information and material. To date, this need has been supplied by one man who has attempted to do it in addition to other duties." [11]

Phillips' thoughtful letter apparently had its effect on the Ambassador who three months later (March 1944) assigned J. Hall Paxton, a China language officer, to give full time to the CU program. Yet the fact that the problem was still not entirely solved six months later is evidenced by a telegram from CU-Washington to the Embassy which starts out: "Please obtain from the National Resources Commission detailed statements of the duties to be assigned each specialist in order that they may be guided in selecting equipment and in making other preparations," and goes on thus, with sudden loss of heart: "Telegraph at least synopsis of prospective duties." [12]

The communication to the home office in Washington of the realities of the Chungking scene and the effect of the program there was accomplished not by the cultural officer but by the various American specialists themselves. They were, after all, working

closely with their Chinese colleagues, seeing and sharing to a certain extent their living conditions, succeeding or failing in their assignments for various complex reasons ranging from personal to political, and always subject to the abnormalities of the wartime situation.

The balance of this chapter is devoted to an attempt to present significant quotations from the reports of a number of these men. Many of the reports are missing altogether and apparently never reached the National Archives; here we are rescuing from oblivion a small part of the words and deeds of that group of Americans who were precursors in China of such programs as Point Four and AID which in the decades since have sent personnel to perform similar functions in many parts of the globe.

The first American technical expert to go to China under the CU China program was Walter C. Lowdermilk, Assistant Chief of the Soil Conservation Service in the U.S. Department of Agriculture. He had been a professor of forestry at the University of Nanking from 1922–27 and during that period had worked with the International Famine Relief Commission in China's arid northwest. His services were specifically requested by the Chinese Government in 1942 to help combat erosion and floods and improve crop yields in that same area.

Due to wartime conditions, his elapsed time from Washington to Chungking was three months. He traveled by bomb-laden freighter through the Panama Canal, down the west coast of South America, around the Horn and across the South Atlantic to South Africa. From there onward he flew, via Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, and over the Hump from Assam, but, with numerous unavoidable delays, the 9,000 miles covered even on this leg of the trip took a month.

Lowdermilk's comments on the end of this flight are vivid:

> "I had one of the most fascinating experiences of my life as I studied the intricate patterns of hill terracing in Szechwan. . . . Here was an entire landscape which represented the labor, care and love of the land by millions of people through many centuries of time. . . . Here was extensive cultivation of well watered sloping lands and yet not a sign of erosion anywere. . . . To me, these achievements were far more imposing than the pyramids of Egypt, which are so famous yet took only twenty years of slave labor to build." [13]

By contrast, the northwest loess-lands to which he proceeded with a staff of eight Chinese assistants were deeply eroded. In seven

months of field work, beginning in the spring of 1943, the group established demonstration projects of contour strip cropping on loessal slopes to absorb the rains, and planned "revegetation" by dropping from planes onto rain-soaked soil clay pellets containing seeds and fertilizer. In addition, he observed that the construction of soil-saving dams to collect silt, tree-planting on hillsides and along stream banks, and other major works were clearly necessary to preserve the land and improve food production.

Lowdermilk submitted to the Executive Yuan at the end of 1943 a report based on his field work which recommended the establishment of 22 pilot projects. These dealt with the problems mentioned above as well as related roadbuilding, development of irrigation systems, purchase of farm machinery, and the organization of a network of equipment repair workshops. The total cost for carrying out his recommendations he estimated to be US$20 million.

It was characteristic of the times that, following submission of his report to them, the Chinese Government waved him off to the United States with the understanding that he was to complete the list of requirements and arrange for financing of his recommendations by the U.S. Government. The latter effort failed (in the depths of wartime), to his bewilderment and chagrin. But many of the developments he envisioned were carried out by the People's Republic of China in the next 25 years using China's own resources of manpower and without dependence on foreign capital.

Ralph Phillips, already well known to the reader, like Lowdermilk reached China in the early months of the war only with difficulty. He sailed from the west coast of the United States in February 1943 to India via Australia and New Zealand and did not reach Chungking until May. He was loaned by the U.S. Department of Agriculture in response to a Ministry of Agriculture request for an expert in artificial insemination of horses, cattle, and other farm animals. This was another preposterous request for the "latest and best" regardless of its suitability to prevailing conditions.

Phillips took with him to China the requisite equipment for artificial insemination but found on his arrival that there were no genetic research centers, no tested sires, no selected males or females of superior stock, no concentration of females for the purpose, and no refrigeration. In view of this situation he was irked to find that he was expected to demonstrate artificial insemination to attract crowds and draw publicity. Since there was no possibility in the circum-

stances to use artificial insemination for the improvement of stock, he left his materials behind when he traveled in the northwest so that he could concentrate on less spectacular but more relevant aspects of animal husbandry such as range management, harness design, and other immediate areas of improvement in the efficient utilization of animal power. On his departure from China he turned over the insemination equipment for use with horses to an army remount station along the Burma Road, and that intended for sheep, goats, and bulls to a Chinese professor of agriculture at Shapingpa outside Chungking.[14]

Rewi Alley, writing of a 1974 trip to the northwestern province of Kansu, reported that artificial insemination is being used in that formerly remote region for improving livestock.[15] The 30-year gap between Phillips' months in China's northwest and this reported development make it very unlikely that there is any link between the two, but the technical advances achieved in China in those years undoubtedly make artificial insemination a practical means for the improvement of animal breeds there today.

Phillips and Ray G. Johnson, another very capable animal husbandry specialist who had been sent to China by CU at the request of the Ministry of Education, on their return collaborated on a book entitled *The Livestock of China*[16] which was published by the Department in English and translated into Chinese by their former colleagues. It contained much firsthand descriptive material and demonstrated Phillips' interest in the problem of breeding livestock adapted for unfavorable environments.

A typically complicated cultural relations venture was the assignment by CU of four American journalists to the Chinese Ministry of Information in the summer of 1943. The request for these specialists arose from an episode which took place in Washington earlier in 1943. Hollington Tong, the suave, articulate American-trained journalist who headed the Ministry was accompanying Madame Chiang Kai-shek on her wartime visit to America. She introduced him to President Roosevelt and in the ensuing conversation the President told him that there should be more human interest stories coming out of China for the American people.[17]

Madame Chiang's trip was an unsuccessful attempt to upset the already determined grand strategy of the Allies which had settled on a Europe-first policy. Joint action to defeat the enemy there was the preeminent aim to which major military, industrial,

manpower, and other resources were committed. China was for the time being necessarily slighted. The fall of Burma had been a shock to the beleaguered Chinese, as had been the defeat by the Japanese of American and other allied bastions in the Pacific area one by one. America's entry into the war against Japan had inspired in the Chinese a dream of immediate rescue after the long struggle; the dream was fading into disillusion and bitterness.

Both Madame Chiang and Hollington Tong had lived for years in America. They were aware of the power of public opinion to sway U.S. Government policy in peacetime. Madame Chiang's speech to a joint session of the Houses of Congress and her subsequent nationwide travels were aimed at winning higher priorities for China through the arousal of American public opinion. Tong settled on another tactic for the same purpose. To improve China's "public relations" with the American people, he approached the Department of State to send to the Ministry of Information under the CU China program four experienced American newsmen to improve the Ministry's capacity to deliver news of China acceptable to the American (and British) public.

Presumably this move was inspired by the conversation with President Roosevelt and undoubtedly Tong's immediate and pressing request was ordered by Madame Chiang to whom he owed his position. The project was presented by Tong to Mr. Peck as endorsed by Generalissimo Chiang himself. Immediate affirmative action resulted and by July 1943 four newsmen had been found and appointed. These were: Floyd Taylor, a specialist in news editing; George Grim, an experienced radio newscaster; George Alexanderson, a skilled news photographer; and Frank Buchner, a feature writer. Like the other American specialists sent to China in the early years of American participation in the war, their passage to China took months; Grim was the first to reach Chungking on October 15th.

Grim's first report to the Ambassador spelled out his understanding of his assignment,

> "First, to write, produce, and arrange for American network and major station broadcasts from China. Second, to train the personnel both of XGOY [Chungking station] and the Central Broadcasting Administration. This is done by instruction and example."

He threw himself with enthusiasm into the task and within six weeks of his arrival was feeding regular and special programs from Chungking to American networks, had established classes for announcers and technical control room members, and had writ-

ten a "handbook for operation" that had been translated into Chinese.[18]

The first adverse criticism of the program appeared in an accompanying comment by the Director of OWI in Chungking. His praise of Grim wound up with the ironical observation:

> "He has made such a success of producing programs in China that are commercially acceptable to sponsors in the United States while being at the same time good propaganda for China, that the net result has been that American broadcasters are paying good cash for re-broadcasts of official Chinese programs in the United States. This immediately removes the possibility of our appealing to the Chinese government for re-broadcasts of American Government programs in China on a reciprocal basis." [19]

The clouds continued to gather. Floyd Taylor, the news editor from the New York *World Telegram*, an already distinguished journalist in his early forties, reported to the Ambassador for the information of the Department the difficulties he was encountering shortly after his arrival. These were the fact that the Ministry of Information to which he was accredited was a Kuomintang Party organ engaged in turning out propaganda, that censorship of the news by the Chinese Government went to absurd lengths, and that he found himself in competition with American commercial press correspondents stationed in Chungking.

Taylor pointed out that he had been appointed "to assist the Chinese Ministry of Information as a specialist in the rewriting and editing of news" and was "expected to be useful to the war effort by aiding the Chinese Government in the preparation of war news and in the training of news editors who are responsible for war news." Yet so far he had found himself working in a publicity service with the purpose of giving a favorable picture of China to readers in America. At the same time representatives of American news services in China were unable due to lack of news sources and to stringent Chinese censorship to send to the United States what they regarded as a true picture of China. It was the Ministry of Information, to which he was assigned, which enforced the censorship, he pointed out. Important material was suppressed, but also such trivia as the fact that Chinese audiences did not like the movie version of Pearl Buck's *The Good Earth*. That news had been eliminated from an article on the ground that it might disturb China's foreign relations.

Taylor discussed with Tong this matter of censorship which so annoyed the foreign correspondents in Chungking. Tong told him that they were annoyed by the censorship "only because they

insisted upon writing about politics, military affairs, inflation and corruption"(!) Taylor commented wryly, "These subjects might well be of interest to the American reader at this time, when the Chinese are anxious to obtain American money for the prosecution of the war now and for development of their country after the war." [20]

Three months later Taylor's second report to the Ambassador about the development of his assignment stressed his same conclusions based on further experience.

> "It seems clear to me that any American working for the Ministry [of Information] is to some degree a press agent for the Kuomintang and the Chinese government. No matter how careful he may be, and I have tried to be careful, he is part of a fabric of deceit. Certain facts about China—facts of no military significance—he must not write. Chinese officials are determined to do their best to conceal these facts from the world and are especially determined to conceal them from the people of America, the people with the bulging pocket books.
>
> "Any American working for the Ministry is part of an organization which would not permit anyone to send to America a sanely written and wholly accurate article about some of the Fascist tendencies of the Chinese government, which are little known in America, the country from which China is so anxious to obtain help, both now and after the war.
>
> "While suppressing articles which give a picture of China as it is, the Ministry sends to America stories about how the gallant Chinese are doing this or that despite obstacles. Chinese officials like to see China pictured as a poor but deserving country. They are perturbed when she is pictured as being not quite so deserving as she might be."

At the end of his report, he concluded:

> "I clearly see the desirability, which at the moment is a dire necessity, of Chinese-American cooperation, both now and after the war. I believe that the Cultural Relations program, especially so far as the agricultural experts are concerned, is a good one. I have developed a strong liking for the Chinese. I like my Chinese associates, with whom my relations are excellent. I frequently have been entertained in their miserable, straw thatched, rat infested, mud and bamboo houses. I am a friend of their wives and their children.
>
> "I am of the opinion, however, that the present is not a time for an American government employee to be working in the International Publicity Department."

With that, he proposed to the Ambassador that his appointment should not be extended beyond the original year and that the project should be quietly dropped. The Ambassador concurred that no additional specialists should be sent to the Ministry of Information and that Taylor's appointment should not be extended in view of the fact that "the use of American Government paid personnel in a Party

Ministry whose chief objective is the dissemination of propaganda aimed at the United States does not seem desirable." At the same time he noted that

> ". . . Mr. Taylor has been one of the most successful appointees sent by the Department under its cultural relations program for China. He has been tactful in his dealings with the Chinese, enjoys the confidence and goodwill of Dr. Tong and his associates in the Ministry, as well as of the foreign press correspondents, and has been extremely cooperative with the Embassy. His picture of the press situation in China is that of an experienced newspaper man, new to China, who has retained an objective viewpoint, and is perhaps the clearer because of his position behind the scene working with the chief propaganda organ." [21]

In the same despatch, the Ambassador made an exception in the case of George Alexanderson, the news photographer on leave from the *New York Times*, by supporting his continuance as desired by the Ministry since his duties were, in the Ambassador's estimation, "less along pure propaganda lines" than Taylor's. Alexanderson did in fact stay with the Ministry for two full years though Taylor, Grim, and Buchner had left by the end of one. Before his departure from New York, he had visited the Chinese News Service (the New York arm of the Ministry of Information) and found the files inadequate and the available pictures poor in technical quality and subject matter. Furthermore he was told that they had not received a picture from Chungking in over six months. He commented in a report to the Ambassador written after his first seven months' service in China:

> "Upon reaching Chungking I quickly found the reason for this lack of material. The photographic department was stagnating. Nothing was of interest to them, nothing was new. They had seen the same scenes, the same people, the same surroundings for years. Feature stories occurred before their eyes without their seeing. They thought the only story worth covering was the Generalissimo making a speech, addressing troops or other public gatherings. They needed a fresh viewpoint. In seven months I have tried to combat this disinterest, this lethargy that pervaded. I think I am succeeding. It is reflected in their pictures." [22]

The lethargy that Alexanderson described was endemic throughout the bureaucracy in Chungking by mid-1944 but the hagiography of the Generalissimo was the primary and continuing function of the Party Ministry, therefore a safe preoccupation of its staff. The enthusiastic young American news photographer, uninhibited by the political insights that so troubled Taylor, saw the Chinese scene with fresh eyes and recorded in picture stories, sent to New York soon after his arrival, "the city of Chungking, transportation, radio,

shops, manufacturing, newspapers, inflation, municipal government and entertainment." [23] His own photographs of scenes of this nature as well as Chinese and American Armed Forces and portraits of leading personalities were very useful to the New York office to build up their file of illustrative material to accompany future news releases and feature stories.

However, perhaps his most lasting influence was accomplished through his teaching young Chinese photographers the special skills of news photography, captioning, and other technical details and in organizing the all-important serial numbering and filing system for the nearly 7,000 captioned pictures and 15,000 feet of 35 mm. film made by himself and his staff during the first 20 months of his stay in China. He greatly improved the quality of photographs which the Chinese News Service could furnish American publications by the simple expedient of filing contact prints in Chungking and sending the negatives to New York. This was the reverse of the procedure then in use. It meant that a journalist radioing a story from Chungking could examine the picture files for appropriate illustrations, the numbers of the pictures chosen could then be transmitted by radio to New York and glossies could reach the editors of the publications concerned almost as soon as the story itself. The scale of operation achieved under his leadership was extraordinary considering that, for example, on his arrival he discovered that all processing of films by the Ministry was necessarily being done at night since "the large cracks in the walls, caused by the bombings, precluded developing in the daytime. . . . My first job was to design and have built darkrooms where the work could be done during the day. . . ." [24] His energy and enthusiasm in grappling with these material problems had their counterpart in his effect in raising the morale of his coworkers. Of the four journalists sent by CU, he was best placed to do both a first-rate technical and at the same time politically neutral job which, because of his own wide-ranging response to all aspects of the Chinese scene, escaped the narrow confines of Party propaganda and contributed materially to heightening American understanding of China.

The National Resources Commission of China in 1944 requested by name Edwin K. Smith, metallurgist, to improve the quality and increase the production of trench mortars in the Chinese Government arsenals. He reached Chungking in the early autumn of 1944 and spent the next eight months in various arsenals and iron and steel works concentrating in particular on improving sand castings

and developing permanent molds. Teaching was an important aspect of his work and for this purpose he had brought slides to illustrate his talks. Before leaving China he gave away the handbooks he had brought with him and ordered relevant books and journals sent from the United States. He himself managed to make microphotographs of some of the sand-cast and permanent mold shells for comparative purposes and these with other foundry work photographs were developed for him in China by the U.S. Army Signal Corps and OWI.

Smith's tireless concern, not only with the technical problems which arose, but also with the human ones made him well liked by his associates. The accelerating inflation in the spring of 1945 drew this comment from him: "There is some discontent, due to the rapid rise in prices, and comparatively little increase in salaries. For example, during the past six weeks, the cost of lunch in the city (Kunming) has risen from CN$600 to $1600." At the same time, the immediate relevance of the work to the winning of the war convinced him that it took precedence over other options which appealed to his war-weary coworkers.

> "I am not conversant with the overall picture for post-war plans, but I cannot see the logic in sending the best young engineers to America when production is so badly needed here. For example, Tze Yu Iron and Steel Works said that they were sending sixteen of their engineers to the States, including all the ones I thought useful for production. At Central Machine [Works] the same process is taking place. The ones who can pass the examinations go to the States, those who cannot pass stay here. Most of the engineers I talked with have a great desire to go to America under the Foreign Economic Administration program, and some of them said frankly that they are not interested in war production, as they wish to be prepared for better jobs after the war."

His own stay in China was about to be cut short by heart trouble diagnosed by the Embassy's Navy doctor, but the only inkling of it was a sentence at the end of the same report: "I might mention in passing that I have worked seven days a week at these plants for almost seven months, and I am beginning to feel it." [25]

A problem of great importance to China was that of establishing industrial standards for her economy. National standards were needed for purchasing, production, and specification to unify domestic industrialization and conform to requirements of foreign trade. Dickson Reck, a standards expert, was sent by the Department

to assist the Chinese Ministries of Education and of Economic Affairs in this matter at its request. His stay in China involved working in the western provinces during the war and in the east for more than a year thereafter. On the basis of his wide travels and observations he wrote:

> "There is very little standardization (of equipment) to simplify operation, replacement and repair. With few exceptions the equipment in individual plants is a hodge-podge of various makes, various designs, various countries of origin, and has been acquired at various times over a span of the past forty years. This confusion of systems, with the resulting inefficiencies, is characteristic of industry throughout China. It stems from the facts that Chinese industry has been built in large part with foreign equipment imported from both metric and foot-pound countries and was specified by engineers some of whom were trained to think in terms of metric units and some of whom were trained to think in foot-pound units. No thought was given originally to problems beyond the walls of the plant which was being built, in other words, to the necessity for a single system of weights and measures for the country as a whole." [26]

Reck noted in the same report that "the metric system is decidedly predominant" in the east coast plants that were still operating at the end of the war, and in view of its logic as a system and its international acceptance in scientific and technical measurements, he recommended to the Chinese authorities that it should be the basis for the new national standards to be promulgated. When this reached the ears of Ambassador Hurley, he exploded. He called Reck on the carpet and berated him for recommending standards which were not tailor-made for the purchase of American exports. Reck's attempt to persuade him that this move was in the best interests of *China*, which faced the postwar task of building up her industries from scratch, simply further infuriated Hurley.

Though soon forgotten by Hurley, apparently, the episode briefly spotlighted a question of cultural relations policy which arose more than once. Should advisers who are sent by the U.S. Government to assist a foreign country be obligated to press for the immediate commercial interests of the United States or are they to offer their best judgment without reference to promoting sales or other advantages to American concerns? Notwithstanding the reaction of the Ambassador, we held the latter view and supported our experts in offering their advice without ulterior motives. The Embassy had a Commercial Attaché and other officers assigned the duty of promoting or otherwise aiding American business interests. CU technical experts were not appointed to augment this staff; their disinterested expertise was clearly what they were called upon to extend to their Chinese colleagues.

Reck soon won the confidence of the engineers and officials with whom he worked, and he responded by becoming deeply interested not only in his work but in observation and enjoyment of Chinese life and culture. His usefulness became more and more obvious as problems of postwar industrial reconstruction loomed nearer and, at Chinese request, his assignment was extended an extra year by the Department. Meanwhile he accompanied the Secretary General of the Chinese Standards Committee to an international standards meeting called by the United Nations in New York at the end of 1945 and arranged visits for him with 21 national standardizing agencies, 3 city purchasing and weights and measures departments, and numerous plants. Four trunkfuls of standards were collected and shipped back to China. Reck reported that "the Chinese Supply Commission in Washington told me that he [the Secretary General] was able to accomplish several times more with my help than he could have alone."—a comment which seems self-evident.[27]

Dr. Harold H. Loucks who had been Professor of Surgery at the Peking Union Medical College in the 1930's returned to China under the CU program in December 1944 at the request of the Chinese Ministry of Education to teach and demonstrate surgical techniques at various refugee medical colleges and military and civilian hospitals in Free China. Conducting ward rounds, teaching clinics and seminars, supervising surgical work and operating, himself, in centers scattered in or near Chungking, Chengtu, Lanchow, Kunming, and Kweiyang kept him very busy through most of 1945. His long-time connections and friendships in the Chinese medical world made him very welcome wherever he went, enabling him to gain a perspective beyond that available to most of the newcomers.

After the first six weeks of his strenuous regimen he reported to the Embassy:

> "Aside from the more strictly didactic and technical assistance which I can provide to the institutions in which I have been working, I so far have found that perhaps the greatest contribution I can make is in the field of general morale. The professional personnel of China's medical schools have struggled long and hard against many obstacles. They are weary not only from working under great handicaps and from overcoming almost impossible difficulties, but also from lack of outside contact and stimulation. Their eagerness to talk with anyone who has been in recent contact with the rest of the medical world is at times almost pathetic. A little understanding and sympathy goes a long way. In common with isolated individuals everywhere, their

concern for the supposed newest developments in medical science and their apprehensions over their own imagined deficiencies is an exaggerated one. They need help in acquiring perspective. Reassurance that the fundamental principles of medicine and surgery have not changed, and that much can still be accomplished without an unlimited supply of the most recent drugs and gadgets is to me one of the greatest needs of the moment—and therefore one of the chief objectives of my work. . . ."

In conclusion he advised CU officers:

"I believe that intelligent help and cooperation from even a small group of foreign professional men willing to accept the conditions of life and share the meager facilities available can be of more real help at this time than thousands of dollars spent for additional supplies or many fellowships granted for study abroad. I think the Chinese must be helped and encouraged to face their own problems in their own country with their own resources as developed by themselves and not trained to think that their only salvation lies in unlimited help from abroad—help which all too frequently seems to breed only jealousy and unhappiness and inefficiency and misunderstanding." [28]

The war ended in the middle of his year in China. A few months later Dr. Loucks spent some time in medical centers in the large east coast cities of Peking, Tientsin, and Shanghai. There he encountered some of the immediate postwar tensions and conflicts between the citizenry who had spent the war years under Japanese occupation and the Chungking government officials who now came swarming down upon them. The staff of the old Shanghai Medical College teaching hospital he discovered to be "in a turmoil because all who remained in Shanghai have been designated as collaborationists and most of them dismissed." In Peking, by contrast, he reported that "much wisdom was shown by the first representative of the Ministry of Education and the Wei Sheng Shu [National Health Administration] . . . as a result of which it seems unlikely that an unbridgable gulf will develop between medical workers who came west and those who remained behind during the period of the war. The supply of qualified individuals is so small that the development of such a gulf could be a major tragedy." [29]

Lieutenant Colonel John T. Tripp was loaned by the U.S. Army to CU to afford the Chinese Government, and particularly the Chinese Army Medical Administration, his skills in the manufacture of serums and vaccine products. In peacetime he had been in charge of such operations as Associate Director of the Michigan State De-

partment of Health. Unlike Dr. Loucks, he had never been to China before, but his ability to adapt his expertise to such conditions as he found, to make do with whatever equipment was at hand or could be scrounged, and, most important, his fairness, his optimism, and his enthusiasm made him an ideal choice for the assignment.

Tripp, on his arrival in China, set up and operated a laboratory for the production of standardized vaccines and serums and also took on the supervision of the four plasma units of the Kunming Blood Bank operated by the American Bureau for Medical Aid to China. These were no easy tasks in the circumstances since, as he wrote, "Any product intended for intravenous use is difficult to prepare. Every step in the procedure must be both chemically and bacteriologically clean as well as sterile to prevent the final product from producing a febrile reaction in the patient." Obtaining or improvising the necessary equipment and avoiding contamination in the manufacture of these products were matters of life and death.

Laconic reports by Tripp on his problems and accomplishments for the months of January and May 1945 deserve excerpting for the snapshots they give of both aspects of his work. These were some of his problems: "While the generator was in the US Army workshop for repairs, the warehouse where it was kept was robbed, and all of the repair parts were stolen." "Bottle clamps for pooling bottle stoppers are inadequate. Apt to result in 'popping' of stoppers during shaking." "Running water is needed and can be installed at little expense." "Store rooms should be straightened out. Real fire hazards." "Bacteriology laboratory is inadequate. Sterile room is necessary." And his next item reads: "Imported sterile room set up out of doors for occasional storage of charcoal because 'glass windows are broken.'" "Rats killed all young guinea pigs." His reports of what he had accomplished are equally laconic: "7000 American beer bottles [U.S. Army empties] have been secured for use with intravenous solution project." "Completed manufacture of first lot of smallpox vaccine." "Continued preparation of teaching manuals for Technician's Training Course." "Worked on designing and building equipment for mobile intravenous production units for Chinese army." "Gave two lectures on immunology in addition to regular instruction of the junior staff." [30]

Details of his activities are amplified somewhat in a letter written in 1975 recalling this period.

> "I wish that there was a way to let Fong Kong and Dr. Au know that the cholera cultures isolated during the 1944 cholera epidemic, dried in small ampoules and sent to NIH in Bethesda, were still viable and very pathogenic when opened and used in vaccine research by NIH and a couple of universities in 1958 (or maybe 1959). We knew that the cultures were good but we

were a bit reluctant to give the details of how they had been prepared. Our centrifuge was a leather bag on a ten foot rawhide thong that was whirled by a workman (coolie turned technician by wearing a white coat) standing on a 3 foot high rock. Not very elegant—but very effective in packing bacteria and much cheaper than the electric centrifuge which required gasoline and cost about the same as electricity generated by the old Pullman car generator and the coal-burning Stanley Steamer automobile engine which our Chinese mechanics hated because they were sure it would blow sky high.

"Our 'centrifuge technicians' also operated the vacuum pump and the cultures were frozen in the Crosley Icy-Ball refrigeration unit which was charged daily by heating over a small charcoal fire. The six college graduates who worked with me worked out the methodology. All I ever did was give them a straightforward statement of the problem and an open discussion of the possible ways of arriving at the desired end product. They solved their own problems and very quickly acquired confidence that they could blow glass, operate an acetylene generator, make a test-tube brush or do whatever was necessary. It was fun working with them because they were so eager and enjoyed their activities to the fullest extent."[31]

Clearly, Colonel Tripp had qualities of personality which enabled him to accomplish the impossible; namely, to carry a very advanced technique to a very backward area, train assistants in the demanding manufacturing process and, despite all the complications, produce usable results.

The last of the visiting professors sent to China under the President's Emergency Fund was Nathaniel Peffer, Professor of Political Science at Columbia University. He had known a number of the Kuomintang leaders for over two decades, first as a journalist reporting from China on the nationalist revolution of the twenties and subsequently through study-visits to China in the course of an academic career which centered on Chinese politics. He reached Nanking in July of 1946 just as the hopeful period of the Marshall negotiations was coming to an end and the outbreak of civil war was seen to be unavoidable. For the next six months he traveled and lectured at the newly reopened institutions of higher education in the eastern part of the country. Talks with academic friends, old and new, and his own acute observations were the basis of a memorandum sent in December at the end of his appointment to the Ministry of Education which had invited him as a visiting professor. The deplorable conditions he found are described in the following extracts:

"I know that the under-financing of higher education is not a matter of choice, but I am not sure its effects are fully realized . . . . I do not think one can exaggerate the demoralization which has set in among the university teachers. The conditions under which they have to live, which are no better than during the war and perhaps worse, have reached the point where not only can they not maintain a position of academic and professional dignity but they cannot even maintain health. Badly clothed, wretchedly housed and under-nourished—and sometimes overworked because they have to take on extra jobs to live—they have not the physical strength to do a professional job adequately. Naturally they are depressed, sometimes almost hopeless, and this is not an attitude in which men can do scholarly and educational work properly . . . Those who now enter the teaching profession, despite the meager compensation, will be those who could not do better in any other vocation—the mediocre who want a relatively secure post, however badly paid. This means that the generation that will come to maturity in forty or fifty years will be trained by the mediocre, perhaps by incompetents. . . . I am aware of the economic difficulties that confront the country now, but I think there should be a clear awareness of how high a priority on governmental funds education must hold if the future is not to be compromised."

He pointed to the ill-advised overexpansion of schools at all levels far beyond the availability of Government funds to support them, the result being the "multiplication of poorly equipped and poorly manned institutions," and the overcentralization and rigid regulation of educational administration. At the end Peffer took up the delicate subject of thought control.

"I do not want to enter into any political discussion, but one of the paralyzing influences in higher education now is the sense of repression felt by all professors. Whether rightly or wrongly—and it seems to me rightly—they believe that they are not free to express their opinions, even in the course of their teaching. It hardly needs to be said that it is impossible to teach certain subjects in the social sciences without at least having certain controversial questions come up for discussion. To try to teach them without such discussion is to teach them so badly that in effect it is not teaching them at all. And when a man of intellectual quality and ability is forced to teach his subject badly, to treat it artificially and stripped of its content, he gets a sense of frustration that sooner or later undermines his self-respect, or, at least, causes him to lose interest in his work. And students quickly detect that they are not being given the full content of their subject and the effect on them is to convince them that it is not worthwhile studying or to lose respect for their professors, which comes to the same thing. To maintain a system of higher education without freedom of thought and expression in teaching is to waste the money expended on it." [32]

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In this period of deepening crisis, Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart, former President of Yenching University, turned to Professor Peffer for his impressions based upon his "wide travel and contacts with all types of intelligent Chinese." Peffer's response was sobering.

> "America is losing moral prestige in this country. . . . Adherents of the Kuomintang and what might be called the reactionary resent that we do not give more active help toward crushing the Communists—and Russia by implication. A large class among business people, academic people, civil servants resent that we give the government just enough support to enable it to believe that it can act with impunity without putting on it enough presure to make it change its spirit and its practices. The radical but not Communist think that our support both makes civil war possible and entrenches the worst elements in power. The extreme left is resentful because it believes we are entrenching a fascist regime in return for its being a tool for our own purposes, which it deems to be imperialistic domination. . . . For the first time we are under both resentment and suspicion." [33]

The foregoing quotations from reports of the Department's experts in China between 1942 and 1946 present even in brief a more vivid picture of the disintegration of all aspects of Chinese life in this period than subsequent historic generalizations, familiar to us all, can convey. Peffer's comments, written at the very end of the period by a lifetime observer of Chinese life and politics, simply reinforce the testimony of others who had preceded him. Good will, high qualifications, patience, and determination on the part of the individual American expert could have only minimal effect in a situation where those whom he came to assist were distracted by all-pervading corruption, killing inflation, and eventual political anarchy.

What long-term effect these Americans sent to China by CU did have can never be measured. Undoubtedly the personal influence of able and congenial experts on their immediate Chinese colleagues must have left some imprint. How much of this survived the revolutionary overturn and the Communist regime's insistent erasure of individuals' former relationships with "imperialist America" is probably not even recognized or if so acknowledged now by those Chinese colleagues who are still living. We may at least hope that the technical expertise itself has been of use to China in the decades since. (Appendix IV lists all the American experts sent to China by CU.)

Notes

CHAPTER FIVE

1. R. W. Phillips to Ambassador Gauss, Chungking, Dec. 15, 1943, NA, RG 84, 862, forwarded in Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 1989, Jan. 3, 1944, *ibid.*, 842–Experts.
2. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Tel. 1280, July 24, 1943, NA, RG 59, 811.42793/1264.
3. See note 1.
4. Minister T. V. Soong to Ambassador Gauss, Chungking, Nov. 21, 1942, NA, RG 84, 842–AID.
5. Secstate to Amemb, Chungking, Instr. 225, Mar. 20, 1943, *ibid.*, 842–Experts.
6. P. Z. King, Director General, to J. C. Vincent, Chargé d'Affaires, Chungking, Mar. 17, 1942, *ibid.*, 842.
7. *CU Monthly Report*, Apr. 1942, p. 30.
8. Secstate to Amemb, Chungking, Tel. 326, Apr. 24, 1942, NA, RG 84, 842–AID.
9. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 412, May 19, 1942, *ibid.*
10. R. W. Phillips to Ambassador Gauss, Chungking, Dec. 15, 1943, enclosure in Desp. 1989, Jan. 4, 1944, NA, RG 84, 862.
11. *Ibid.*
12. Secstate to Amemb, Chungking, Tel. 848, June 17, 1944, NA, RG 59, 811.42793/1800.
13. Interview with W. C. Lowdermilk, p. 385, Regional Oral History Program, Univ. of California, Berkeley, Calif.
14. Author's interview with R. W. Phillips, May 7, 1973. At that time Phillips was Director of the International Organizations Staff, U.S. Dept of Agriculture, with important responsibilities for U.S. participation in the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
15. R. Alley, "Four Once-Poor West Kansu Counties," *China Reconstructs*, Vol. 23, No. 4, Apr. 1974, pp. 25–28.
16. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1945. Dept. of State, publ. 2249, Far Eastern Series.
17. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 2155, Feb. 14, 1944, NA, RG 84, 891–Buchner.
18. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 1893, Dec. 9, 1943, NA, RG 59, 811.42793/1468.
19. *Ibid.*
20. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 1940, Dec. 21, 1943, *ibid.*, 811.42793/1480.
21. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 2355, Mar. 25, 1944, NA, RG 84, 891–Taylor.
22. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 2655, June 7, 1944, NA, RG 59, 811.42793/1824.
23. *Ibid.*, see "Hometown, China," *Look*, May 2, 1944, pp. 22–26 for examples of his own photographs.
24. Amemb, Chungking, Desp. 652, Aug. 25, 1945, *ibid.*, 811.42793/8-2545.
25. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 297, Apr. 13, 1945, *ibid.*, 811.42793/4-1345.

26. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Desp. 1375, June 26, 1946, *ibid.*, 811.42793.
27. Amemb, Chungking, Desp. 1128, Feb. 15, 1946, *ibid.*, 811.42793.
28. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 124, Feb. 5, 1945, *ibid.*, 811.42793/2-545.
29. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 1651, Feb. 5, 1946, *ibid.*, 811.42793/2-546.
30. *January 1945 Report:* Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 138, Feb. 12, 1945, NA, RG 59, 811.42793/2-1245.
May 31, 1945 Report: Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 465, June 7, 1945, *ibid.*, 811.42793/6-745.
31. John T. Tripp to author, July 1975.
32. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Desp. 475, Feb. 4, 1947, NA, RG 84, 842.
33. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Desp. 206, Oct. 17, 1946, *ibid.*, 893. (Published in *Foreign Relations*, 1946, X, p. 388.)

CHAPTER SIX

Chinese Educators and Artists Visit the United States

THE American scene, in the years 1942–49 which concern us here, contrasted markedly with the disintegration and eventual overturn of the Chinese state discussed in the previous chapter. For the first three years we were at war. But though this brought about major dislocations of the norms of peacetime America, at the same time it offered special opportunities peculiarly advantageous to Chinese who reached the United States from Free China at that period. For example, since millions of Americans of military age were in the armed services at bases in this country or overseas, American universities were functioning but, aside from special courses for the military services, were underpopulated in the war years. Their facilities of personnel and equipment were unprecedentedly available to such individuals as were free to come. For the same reason, the pressing need for additional manpower at home to replace those absent on war service afforded openings for on-the-job technical training and for the temporary assumption of roles in a wide variety of fields normally filled by Americans. The following chapter, concerned with Chinese students in the United States, examines CU's experience in assisting them to take advantage of these special opportunities. Here we present the not unrelated story of bringing to the United States each year a small number of Chinese in the professions under the "exchange-of-persons" program of which the American-experts-to-China aspect has already been examined.

The "exchange" as it evolved was markedly different in the two directions. The Americans who went to China were for the most part skilled in technical fields. The Chinese who were invited to America were principally from the academic professions; a majority were professors of the sciences. The final group also included two of China's outstanding writers of fiction and drama and a gifted artist.

The Americans who went to China were selected to meet requests from Chinese Government agencies. CU assumed that behind each request was some wartime urgency though this, as already noted, was not always the case. The wartime situation did, however, motivate CU's project for inviting Chinese to come to the United States. The

intention was to try to alleviate even in a small way the long-term isolation of Chinese refugee academic institutions. The Embassy was instructed in October 1942 to convey to six Chinese universities the Department's invitation:

> ". . . to select one representative each from their professional staffs to come to the United States for residence of about one year in order that such representatives may have the opportunity to benefit themselves by further studies in their particular subjects and benefit their institutions through contact with developments in the general educational field. Opportunity would likewise arise for them to bring Chinese educational and other needs to the notice of interested parties by lectures, speeches, or interviews. Representatives should be selected with these points in mind." [1]

The wording of the Department's telegram led the Embassy officer who was handling the matter to comment in a memorandum to the Ambassador:

> "It appears to me that it is not requisite that the Embassy in its invitation limit itself to the phraseology of the Department's telegram . . . . I would therefore propose that, in order that the Chinese concerned are not to feel that we are adopting a patronizing attitude toward their scholarship, we indicate that it is anticipated that American academic life will receive benefits from the proposed contacts as well as presumably will the concerned Chinese scholars and institutions . . . ." [2]

Consequently the invitation as issued followed the telegram closely but added this sentence: "His contacts with American post-graduate groups would naturally bring to American academic circles a better general understanding of the Chinese culture, and be of corresponding benefit to the American people." [3] The addition of this sentence was entirely in accord with the Department's basic policy that cultural exchange should be reciprocal. But the fact that the Department had neglected to express it and the Embassy felt it necessary to interpolate it reveals a significant difference between the attitudes of Washington and Chungking in the matter. This is worth examining.

In Washington, the CU staff was deeply concerned with ameliorating the plight of the refugee intellectuals who through this program might "have the opportunity to benefit themselves . . . and their institutions. . . . " Further, by offering them the opportunity "to bring Chinese educational and other needs to the notice of interested parties. . . ." Washington was saying, in effect, "By coming to our country you can not only benefit yourself and your institution in your time of trial but you can also press for aid from 'interested parties' here to meet China's needs." Even this paraphrase with its

crude incitement to supplication would not have appeared unseemly in the Washington of 1942. Ours was certainly the richest and strongest nation in the world and our sentimental attachment to China over many years, not to mention our guilt at her five years of suffering while we remained neutral and traded with Japan, inspired us to press upon her in her weakness whatever aid we could give from our strength.

In Chungking, however, the Embassy at once sensed that this well-intentioned generosity smacked of charity with a whiff of the patronizing. It could be received as an affront to that peculiarly sensitive form of self-respect called "face." The Embassy met this hazard by adding the sentence cited which spelled out China's reciprocal contribution anticipated by the exchange.

This small slip would not be worth mentioning were it not for its bearing on the experience of China over the previous hundred years in which she fell from being the Middle Kingdom, the center of civilization, to being a helpless giant overwhelmed by the West and forced to adopt Western ways and Western knowledge to save herself. In 1942 this period, epitomized in the unequal treaties with the Western Powers, was rapidly drawing to a close, but American glad-hand friendship was still tainted with benefaction and the sensitive Chinese acceptance of it still festered with humiliation.

Considerations of Chinese "face" and of Willys Peck's sensitivity to it have been mentioned several times in the previous chapter. Those instances concerned his eagerness to meet Chinese Government requests for expert assistance as presented, without subjecting them to what might be regarded as humiliating skepticism or distrust. In the present case, a similar desire to help without stint was being expressed. But the Embassy sensed and corrected the possible implication that proud and touchy Chinese academics would be coming to the United States in the submissive role of beneficiaries and mendicants.

The Embassy extended the Department's invitation on November 4, 1942, to the following universities: Southwest Associated University, Kunming; Central University, Chungking; Wuhan University, Chiating; Chekiang University, Tsunyi; Szechwan University, Chengtu; and Yunnan University, Kunming. The first four had taken refuge in the west from their prewar locations in eastern cities; the last two were locally established, though some refugee scholars were included in their faculties. Y.S. Koo, Vice Minister of Education, was informed orally of this action on November 10 and on November 13 a copy of the letter of invitation was sent to him with an explanatory covering letter.[4] But the invitations themselves were sent directly to the presidents of the uni-

versities concerned to avoid unnecessary political interference by the Ministry.

The universities responded to the invitation by appointing worthy representatives, some of whom were, in fact, outstanding individuals.

Southwest Associated University in Kunming was a wartime conglomerate of three leading universities, Tsinghua and Peita (Peking University) from Peking and Nankai from Tientsin. As their appointee, they named a professor of logic and epistemology from Tsinghua, Chin Yueh-lin. Professor Chin was, at 48, the oldest of the representatives selected. He had studied in the United States many years before, receiving his B.S. from the University of Pennsylvania in 1917 and his Ph.D. from Columbia in 1920. He was representative of a small but remarkable group of scholars in China of his generation who were completely bicultural. Born in Hunan and educated at home as a boy by tutors in the traditional learning, he knew large segments of the Chinese classics and of T'ang poetry by heart. Tsinghua College, founded with the Boxer Indemnity Funds remitted by the United States, had given him his basic modern education and rudiments of English. His subsequent college and graduate education in Pennsylvania and New York, followed by a period of five years in England and Europe, perfected his mastery of English and widened and deepened his knowledge of Western thought and culture far beyond the bounds of his immediate academic training. After his return to China and appointment to a professorship at Tsinghua University in 1926, he had published articles and books both in China and in the West.[5]

A leading physiologist, Dr. Ts'ai Ch'iao, 46, was chosen by Central University. Professor Ts'ai was head of the Department of Physiology and Pharmacology in its Medical College. He, too, had received part of his education in America, with a B.A. from Indiana University in 1922 and a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in 1924, and he was completely at home in the English language. He had returned to China in 1925 but had subsequently done further research in England and Germany in 1930–31 on a Rockefeller Fellowship. The Embassy forwarded to the Department a list of 47 of his physiological research papers published in English between 1924 and 1942. It is notable that the only gaps in his annual output were in two of the years of wartime disruption, 1938 and 1941.[6]

Wuhan University appointed Professor Liu Nai-chen, head of the Department of Political Science. A native of Anhwei, he had graduated from the American mission-supported Nanking University and had had six years of graduate training in Europe from 1926 to 1932. His Ph.D. in political science was obtained at the

University of London, but he had also done research at Berlin University and the Universities of Paris and Vienna and had traveled widely in Europe. Since his return to China in 1932, his entire teaching career had been at Wuhan University. He had published textbooks on Western governmental systems and from 1933 to 1937 had been Councilor of the City of Hankow and Adviser to the City of Wuchang.[7]

The representative of the University of Chekiang was selected "after consultation with the Ministry of Education." Possibly for this reason a professor with strong Kuomintang connections who had been a member of the Peoples' Political Council since 1939 was chosen: Chang Ch'i-yun, geographer, age 42. He was a graduate of Central University and had taught geography there and at the Central Political Institute, both in Nanking, before taking up his post in Chekiang in 1935. He had traveled widely in China and published extensively on the geography of China but had never previously been abroad. In accepting the invitation he specified that he wished to pursue his studies at Harvard.[8]

By chance, it was the youngest of the appointees who was best known in American academic circles though he had never previously visited the United States. This was Fei Hsiao-t'ung, age 33, acting head of the Sociology Department at the University of Yunnan which chose him to be its representative. He had studied at the American-supported Yenching University in Peking and obtained his doctorate in social anthropology under Professor B. Malinowski at the University of London in 1938. His reputation had already been made by the publication of his book in English, *Peasant Life in China*, a pioneer field study, and he was at the time of his appointment directing researches on wartime social conditions in interior China in a field station he had established outside Kunming which was supported cooperatively by Yenching and Yunnan Universities.[9]

The appointment of these five representatives was accomplished with admirable smoothness. Perhaps it was too much to hope that the sixth could proceed with equal dispatch. Instead, though a representative of Szechwan University was eventually confirmed, the preliminary moves in the early months of 1943 veered between the exasperating and the ludicrous.

On January 18, 1943, Szechwan University's presumed president, Cheng Tien-fong, wrote to the Ambassador that he had appointed Dr. Hsiao Tso-liang to represent the University. He described Dr. Hsiao as a 1933 graduate of the Central Political Institute in Nanking with a Ph.D. degree from the University of Berlin in 1939. Age 36, "he has been professor of international relations in the Na-

tional Szechwan University since 1939 and is now on leave for research purposes." Not until his final paragraph did Dr. Cheng mention that "I am now appointed to be the Vice-Chancellor of the Central Political Institute," [a different institution, elsewhere] and added, "whose Chancellor I presume you know is Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek."

Notwithstanding this impressive finale, the Ambassador commented in forwarding the text of the letter to the Department,

> "It will be observed that it is not entirely clear whether Dr. Cheng or Dr. Hsiao could be considered technically to be contemporary representatives of the University in question. The Embassy has in fact been informed by a Chinese academician that the faculty and student body of the National Szechwan University staged a strike upon the appointment of Dr. Huang Chi-lu to be new president, their opposition apparently being based upon their objection to the appointment of a person who was more a Kuomintang man [head of the Szechwan Provincial Kuomintang] than an educational leader. That same academician characterized the National Szechwan University as primarily a 'party' institution, remarking its close connections with the [Kuomintang's] Central Political Institute. In the circumstances, it was thought desirable . . . to obtain clarification in regard to the question of whether Dr. Cheng's designation could be considered to have the approval of the present leaders of the National Szechwan University. To obtain clarification, an officer of this Embassy took up the matter at the Ministry of Education on January 25, 1943, but was there advised that the best procedure would be to request Dr. Cheng to confirm that the appointment had the approval of the new president (Huang Chi-lu)." [10]

Accordingly, the Embassy the next day wrote such a letter to ex-President Cheng. Cheng replied on February 6 that the designation of Hsiao had been made prior to the newcomer Huang's assumption of the presidency but that Cheng had now written Huang for his opinion of the appointment. On February 28 Cheng informed the Embassy of his receipt of a letter from his successor, Huang, from which the relevant quotation was "as the choice of Dr. Hsiao Tso-liang was made by you as well as the Ministry of Education, I certainly agree to it." Consequently, on March 5 the Embassy communicated to both Cheng and Huang an acknowledgment of the appointment of Hsiao.[11]

With any normal luck this action would have terminated the confusion. But within a week a new player entered the scene and escalated the confusion. A Szechwan University professor of education, Hsiung Wen-ming, came to the Embassy to deliver a letter of protest of which the gist was,

> "Since Mr. Hsiao is neither a member of our faculty, nor of our staff, Mr. Hsiao has no right to be our University repre-

sentative to go to America no doubt. And since Mr. Cheng is no longer president of National Szechwan University, he also is not in a position to make any appointment for the said University."

In addition to his written complaint, Hsiung alleged in an interview at the Embassy that ex-President Cheng had handled the matter secretly and that members of the faculty knew nothing of the invitation extended by the Embassy. The appointee, Hsiao, he said, had left the University at the beginning of 1942 after serving as a part-time professor teaching one course and simultaneously as secretary to Dr. Cheng when the latter was president. He went on to denigrate Hsiao's scholarship and intimated that the new president, Huang, had not approved his appointment.

Philip Sprouse, the Embassy officer handling this matter, explained that the Embassy could not change the appointment unless informed by the president of the University of his desire to designate another representative. Hsiung responded that he was taking this action merely because he was the only faculty member who knew of the invitation or of Dr. Hsiao's appointment and "that he was doing so on behalf of his university and not for personal reasons."

This claim of personal disinterest by the protesting professor, Hsiung, seemed the more remarkable by hindsight when the Ambassador received a letter from him dated March 25 and written after his return to Szechwan University in Chengtu.

". . . . our administrative council members were alarmed to know that Mr. Tso-liang Hsiao, a man not connected with National Szechwan University, should go to the U.S.A. in its name. They have discussed the matter in a meeting and have decided upon me as our University representative.

"Besides an official letter already mailed to you by our acting president, Dean Shou [Chu] (President Huang Chih-luh is now under major operation), our University has also issued me an identification paper. When should I come to Chungking and what preparation should I make? . . ."

Sure enough, the Embassy received almost simultaneously the March 19 letter from Dean Chu, the acting president in Chengtu, confirming the appointment of Hsiung and signed jointly with the official President Huang's name and seal.

The addition of an *acting* president to the *ex*-president and the *replacement* president sponsoring competing appointees should have been enough to drive the Embassy to distraction. However, Sprouse kept his head, wrote President Huang on March 30 for written confirmation of his approval and, hearing nothing in reply, wrote to the Ministry of Education for clarification on April 9. This latter

move brought results. A telegram from President Huang to the Embassy received April 19th backed Hsiao.

> "No alteration has ever been made. It is stated in your letter that we sent you a telegram recommending someone else. This University has not sent such a message. Please send us a copy or original of the telegram in question to enable us to investigate the matter."

A letter to the same effect signed by the dean in the name of President Huang was received by the Embassy on April 27 and spelled the end of whatever hopes the sanguine Mr. Hsiung had had. Dr. Hsiao was officially appointed.[12]

The appointment brought to an end one of the many administrative hassles that the CU program was causing the overburdened Embassy political officers at this time. The political officers themselves, however, were well aware that the problems raised in connection with CU's first try at inviting Chinese professors to come to the United States were not merely administrative. The political hurdles that the program had to surmount followed one upon another relentlessly, and the Embassy took the occasion to educate the CU staff.

As early as March 5, Sprouse had written in a despatch drafted for the Ambassador's signature:

> "In connection with the designation of Dr. Hsiao, it may be of interest to the Department to know that in conversation at the Embassy he emphasized his desire to make speeches and to get in touch with American newspaper representatives while in the United States. In view of his close connection with Dr. Cheng, who is now Vice-Chancellor of the Central Political Institute, and his tenure of service at National Szechwan University, which is strongly supported by the reactionary Ministry of Education (according to Dr. Cheng's letter, the choice of Dr. Hsiao was made by that Ministry as well as by the President), Dr. Hsiao may have more interest in the political aspect of his activities while in the United States than in the cultural phase. His interest in dividing his time between New York, Chicago and California, the chief centers of Chinese population, may be more than coincidental." [13]

The implication was, of course, that the Department's invitation was being used by the Kuomintang in the case of Dr. Hsiao to send a party agent for intelligence or propaganda activities rather than a faculty member for the benefit of Szechwan University.

Whether or not this surmise was correct, Hsiao was the only appointee who accepted without question the Department's request that the professors depart for the United States in March. The invitations had been sent out by the Embassy in November and by January 27, 1943, the final six appointees had been selected (including Hsiao; Hsiung's temporary protest came later). But the Embassy informed

the Department that with the one exception of Hsiao all the professors preferred to leave in May or June.[14]

It was a simple case of collision between the fiscal year and the academic year. CU had funds available which had to be encumbered before the end of the fiscal year on June 30. This problem was inextricable from many others. Primary among these were the difficulties of obtaining travel priorities and of arranging to reserve and pay for transportation from China by air to India and from India by air or boat to the United States for these Chinese civilians in this critical period of the war. The red tape was endless and time was required to untangle it. On the other hand, picture the situation at the China end. Distinguished and busy professors with prearranged course schedules were expected to cut them off at an arbitrary point and abandon the students whose education was their primary responsibility.

A compromise date was set and the professors notified by the Embassy to come to Chungking prepared for departure on May 1. Professor Chin, the logician, wrote to the Ambassador on April 1,

> "I will try to manage to be ready by the end of April through means that ordinarily would be considered inadvisable but which under the present circumstances might be approved by the University. I shall write to the [University] President suggesting that I try to wind up my work here in a month. . . ."

He was concerned also with the requirement that the professors report to the Embassy in Chungking before departure. For him, living in Kunming which was the lift-off point for the flight southward over the Hump to India, the northward flight to Chungking represented a wasteful move in the wrong direction. "I wonder whether it is necessary to start from Chungking," he wrote further in the same letter, "I am already very much pressed for time and it is difficult for me to divert any of it for a trip to Chungking. The air service is so inadequate to meet the needs of travellers that even those who have urgent business for travelling are kept waiting for days at a stretch. I might not be able to reach Chungking in time even when my work is already concluded by the 25th of April. If therefore you could by any chance see your way to letting me join the others in Kunming I should be exceedingly grateful." [15]

But this very logical suggestion from the logician was not acceptable to his own Government. It was struck down by the same all-pervasive political considerations that dominated every significant move in the Chinese refugee capital throughout those years.

The first intimation of further trouble ahead was the arrival at the Embassy of a letter from young Professor Fei Hsiao-t'ung written in Kunming saying that he had not yet received his passport and

that he understood that several of the other professors had also not received theirs. It was dated April 26, five days before their scheduled departure from Chungking. This unexpected complication was confirmed in a face-to-face report from Professors Tsai, Liu, and Chang, who converged on Chungking and called at the Embassy on April 30, the very afternoon before they were to fly to India in accordance with the complex plane priorities and other arrangements made by the Embassy and the Department.

Sprouse recorded the interview with the three professors the same day:

> "They stated that the issuance of their passports was being held up because of a requirement that they receive at least two weeks' training at the Central Training Corps prior to their departure from China. Dr. Tsai said that this was required for all Chinese who wished to leave the country but added that there were exceptions from time to time. They had been informed of this requirement this morning by Dr. Chen Li-fu, Minister of Education, who stated that this period of training would be for at least two weeks and possibly more and that they might or might not be able to begin the course on May 3. They stated that the Generalissimo would, of course, have to give his final approval before their passports could be issued. In reply to my question concerning the dates of their request to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the issuance of their passports, Dr. Tsai said that he had first applied for a passport several months ago, that he had requested his university to apply about a month ago and that he himself made application two weeks ago; Dr. Liu and Dr. Chang said that they had applied for passports about two weeks ago. They also stated that the Ministry of Education had telegraphed to Dr. Chin Yueh-lin and Dr. Fei Hsiao-t'ung . . . to proceed to Chungking [from Kunming] at once to take the training course. They informed me that they did not yet know when they would be able to leave."

For his part, Sprouse explained to the three that the Department had obtained priority plane accommodations for them from Karachi, India, to the United States on the assumption that they would leave Chungking May 1 and that this postponement might mean that they could not leave until July or August and that even then their departure "would necessarily be dependent upon the allotments received by the Department for the fiscal year beginning July 1. I stated that the Embassy had informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the sense of the foregoing on April 28 and in communications addressed to that Ministry on March 20 and March 30 but that the Ministry had said that it could issue the passports only upon orders from higher authorities. They seemed somewhat surprised when I told them that Dr. Hsiao Tso-liang, the National Szechwan University's representative, had obtained his passport in

March. . . . I expressed regret that they had made the expensive and time-consuming trip to Chungking and were now faced with the possibility that it might not be possible to obtain the necessary plane priorities for them and said that it would be unfortunate if Dr. Chin and Dr. Fei were to come to Chungking and find that they could not proceed to the United States as planned." As they left the Embassy, Dr. Tsai who acted as spokesman told Sprouse that he would telephone him the next morning the results of their scheduled interview with the Minister of Education, Dr. Chen Li-fu.

However, the next day two officers of the Ministry of Education called in person at the Embassy to state that the six professors, including Hsiao, would not be able to leave China until May 20, "because of a requirement that every Chinese who left the country must first have a personal interview with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and receive training at the Central Training Corps. They explained that the requirement was established by the Generalissimo approximately a month ago but that neither the Ministry of Education nor the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had learned of it until the present situation had arisen. Dr. Chen Li-fu had talked with the Generalissimo and had obtained a reduction in the training period of the professors from six to two weeks. They added that Dr. Chin Yueh-lin and Dr. Fei Hsiao-tung were being summoned from Kunming to interview the Generalissimo and enter the Central Training Corps."

Sprouse commented:

> "It is impossible to say with certainty what has brought about this last minute postponement of the departure of the university representatives. It is perhaps safe to assume that the Generalissimo has not been and will not be told the entire story with respect to the reasons for the Department's desire that they depart on May 1 and the difficulty of obtaining plane accommodations for them. The delay may arise partly from Dr. Chen Li-fu's desire to place all hindrances possible in the path of a project which doubtless does not have his approval in that the group, with the exception of National Szechwan University's appointee, consists of outstanding Chinese scholars who have already received western training and presumably entertain western liberal ideas. The situation has also enabled him to require their participation in the Central Training Corps, an act which might otherwise have been difficult to accomplish. The statement of the Ministry of Education that the requirement that all Chinese leaving the country must first undergo training at the Central Training Corps was not known to that Ministry or to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs hardly seems credible unless one takes into consideration the circumstance that the Chinese who are now proceeding abroad are probably all bearers of official or diplomatic passports proceeding on official business to foreign countries. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs telephoned the Embassy during mid-April to inquire whether the Embassy

desired to have the professors furnished official passports. Therefore, the question may not have arisen previously with regard to requiring non-official Chinese to interview the Generalissimo and enter the Central Training Corps, although Chinese officials are reported to have been required for some time to see the Generalissimo and attend the Central Training Corps prior to their departure from China. The National Szechwan University representative called at the Embassy in March with his passport but his political connections and his evident political motives in going to the United States offer a plausible explanation for the ease with which he received his passport and are in strong contrast to the difficulties encountered by the less politically-minded representatives of other universities." [16]

The "training" and political indoctrination undergone by the professors in the next two weeks was clearly a source of exasperation to them at the time but seldom alluded to and never described in detail after their arrival in the United States. It was their economic plight as they waited in Chungking and their uncertain future that disturbed them most deeply. A letter from Dr. Tsai to Sprouse written on May 18 after completion of their "training" gives a glimpse of the difficulties they faced:

"I have just been informed by Dr. Liu that you desire to meet us together on the coming Saturday. Since we are living far away from each other [in Chungking], I would advise you to send each of us an informal letter stating the exact time of appointment and the place of meeting, which is preferable in the north bank of the city. [The Embassy was still located at a troublesome distance from the city, on the south bank reachable only by ferry across the swift-flowing Yangtze River.] We wish that we, six university representatives, can live together, but the lack of hotel accommodation has prevented us from so doing.

"I am instructed by the other members of our group to inform you that we wish to depart from Chungking as early as possible because the living expense here is unbearable by any one of us for longer time. I am sure you understand the situation. I wonder whether it is possible for us to leave here and wait in India. I guess that can be done only after you have received instructions from the Department of State. At any rate we appreciate your consideration and assistance regarding this matter.

"Professors Liu and Chang and I have got our passports today and I think the other members should have the same any time." [17]

The tone of polite dismay expressed in this letter was replaced by frank desperation a week later. Five of the professors (all except Hsiao) signed another letter to Sprouse on May 26:

"We hope that you appreciate the fact that we find it extremely difficult if not impossible to wait here indefinitely. If our finances hold out, our health may not. While it may be difficult for you to give us any definite information on your part,

it may be possible for you to telegraph to the State Department on the following two points:

1. Whether the invitation is to be cancelled.
2. If not, whether we may wait for transportation in India so that we might proceed with whatever purchases we need.

"We presume that it takes about a week for the answer to come, and if nothing is available by that time some of us may be obliged to return home." [18]

Immediately on receipt of this letter on May 27, Sprouse sent a telegram to the Department. Emergency action empowered this group of five professors to fly out of the murderous inflation of Chungking to India on June 5 to await onward transportation there (Hsiao followed later). Their financial troubles were now over; the Department's invitation had specified that all transportation costs to, from, and within the United States were guaranteed and that each representative would receive the then adequate sum of $10 per diem from the day of departure from China until his return as well as a lump sum of $500 for the purchase of needed equipment in the United States.[19]

The delay in India was brief. By August 5, exactly two months from the day they flew over the Hump out of China, Tsai, Chin, Fei, and Liu were seated at a round table at the University of Chicago participating in a conference on "Unoccupied China," Chang had settled in at Harvard from which he refused to budge for considerably longer than the year allotted in the invitation, and Hsiao had arrived in the United States and embarked on his ambitious travels.

The proceedings of the Chicago conference were published in a small volume entitled *Voices from Unoccupied China* [20] which provides us a first-hand glimpse of the views of four of the Department's invitees (as they cared to express them publicly) shortly after their arrival in the United States. Professor Liu Nai-chen declared himself very optimistic about the postwar outlook for a constitutional regime, national unity, and attaining political democracy by degrees. Dr. Tsai Chiao addressed himself to problems of nutrition in Free China, listing serious deficiencies in vitamins and protein intake and widespread related diseases among poor peasants, soldiers, and students in the western provinces. These problems could be cured, he concluded, only by simultaneous progress in economic, agricultural and industrial development, and health education of the people. Chin Yueh-lin spoke on education. He surprised the American conferees by giving figures on the large increases in numbers of educational institutions and of students at all levels during the war period but deplored the "distinct deterioration of quality" which he believed would retard educational progress for a period that would be double the period of the war. Turning to consideration of the postwar world

he made a moving plea for a world plan for international order and security. It is dismaying, over 30 years after he spoke, to realize how far we still are from achieving that goal.

Young Fei Hsiao-t'ung discussed some social problems of the Kunming area where the influx of refugees from the coastal cities and the wartime expenditures had at first raised the standard of living of the poor peasants, then drained off labor from the farms. Young peasants were conscripted for the army; sons of well-to-do families were sent away to avoid conscription. Young people from the villages, both men and women, went to the cities to work in factories or other employment. In most cases, they left the land forever and their departure radically disrupted the age-old social structure of the countryside.

Fei and his colleagues in the Yenching-Yunnan field station had been for several years researching both the traditional patterns of peasant life in Yunnan and the disruptions due to the wartime upheavals. In addition, they had made several studies in modern factories in Kunming in order to follow the villagers into their city life and examine the problems encountered in converting rural hands into factory labor.

Most of Fei's efforts during his year in America were devoted to translating these researches into English. His graduate study at London University and the publication in English of his book *Peasant Life in China* had made Fei a citizen of the international world of scholarship. Now he wanted to introduce the work of his Yenching-Yunnan research team to this same world. He set about the task with concentrated energy. With the cooperation of American friends in New York, Chicago, and Cambridge who gladly worked long hours with him on his manuscripts, he prepared for publication two books: *Earthbound China*, on the team's agricultural studies, and *China Enters the Machine Age*, on the urban investigations.[7] In addition, he managed to get some fellowships and appointments for his colleagues and students at American universities as well as books and financial support for his research station.

Beyond benefiting his own institution, he had the wider objective of developing academic cooperation in the social sciences between Chinese and Americans in general. His major coup in this connection was to persuade Robert Redfield, Dean of the Division of Social Sciences at the University of Chicago and Chairman of the Social Science Research Council, to go to China for a year to

foster this cooperation. CU agreed to provide partial support for this project and the travel priority assistance necessary in wartime. Unfortunately this venture came to a sudden end when illness forced Dean Redfield to debark from his transport at the outset of his voyage. Though he succeeded in reaching China four years later on a Fulbright grant, the time had passed when the original intent of his trip could be accomplished.

Fei drew from the well-spring of his natural exuberance sufficient extra energy to supplement his scholarly labors by writing a weekly "Letter from America" for a Kunming newspaper. The series was later published in book form (in Chinese) with the title *Human Feelings and International Relations: A Message from America.*[22] The weekly despatches reported on such aspects of America at war as the rationing system, women working in war industries and government, and the popular support for the war effort. He contrasted the good nutrition and medical care for U.S. troops seen on the air bases en route from India with the living conditions of the average Chinese conscripts. He reported on a visit to a farm in Minnesota, the size, "500 *mu*," of an entire Yunnanese village as compared to the average Yunnan farm of 5 *mu*.* The farm's American family drove cars, listened to radios, sent the children to college, but if there were 100 people on that land how could these ends be achieved? He disliked certain aspects of American life, the food, the loneliness of the elderly, the absence of continuity with the past, of a sense of history. Though he was constantly stimulated by his daily experiences and observations which stirred him to analyze American society, his busy life inevitably wore him down from time to time. When he was overworked and exhausted, he was depressed by the restlessness and discontent that drove Americans to produce and consume hugely. He longed for acceptance and contentment which he regarded as traditional Chinese values. He concluded that only abroad did he discover how truly Chinese he was.

The first group of Chinese professors invited by the Department had barely reached the United States and settled into their activities when the time arrived for planning the second year of the program. It was September 1943 and the second group would not be leaving Chungking until June 1944 but the memory of the trying negotiations with Szechwan University, the Central Training Corps

* One *mu* is approximately 100 square meters.

tangle, and other headaches was still vivid in the minds of the Embassy officers concerned. Plenty of time had to be allowed for selection of the universities and for them to name their representatives, whose necessary departure for the United States before the end of June had to be well understood in advance.

The matter of selection of the institutions to send representatives was discussed in Chungking by Sprouse with John Fairbank whose widespread academic connections were useful to the political officers operating in a relatively unfamiliar field in the absence of a Cultural Attaché. At Sprouse's request he wrote a memorandum setting forth his thoughts on the matter.

Fairbank pointed out that, despite the fact that Professor Y. L. Chin had gone to the United States in the first group as representative of Southwest Associated University (Lienta), that appointment, strictly speaking, represented only one (Tsing Hua) of the three leading universities which had merged for the war period to form the refugee Lienta. He urged that a representative of each of the other two constituents, Peking University (Peita) and Nankai University, be invited for the coming year. He argued,

> "At one time it might have been contended that American benefits should be spread about the country, and not concentrated to any degree in institutions which were already well established, such as Tsing Hua and Peita. At present, however, all institutions are fighting for survival, and the best should be helped first. We must seek men of quality, wherever they may be found; but we should look in the places where they are most likely to be. Lienta is such a place."

He also recommended that the national academy, Academia Sinica, should be included in the invitation.

> "If scholarship in China is the point at issue, rather than the number of students taught per year, then Academia Sinica should be invited along with the universities. Its personnel are hard pressed and badly need American encouragement."

In the first year of the program, the invitations had been extended to Chinese Government-supported universities. This caused some murmuring in American missionary circles that the U.S. Government was discriminating against the Chinese scholars on faculties of American-supported Christian universities. Fairbank recommended that one of the missionary institutions should be included in the second year's list "mainly for the moral value of avoiding an avoidance of missionary institutions. Yenching and Nanking Universities both compare favorably with some of the Government institutions. Their scholars need support, in spite of all the mission aid that may come. More important, they both contain some men of the

first rank." He also suggested that Amoy University be considered for an invitation.[23]

The Embassy incorporated these suggestions in an airgram sent to the Department on September 30. In the same message, certain changes in procedure were proposed to avoid the confusion and misunderstandings of the previous year. The universities were to be notified of the departure date from the outset. The invitations were to be sent directly to the institutions with copies going to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under cover of a note requesting that the Ministry of Education be informed of the invitations to the national universities. This course would retain direct negotiation with the universities while avoiding criticism that the Government organizations concerned had not been fully informed. At the same time, it would "likely make more difficult the dictation of choice by the Ministry of Education than if the invitations were extended through that Ministry."

A financial problem not faced in the previous year was the effect of the constantly mounting inflation upon the families left behind in China when the professors left for America. In the interim the Embassy had been informed that in 1943 an unmarried professor (Y. L. Chin) had been selected "partially because persons with families could not afford to accept such an invitation." The Embassy recommended that the Department raise the per diem payments from $10 to "at least $15" so that a portion of this allowance could be paid to the families in China, preferably by arrangement through the Embassy at the 30 to 1 rate instead of the official rate of 20 to 1 required if remittances were made by the professors from the United States.[24] This difference appears minuscule in view of the fact that by March 1944, three months before the professors departed, the open market rate was already between CN $300 and CN $400 to US $1.

In the event, the Embassy's recommendations for the second contingent were followed, the two other constituent universities of Lienta, namely Nankai and Peita, were each invited to appoint a representative as were Amoy University and Academia Sinica, and none but two American missionary-supported Christian universities, Nanking and Lingnan, completed the list. The smoothness with which the selection and departure of the representatives progressed was no doubt due to dealing through Foreign Minister T. V. Soong (particularly in the time of the Generalissimo's ban on students going abroad for study). But the early planning and generous time allowance were well advised; the Embassy notified the Foreign Ministry on March 1 of the invitations to the four Government institutions to send representatives who were to depart in the month of June, but a response listing the four men selected was not received until two months later

on May 30. Fortunately the institutions had replied to the Embassy directly in early April.

Considering that top institutions were named and there was certainly some internal pressure to name leading figures, it is not surprising that the group selected for 1944–45 was representative of the Chinese academic establishment. There were two university presidents; Ch'en Yu-kuang from the University of Nanking and Sah Pen-tung from the University of Amoy. Both were scientists by training. Sah was still active, despite his educational responsibilities, in advanced electronics research. Dr. Wang Ging-hsi, a physiological psychologist and neurophysiologist, was Director of the Academia Sinica's Institute of Psychology in Kweilin. Dr. Ch'en Shu-ching, the representative of Nankai University, was a sociologist and Dean of the College of Law and Commerce at Lienta. Yang Chen-sheng who represented Peking University, the third constituent of Lienta, was a very cultivated scholar in the fields of Chinese literature and painting. He had been President of Tsingtao University and later, at Peita, Acting Dean of the College of Arts and Literature in the absence of Dr. Hu Shih, Ambassador to the United States from 1938 to 1942. The youngest of the group was Dr. Yung Chi-tung, botanist and accomplished musician, from Lingnan University, the Christian institution in Canton founded and supported by American missionaries. Later he, too, became a leading educational administrator, assuming the presidency of Ch'ung Ch'i College in Hong Kong.

All six had pursued their advanced studies at American universities and were able to outline quite concretely where and how they wished to spend their year in the United States. The scientists in particular were eager to spend time in American laboratories catching up with new developments in their fields and learning new experimental techniques. At the same time, seeing old friends was an equally strong desideratum. As Kunming Consul General William R. Langdon noted on the return of Chin and Fei from the first year's group,

> "It is felt that those professors chosen to go to the United States, regardless of whether they may feel reluctant to accept the invitation, return with restored spiritual and physical vigor. Renewed contacts with colleagues in their respective fields in the United States and the change from the conditions of poor housing and malnutrition in China inevitably have an effect." [25]

The Department had anticipated a repetition of the professors' financial predicaments of the previous year (1943–44) and had arranged that per diem should be paid to each man from the time he left his home to start the journey and during any unavoidable waiting in Chungking or elsewhere "with the exception that per diem may not be paid during such period as he is performing duties im-

posed by the Chinese Government." [26] This is an obvious reference to the two weeks' training at the Central Training Corps required of the 1943–44 group but there is no mention in the despatches that this was again required.

By the middle of July 1944 all six representatives in the second group had reached the United States and after an initial stop at the Department had scattered to various institutions across the country. Early word from Chungking of the intentions and goals of each individual simplified the administration of the program in Washington; institutions and special laboratories were alerted regarding the impending arrivals, and arrangements were made for their reception and whatever assistance might be required.

A brief glimpse of Dr. Sah's accomplishments for the year will serve as an example of the types of activities undertaken. Though he traveled widely he also managed to write a 466-page book during his year's stay. It was entitled *Fundamentals of Alternating-Current Machines*, published in 1946 by McGraw-Hill, and reviewed in the *General Electric Review* of August 1946 as marking "a new and welcome trend in educational methods." Sah presented a copy of the book to Ambassador Stuart with the comment "I feel that you may like to see how your efforts at the exchange of personnel between our two countries are bearing fruit." On his return to China he was appointed Secretary-General of Academia Sinica and devoted himself to developing Chinese scientific and industrial research along the lines of the American Office of Scientific Research and Development which had much impressed him during his visit to the United States.[27]

Sah, Yang, and Wang left for home on July 4, 1945, by way of Great Britain at the invitation of the British Council. Through this cooperation between the cultural offices of the two allied nations, they were enabled to visit educational and cultural centers in the British Isles and proceed homeward over the Air Transport Command route to celebrate the victory over Japan and face the heavy responsibilities of the immediate postwar period.

Year by year the program of bringing visiting professors from China was operated more smoothly at both the China and Washington ends. J. Hall Paxton was devoting himself to handling cultural relations matters in the Embassy in the early autumn of 1944 and by September 16 had sent out the letters of invitation for the third contingent (1945–46). These went to two Christian colleges, two academies, a national university, and a teachers college. Fukien

Christian College appointed its dean, Cheng Tso-hsin, a biologist and ornithologist, who used his year's leave to visit American museum collections and ornithologists while completing his checklist of Chinese birds. The President of Yenching University, Mei Yi-pao, came as its representative and traveled extensively in connection with its many American ties. His year was unfortunately interrupted by two operations. Dr. L. K. Tao (T'ao Meng-ho), British-trained sociologist, was sent by Academia Sinica; he was Director of its Institute of Social Sciences and spent his year visiting similar research centers and university departments of sociology and political science. The National Academy of Peiping, located in Kunming during the war, appointed Dr. Ny Tsi-ze, Director of its Institute of Physics. Dr. Ny's special interest was in piezoelectricity and spectroscopy. His advanced studies had been pursued in France in the 1920's, and of the 50 papers he had published in his field many had appeared in French journals. This was his first visit to the United States where he visited laboratories engaged in research work in his field's of interest in Rochester, New York, and elsewhere. Dr. Lin T'ung-chi, Professor of Political Science at Fuhtan University, had taught government at Mills College in Oakland for two years, 1931 to 1933, while working for his Ph.D. degree at Berkeley. Mills invited him to lecture on contemporary politics at a summer workshop on his return to the campus 12 years later. He subsequently lectured at Stanford University and returned to China via Europe. Thomas L. Yuan (Yuan Tun-li) came as representative of Northwest Teachers College in Lanchow where he was Professor of Health Education and Dean of Students. He threw himself with enthusiasm into conferences with the U.S. Office of Education, the Children's Bureau, and other organizations to observe a wide variety of programs in physical training and rehabilitation. The result of his concentrated activity was his appointment on his return to China to the Presidency of the Peking Normal College where he had taught for 10 years before leaving for Lanchow at the onset of the Japanese invasion.

Yuan's comments on his 11-months' stay in the United States were reported in the *Peiping Chronicle*, August 18, 1946. He analyzed the social organization of the Americans from a Chinese viewpoint.

> "When the first European settlers came to America they did not live in clans as they did on the old continent. Belonging to different families and racial stocks they had to cooperate with one another in meeting the environment of the new continent. For this reason they developed a strong sense of social organization. This explains why the religious, professional and social life of the American people is in sharp contrast to the family life of the Chinese, and has produced a spirit of solidarity among them."

And here is his slant on American education:

> "What a child learns in school is to enable it to meet its social environment as well as to improve it. This is different from the Chinese conception of education which aims at the imparting of knowledge to the child. . . . American education gives free scope to the development of individual initiative and talent and prepares men and women for work to which they are best suited by natural endowment and inclination. This is different from Chinese education which concentrates everything on textbooks and neglects the individual aptitudes of the students." [28]

The professors coming to the United States in the summer of 1945 at the end of World War II which, for them, had lasted for eight long debilitating years, clearly found the vigorous, functioning U.S.A. worthy of study. L. K. Tao was quoted on his return as saying to a reporter:

> "I had not been in America for over twenty years. On my present visit, I had the experience that I was living in a totally different America. This refers to the great strides that have been made by America. The Americans live a comparatively easy life, the reasons being that they have a stable living, their social order is sound and their productive power is enormous. Without America's contribution in producing the necessary war materials, the war might still be going on. During the war, America mobilized all available manpower for her war industries. As soon as the war was over, she rehabilitated her peacetime industries." [29]

Whether or not this conveyed to the Chinese public an accurate picture of contemporary America, it evoked rather poignantly those aspects of American culture which appeared enviable to Chinese in 1946. The "stable living," the "sound social order," the "enormous productive power," all resulting in the "comparatively easy life," were in marked contrast to the situation of China which had lived through the long war years to see victory over the Japanese and yet faced instability, social disorder, mismanagement of production, and for everyone increasingly difficult living conditions for the foreseeable future.

The end of the war in August 1945 also heralded the end of the President's (wartime) Emergency Fund which had financed the various aid programs administered by CU during the hostilities. Final allocations from the Fund had to be completed by CU not later than June 30, 1946. Thus whatever group of visitors was invited to

come from China to the United States for the 1946–47 year would be the last under existing arrangements.

This fourth and final group differed in some degree from the three previous ones. Four of the five institutions invited to send representatives were American-supported Christian institutions: Hsiang Ya Medical College in Changsha, Cheloo University in Tsinan, West China Union University in Chengtu, and Ginling Women's College in Nanking. The fifth was again Academia Sinica which sent Jaw Jeou-jang, the young Acting Director of another of its research institutes, the Institute of Meteorology. Two medical men were for the first time among the group, Dr. Chang Hsiao-ch'ien, Director of the Hsiang Ya Medical College and Dr. Hou Pao-chang, Dean of the Cheloo Medical School. Dr. Liu Cheng-chao, Professor of Biology and specialist in the study of amphibians came from West China Union University and pursued his interests with American researchers at the University of Florida, the Smithsonian Institution, the American Museum of Natural History, and elsewhere. Ginling College sent the first woman representative, Dr. Liu En-lan, head of its Department of Geography. She had done much exploratory field work in China's far west during the war and had published a number of articles in Chinese and in English on the geography of western Szechwan and the ethnology of border tribes in the area. Interested in comparing the American Indians and the Chinese aborigines, she spent some time in the summer of 1946 in New Mexico studying and sharing life among the Pueblo Indians, and in Arizona witnessing the famous snake dances of the Hopis. Experienced though she was in hiking the trails of western Szechwan, she unfortunately fell victim to U.S. metropolitan traffic. She was seriously injured in an automobile accident in New York in October 1946 and could not resume her planned schedule of travel and research until the early spring of 1947.

Hsiang Ya Medical College was part of the complex known to Americans as "Yale-in-China" from the longtime relationship between the two institutions. Its Director, Dr. H. C. Chang, spent four and a half months in New Haven making an intensive study of the Yale Medical School, but thereafter was almost constantly on the move studying medical school administration and curricula at a total of 42 medical institutions across the country. On his return to China he expressed himself as particularly interested in adapting to China the system of regional medical centers he had observed in the United States. Negotiations for the first Fulbright agreement were then in progress in Nanking and he communicated to the Department a hope that some of the American internists and researchers who had evinced a desire to cooperate with Chinese scientists might come to

China for a period under that program. "A free international exchange of personnel in the field of medicine is more needed than ever," was his conclusion.[30]

A significant departure from prior practice in this final year was the extension of invitations outside the academic world to two of China's leading writers and an artist-cartoonist of note. Shu Sheh-yu was already well known in America under his pen name, "Lao Sheh" (also romanized "Lau Shaw"), for his novel, *Rickshaw Boy*,[31] which was currently a best seller in the United States in English translation. The translator had tampered with the grim outlook for the hero at the close of the book; he provided a happy ending—the hero and the girl together looking toward a better future—as pablum more suited to the American public's taste. Whether or not this was a factor in the popularity of the English version, it naturally outraged the author. During his time in America, Lao Sheh worked with an American writer, Ida Pruitt, who had spent most of her lifetime in China, to translate into English another of his novels, *The Yellow Storm*.[32] He lamented after months of work that though it was faithful to the plot, the turns of phrase and the special essence of Peking (for both of which he was famous) appeared to be untranslatable. He stayed on in America for some time after his year was up, living on his royalties while writing, translating, and rebuilding his health. The writers' retreat at Yaddo, New York, welcomed him for a period to write in the protected isolation which was its special contribution to the creativity of American authors. But Lao Sheh, accustomed to concentrated composing amid the turmoil of his family's comings and goings, found the loneness and silence oppressive and departed for the city.

In the early summer of 1948 he returned to Peking to participate in a gathering of Chinese writers and remained there in various responsible positions until his death.[33]

With Lao Sheh came Wan Chia-pao, a popular dramatist, author of several plays of contemporary Chinese life, who was better known by his pen name, Ts'ao Yu. The two men spent June and July in Colorado, attending a Humanities Conference of the University of Denver at Estes Park in the Rocky Mountains and the annual Dramatic Festival at Central City where they met theater people from many parts of the country. Ts'ao Yu helped to direct and produce his play *Peking Man* presented by the Fine Arts Department of the University of Denver. Later they continued westward to Santa Fe, the Grand Canyon, Hollywood, where they were given a reception by the Screen Writers' Guild, north to San Francisco for several talks, to Seattle where both participated in the Northwest Pacific Writers' Conference and the Childrens' Theater Conference. In

August they visited Canada at the invitation of the Canadian Government.

After returning to New York, Ts'ao Yu worked with an American playwright, Reginald Lawrence, to adapt his play *Peking Man* for the Broadway stage. He commented,

> "Having seen several plays on Chinese life both on Broadway and in community theaters, including 'Lute Song,' I began to wonder if there is not a possibility of producing some modern Chinese plays for a better understanding of modern China and her theater. To me it seems that the Chinese theater in the minds of the American public is still lingering on the stage of old Cathay or based on a scanty observation of 'Chinatown.' As a matter of fact, apart from a few unessential points in production, the modern Chinese theater is no different from the American. The characters in their struggle for living are virtually the same, and perfectly understandable if we can make clear the conditioning circumstances against which they play." [34]

There is no evidence that *Peking Man* reached Broadway, nor that other of the searching modern dramas of human conflict and cultural change in China which he and his contemporaries wrote have ever been presented here in the years since.

The Chinese artist who completed the group was Yeh Ch'ien-yu who came with his wife Tai Ai-lien, a professional dancer and student of the folk dances of Tibet and Sinkiang. Yeh's satirical cartoons had been published in Chinese newspapers over the previous 15 years and he had had one-man exhibitions of his drawings and cartoons in Hong Kong, Kweiyang, Chungking, Bombay, and Calcutta. He brought with him from China a collection of his own and other cartoonists' works to show to Americans. The New York *Herald Tribune* carried an interview with him and reproduced several of his sketches in its January 19, 1947, editions, and in February he and his wife had a joint exhibition and dance recital in New York City arranged by the Artists League of America and were entertained on another occasion by the Society of Illustrators at a dinner where he showed drawings which depicted his experiences while fleeing from the Japanese.[35]

This final group of invitees, as previously noted, departed to some extent from the previously established norm. Since some funds remained which could be expended for this same program before it was to end on June 30, 1946, an even more unprecedented departure was proposed to General Marshall while he was involved in the early months of mediation for a peaceful settlement between the Kuomintang and the Communists. It was suggested that invitations should be extended to educational representatives from the areas under the control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to spend a year in the United States under the CU program.

General Marshall approved the plan as consistent with the even-handedness he was endeavoring to maintain in relation to the two factions. There was a vain hope that individuals designated to accept the Department's invitation might acquire and take back to China not only specific newly acquired professional knowledge and skills but also some sympathetic understanding of the American people.

General Marshall's authorization to select four representatives and General Chou En-lai's approval were wired to the Department at the end of May.[36] The Communist capital had by this time been moved from Yenan northeastward to Kalgan in Inner Mongolia. As Cultural Attaché of the Embassy, I flew to Kalgan the first week in June to meet with the Vice President of their cadre training school there, which they called North China Associated University, and to interview the individuals proposed for acceptance of the Department's invitations. The Vice President was none other than Chou Yang, at that point riding high as a cultural leader but due to be harshly repudiated by the CCP some two decades later. Not surprisingly, his own name led the list of four proposed by the university to make the trip to America. He was then 38, a graduate of Ta Hsia University in Shanghai who had studied the year following in Japan (1929). As a writer in Shanghai and, during the war years, an educational leader in Yenan, he had translated some works of Russian authors and of the Americans, Jack London and Upton Sinclair. He hoped to find a collaborator in the United States with whom he could translate Chinese revolutionary writings.

The second candidate was Ouyang San-tsen, 32, a dramatist, producer, and actor. He was also from Ta Hsia University but had left it in 1937 to travel with the CCP's Eighth Route Army as a member of dramatic groups giving anti-Japanese plays before audiences of soldiers and peasants. His spoken English was fairly good and he wanted to study the American theater and see amateur dramatic groups of students and workers.

Nieh Chun-jung, a mechanical engineer who had graduated from the Hopei Institute of Technology in Tientsin in 1934, was the third candidate. He had worked as an engineer in Nanking and Chungking, moving on to Yenan in 1938 and Kalgan in 1945 where he taught mechanical drawing and mechanics. He looked forward to visiting American machine shops, steel and iron workshops and laboratories, and mechanical engineering laboratories.

The fourth candidate, Chen Ling-phong, was a young animal husbandry specialist, a graduate of American-founded Lingnan University in Canton, who wanted to visit agricultural experiment stations, agricultural schools, and laboratories and to study serum and vaccine production. He himself had been doing research on

rinderpest serum and vaccine as director of an experimental farm in Yenan. His spoken English was quite good and he was accepted for the CU program but subsequently received and preferred an offer from United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) to be one of two persons from the CCP areas to study in America under their auspices. In his place the University nominated a research chemist, Lee Su, graduate of the University of Nanking (also American-founded and supported) who had been a technician in the munitions department of the Ministry of War in Chungking until he went to Yenan in 1940 and, at 26, became head chemist of the Engineering Department of the Institute of Natural Sciences there. His special interest was research in the coal tar dye industry and he hoped to pursue this in America.[37]

Kalgan in June of 1946 was the CCP capital but there was a palpable temporary air about the place. It was clear to all that Mao and his followers were headed northeastward toward the Manchurian provinces, rich in natural resources and already heavily industrialized by the Japanese. Simultaneously, American planes and ships were transporting to the same goal American-trained Kuomintang troops from the far southwestern provinces in a race to occupy the cities and lines of communications there first.

The Yenan English language broadcasts for the week of my visit to Kalgan questioned General Marshall's role, saying

> ". . . reliable reports stated that General Marshall seems to be engaged in efforts for peace in Manchuria and China but still Americans transport troops northward in violation of all agreements. . . . The Chinese people cannot but awake to the fact that such military intervention by the U.S. is not devoid of imperialistic designs. The day may even come when they might find America demanding military bases and political and economic rights from China, thereby degrading China into a protectorate or colony of America; or Chiang Kai-shek unscrupulously betraying national interests and national life and property in return for foreign intervention to consolidate his dictatorial position." [38]

The attempted evenhandedness in dealing with the Kuomintang and the CCP, which characterized General Marshall's negotiations at the outset, had led the war-weary Chinese populace to dream in the early months of 1946 of avoiding the dreaded resumption of civil war. But the subsequent major American support for the Kuomintang, the Government we recognized as legitimate, ended any possibility of Marshall's retaining the trust of the two sides as an impartial

negotiator. His assignment was, it now seems, doomed from the first. And, ironically, despite massive American military aid throughout the war and immediate postwar years to arm, train, organize, and transport Chiang's armies, they were soundly defeated and driven into exile within three years of Marshall's disillusioned departure in January of 1947.

By June of 1946 mutual recriminations between the two parties were already reaching a high pitch. If there was ever a time when the Department's program of cultural relations with China could have been extended to all of China, that time had, it soon became clear, already passed. The four CCP appointees including the substitute, Lee Su, reached Nanking on July 13 in an American plane of the Peking-based Executive Headquarters set up by Marshall to police the truce. They applied at once to the National Government for passports to enable them to accept the invitation of the U.S. Department of State. But the American official concern in the case carried no weight with Chiang Kai-shek when representatives of his domestic bitter enemies were involved. By August 9 the four were notified that their applications for passports were refused. The two UNRRA invitees, including our original appointee, Chen Ling-phong, were also refused passports.

As the group returned to Kalgan by another Executive Headquarters plane, it seemed a thoroughly disappointing ending to a project which might have formed a small bridge between these young Chinese coming from their isolated life and at least a few American engineers, dramatic groups, industrial chemists, and writer-translators. On the other hand, there is no doubt that they would have remained true to their political beliefs and this might well have antagonized Americans in the already burgeoning anticommunism of the time and erupted in incidents which could have given some substance to Senator Joseph McCarthy's empty accusations in the years following. From their own point of view it was probably fortunate that the chosen four escaped the ignominy and suspicion of having spent a year among the capitalists in the pay of the U.S. Government.

So the project died stillborn and even the fact that it had been proposed, under the office sobriquet "Operation Overleap" within the CU unit of the Embassy, was kept to themselves throughout the McCarthy years by the few who had known about it.

(Appendix V lists the Chinese educators and artists who did come to the United States at the Department's invitation.)

Notes

CHAPTER SIX

1. Secstate to Amemb, Chungking, Tel. 953, Oct. 13, 1942, NA, RG 84, 842.
2. Memorandum for Ambassador Gauss from O. Edmund Clubb, Chungking, Oct. 19, 1942, *ibid.*
3. Ambassador Gauss to President, Szechwan Univ., Nov. 4, 1942, *ibid.*
4. O. Edmund Clubb to Y. S. Koo, Chungking, Nov. 13, 1942, *ibid.*
5. Mon-lin Chiang and Y. C. Mei to Ambassador Gauss, Kunming, Dec. 21, 1942, *ibid.*
6. Ku Meng-yu to Ambassador Gauss, Chungking, Jan. 11, 1943, *ibid.*
7. S. K. Wang to Ambassador Gauss, Chiating, Jan. 27, 1943, *ibid.*
8. Coching Chu to Ambassador Gauss, Tsunyi, Dec. 16, 1942, *ibid.*
9. Ch'ing-lai Hsiung to Ambassador Gauss, Kunming, Dec. 19, 1942, *ibid.* See Note 21 for data on Fei's publications.
10. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 896, Jan. 26, 1943, enclosing Tien-fong Cheng to Ambassador Gauss, Chengtu, Jan. 8, 1943, *ibid.*, 842-Professors.
11. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 980, Mar. 5, 1943, *ibid.*
12. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 1108, Apr. 27, 1943, *ibid.*
13. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 980, Mar. 5, 1943, *ibid.*
14. Memorandum dated Mar. 20, 1943, enclosed in Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 1108, Apr. 27, 1943, *ibid.*
15. Chin Yueh-lin, Kunming, to Ambassador Gauss, Chungking, Apr. 1, 1943, *ibid.*
16. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 1144, May 5, 1943, enclosing copies of four relevant memoranda including that reporting conversations with professors Apr. 30, 1943, *ibid.*
17. C. Tsai to P. D. Sprouse, Amemb, Chungking, May 18, 1943, *ibid.*
18. P. D. Sprouse, Amemb, Chungking, from Y. L. Chin, C. Tsai, G.(sic) Y. Chang, N. C. Hu, H. T. Fei, Chungking, May 26, 1943, *ibid.*
19. Secstate to Amemb, Chungking, Tel. 953, Oct. 13, 1942, *ibid.*, 842-AID.
20. Harley F. MacNair, ed. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1944).
21. Fei Hsiao-t'ung and Chih-i Chang, *Earthbound China* (London: Routledge & E. Paul, 1949); Shih Kuo-heng, *China Enters the Machine Age* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1944); Fei Hsiao-t'ung, *Peasant Life in China* (London: G. Routledge & Sons, 1939).
22. *Jen-ch'ing yü Pang-chiao* (Kunming, 1944). An expanded version, entitled *Ch'u-fang Mei-kuo* (*First Visit to the U.S.A.*), was published by OWI. For many details of Fei's activities I am indebted to Prof. David Arkush of the Univ. of Iowa who is preparing a book-length study of the life and work of Fei Hsiao-t'ung.
23. J. K. Fairbank to Chargé d'Affaires J. C. Vincent, Memorandum: Invitation of Chinese Professors. Sept. 10, 1943, NA, RF 84, 842-Professors.
24. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, A-61, Sept. 30, 1944, *ibid.*
25. W. R. Langdon to Secstate, Desp. 104, Kunming, Oct. 31, 1944, *ibid.* There was a natural reluctance to leave family and colleagues in time of crisis.
26. Secstate to Amemb, Chungking, Instr. 844, June 16, 1944, NA, RG 59, 811.42798/1798.

27. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Desp. 235, Oct. 31, 1946, *ibid.*, 811.42793/10–3146.
28. "Chinese Educator on U.S.," *The Peiping Chronicle*, Aug. 18, 1946.
29. "L. K. Tao's Impression of America," *Chung Yang Jih Pao*, Nanking, May 28, 1946, quoted in Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Desp. 1378, June 27, 1946, *ibid.*, 811.42793/6–2746.
30. Congen, Shanghai, to Secstate, Desp. 1941, Dec. 10, 1947, *ibid.*, 811.42793 SE/12–1047.
31. New York : Reynal and Hitchcock, 1945.
32. New York : Harcourt Brace, 1951.
33. Several years after Lao Sheh's suicide in Peking in the late 1960's during the Cultural Revolution, Miss Pruitt wrote in a letter to the author, Nov. 16, 1973 :

    "What is there to say about Lau Shaw that has not been said. I have never written anything about him, about those months we worked together on *The Yellow Storm*. How patient he was. How understanding. And how impatient he became in the end, wanting to get back to his country, his city, and I was so slow. He wanted to record old Peking before it was gone. The peddlars and their night cries, the acrobats at Tien Chiao, the markets in the old temples. How he loved them all." Lao Sheh's comments on the translation and on Yaddo were made to the author.
34. *The Record*, III, No. 1 (Jan. 1947), pp. 31–32.
35. *Ibid.*, II, No. 11 (Nov. 1946), pp. 37, 38 and III, No. 3 (Mar. 1947), p. 44.
36. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Tel. 894, May 31, 1946, O/FADRC, microfilm.
37. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Tel. 945, June 11, 1946, *ibid.*
38. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Tel. 946, June 11, 1946, *ibid.*

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CHAPTER SEVEN

Chinese Student Problems and Emergency Aid

ACCUSTOMED as we are to having large numbers of Chinese students in our institutions of higher learning in the United States, it is easy to forget that China's interest in Western education began less than 150 years ago, and that her first "foreign students" to come to America for study were three school boys brought by an American missionary in 1847 to enroll at Monson Academy in Massachusetts. One of the three, Yung Wing, went on to graduate from Yale University in 1854. Almost two decades after his return to China he was empowered by the Chinese Imperial Government to bring four groups of school boys, totaling 120, to New England between 1872 and 1876 to undergo similar immersion in Western life and learning. They were lodged in the homes of ministers and friendly townspeople in the small towns of the Connecticut River Valley where their Manchu pigtails and exotic appearance were very noticeable and at the same time their youth and their inbred politeness were very appealing. Many became general favorities with their hosts and teachers. They were all called back to China in 1881, their education cut short by a fear on the part of the Chinese Government that they were being alienated. This continued to limit their effectiveness on their home ground.

Nevertheless, repeated humiliations suffered from gunboat diplomacy convinced the Imperial Government that China must learn the secrets of Western power in order to defend herself. Consequently, small groups of Chinese students were sent to Europe for military, naval, or technical studies in the final decades of the 19th century. After the defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, many Chinese were sent to nearby Japan to study her mastery of Western science and technology which had enabled her to overcome the reputedly formidable power of the Russian Empire.

Throughout these years individual Chinese students were coming to the United States to study under the sponsorship of American missionaries in China and their home church groups in the United States. But the number was increased into a steady flow by an act of

Congress which remitted part of the American share of the Boxer Indemnity ($12 million surplus after claims had been met) to the Chinese Government in 1908 with the suggestion it be used for educational purposes. Fellowships were set up for Chinese students to study in the United States, and Tsinghua College was established on the outskirts of Peking to prepare students to take advantage of such study. The remainder of the Boxer Indemnity was remitted in 1924 and the China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture was then established by agreement between the two Governments to administer the funds. The Foundation was located in China and administered by its Chinese officers and staff but had 5 Americans to the 10 Chinese on its Board. By 1955 an estimated total of 2,000 Chinese students had been assisted to secure education in the United States from the Boxer Indemnity Funds.[1]

With the second remission in 1924, the U.S. Government stepped out of the picture officially as regards the support of Chinese students in America. Meanwhile increasing numbers of students had been coming from China to the United States for higher education or specialized graduate studies, financed by their families, by fellowships, by church or other private agencies, American or Chinese, or in the case of some individuals or groups, by the Chinese Government. By 1942 there were over 1,500 Chinese students in the United States. Financial support for the continuation of their studies had been in many cases affected by the freezing of Chinese assets in America in July 1941. This had been done at the request of the Chinese Government to prevent these funds from falling into the hands of the Japanese who by that time controlled the major cities and communications of China. America's entry into World War II effectively suspended the remittances from China which had been providing subsistence for others. At the same time, the wartime transportation stringency prevented the return to China for those who wished to go. For many it was a critical situation. The war had stranded them in America, without means of support or of continuing their education and, more depressing still, with their future plans reduced to timeless uncertainty.

This situation was brought to the attention of CU by Dr. Chih Meng shortly after the inauguration of the China program in early 1942. As Director of the China Institute in America, the New York based organization which administered the Boxer Indemnity and other fellowships for the China Foundation, he was in close touch with the many Chinese students attending American colleges and universities. He described their plight to officers of the Department and urged that a grant from the President's Emergency Fund, to

enable outstanding individuals among them to continue and complete their studies, would be a means of immediate as well as long-range assistance to war torn China.

Ambassador Hu Shih, as mentioned earlier, had been consulted by CU in September of 1941 regarding proposed projects to be undertaken in the China program. At that time he declared that bringing students from China was impractical under current wartime conditions and suggested that aid should be afforded to those already in the United States.

Meng's reiteration of this point within weeks after Pearl Harbor at once received favorable consideration. A committee which included Meng himself and Dr. Stephen Duggan, Director of the Institute of International Education, was appointed by the Department to advise CU on worthy individual students to be aided. Duggan had been a close associate of CU from the start and he was constantly consulted for his expertise derived from years of dealing with problems of foreign students in America. Meng co-opted Roger Greene to meet with and advise them. Nevertheless it was primarily Meng, whom both men knew well, who was in a position to select from personal acquaintance and extensive files the Chinese students to be presented to the committee and recommended for support by U.S. Government funds. The criteria for selection, laid down by the Department, were: (1) the importance to China of the student's field of study; (2) the ability of the student; and (3) his or her financial need. The Department made a small annual grant to the China Institute to defray secretarial and other expenses incurred in this collaboration.

The program was initiated in April 1942 with the mailing of checks by the Department for $75 monthly to selected Chinese studying in American universities and colleges. Two years later, on May 1, 1944, there were 193 Chinese students currently receiving these grants out of a total of 376 who had been assisted for longer or shorter periods during this interval.

The Chinese Government had meanwhile been extending similar financial assistance to Chinese students stranded in the United States. Its funds were deposited with its official Committee on Wartime Planning for Chinese Students in the United States and the administration was entrusted to the China Institute. It was reported that up to January 1944 this organization aided about 200 students.

Most of the students assisted by the Department were graduate students preparing themselves for responsible positions on their return to China. Among them were individuals who had already held such positions before coming to the United States for further study, for example: a former provincial commissioner of education, a former secretary of a provincial branch of the Nationalist Party, a former

member of the Institute for Agricultural Research of the Executive Yuan, a former technical expert of the Nanking Health Station, a woman surgeon who had directed a large hospital, a former district magistrate in Kwangtung Province, a former fellow of the National Research Institute of Chemistry at Kunming.

As time went on and the Chinese students completed their specialized academic education, opportunities were found for many of them to obtain practical training in their special fields. The American armed services had withdrawn skilled workers from industrial plants on such a scale that openings for qualified foreign trainees were readily available which in peacetime would normally have been filled by Americans. The Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Nelson Rockefeller, had set the example by establishing inter-American trade scholarships for Western Hemisphere students to come to the United States for training in American companies which paid all expenses of the trainee during the period of instruction. The Coordinator had also placed Latin American students for training in various U.S. Government departments, notably the Department of Agriculture, the Civil Aeronautics Administration, and the Weather Bureau. Following this lead, the CU China staff found positions for a number of Chinese trainees in appropriate bureaus of Government departments. By March 1944 there were 33 Chinese placed by CU in this type of advanced training. Several were in field stations of the Department of Agriculture, two were in the Tennessee Valley Authority studying hydraulic engineering, two were with the Bureau of the Census in Washington, still others with the Farm Credit Administration, the Library of Congress, and the Division of Tax Research of the Treasury Department. At the request of the Chinese Government a group of six were being trained by the U.S. Soil Conservation Service in the making of composite maps from aerial photographs in the hope that a new land survey of China could be undertaken through these means. The stipend for unpaid trainees was raised to $100 or in some cases $120 a month.

In the first two years of the program over 300 Chinese trainees were placed in positions in American industry or commerce where they could earn their own living and receive practical training in their fields of study. Naturally many of these were in war industries. They were employed by 10 aircraft companies, 3 electrical manufacturers, 2 locomotive works, 2 steel companies, and a score of other engineering and scientific firms.[2]

In-service training was, of course, not confined to governmental or industrial placements. Professional training was equally needed. Internships were found for a number of doctors in hospitals across

the country. And perhaps the most unique training arrangements were worked out for a few Chinese graduate students who were assigned as "visiting teachers" or, more grandly, "cultural ambassadors" to public school systems in widely scattered cities and towns across the country. The Chinese visiting teachers, while studying American educational methods in action, were themselves to contribute knowledge of China to pupils and colleagues through their own teaching of Chinese language, culture, and daily life.

William Dennis of the CU staff inaugurated this program by bringing three Chinese student "cultural ambassadors" to Washington January 28–29, 1943, to have tea with Mrs. Roosevelt and explain their intentions. She gave the project her blessing by favorable mention in her newspaper column "My Day." One of the three, Fook Tim Chan, has recapitulated his subsequent adventures in his thesis for the degree of Doctor of Education at Teachers College, Columbia University, entitled "An Experience in Cultural Education."

Chan's first assignment was to Springfield, Massachusetts, where his mission was, he wrote, "to interpret China to the American students and to visit and observe the Springfield educational system." In addition, he was surveying "the community both as an industrial and a social unit as well as from the educational standpoint." He operated as a "floating teacher" to enrich the usual curriculum with Chinese instances and made himself popular in the community by participating in Rotary and other clubs, demonstrating Chinese cookery and preparing meals in private homes, enrolling in an evening course in machine shop skills at the local trade school, tending a victory garden, and visiting the principal industrial plants and public institutions of Springfield.

Chan commented on the freedom and independence of the American pupils in expressing their opinions, and marveled at the wartime earnings of many of the older students, some of whom were paid as much as $50 a week as machinists working part time in the armory. Chan himself had much to learn. He admitted entertainingly that learning to hold open doors for women, to seat them, to help them on with their coats, and to light their cigarettes was a matter of mastering skills which would be frowned upon in China. These American folkways he picked up as a guest in American homes. Such experiences he obviously enjoyed. He was taught to play American games by the families who entertained him and to whom he taught Chinese cookery. He confessed, however, that a difficult problem for him was sensing when to leave after dinner. In China, an evening ends for the guests promptly when the meal is finished; in America leaving at that point is considered boorish as he soon discovered. His personal relationships with teachers and pupils in the public

schools and the friendships he made in the community during his three months in Springfield obviously made a deep impression on him.

His second assignment was a brief period at the Lincoln School of Teachers College, Columbia, in New York City, where he observed and participated in the current experiments in "progressive education." Finally, he was sent across the country on a six-months' assignment to the public school system of Berkeley, California. There he was again able, as in his happy Springfield period, to teach (smatterings of?) Chinese language and culture in the schools, give radio talks and cooking demonstrations, all the time carefully observing the Berkeley school system for use, as he noted, in his thesis for his Doctor of Education degree. In that very thesis he rather unblushingly quoted a written testimonial of Dr. Virgil Dickson, the Berkeley Superintendent of Schools:

> "We found Mr. Chan to be unusual in his ability to meet people of all ages and stations in life and inspire an interest and a naturalness as he instructed and talked. He worked with children from kindergarten through high school, inclusive, with all the teachers and supervisors in the schools, and other groups in this area of the United States. . . . In six months . . . Mr. Chan brought to our people an understanding of China far beyond any other type of experience which we could have planned for a similar length of time." [3]

It would be interesting to have personal accounts from other Chinese students or trainees of their experiences during the period that they were receiving CU support. Reports, however, were not required of them. Dennis traveled to campuses across the country to interview these and other Chinese students regarding any problems which CU might help to solve, but he left no record of his interviews or experiences with Chinese students, or, at least they have not been found in the surviving CU archives.

Still, this personal contact with Chinese students at scattered campuses, large and small, acquainted the CU China staff with the many confusing situations faced by the students beyond the immediate necessity of paying for room, board, and tuition. The staff was able to assist them in problems of selective service, immigration regulations, income taxes, and clearances for visiting restricted factories.

This concern for the fate of the Chinese students stranded in the United States by the war was of course shared by the universities they were attending. The financial assistance offered by the American and Chinese Governments was probably equaled by the contributions of American universities which extended scholarships, work opportunities, and financial credit to Chinese students. Mutuality of

interest naturally led the CU China staff to exchange views and solutions with deans and foreign student advisers at the universities most heavily attended by Chinese students.

At the suggestion of administrators in several of these universities the Department called a conference in Chicago July 29–30, 1944, "To Discuss Problems Concerning the Admission and Adjustment of Students from the Far East during the Current and Postwar Periods."

The conference was attended by 15 deans and foreign student advisers and the administrators of three on-campus International Houses. The universities represented were California, Washington, Michigan, Chicago, Northwestern, Cornell, Columbia, Harvard, and M.I.T. From Washington came representatives of the U.S. Office of Education, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Bureau of the Budget in addition to Dennis and me from CU in the Department of State.

It was no surprise to those present to be told as the meeting opened that the current problem facing us all was the large number of applications for admissions received in recent months by American institutions from students in China. The University of Michigan alone had received 317 since January 1, 1943. The other universities represented at the conference were faced with similar floods of applications from remote Free China, often by telegram without accompanying transcripts or other data. A typical telegram might read: "Will graduate from Szechwan University next June. Will you admit me to your graduate school for economics study. Wire reply immediately. Signed, Pei-fu Chi." In many such cases, the American universities' admissions offices not only had no means of ascertaining the student's academic standing but were also ignorant of the academic status of the Chinese institution itself at which he had studied. To admit or not to admit? And how to decide fairly? These were questions faced by all the academic administrators present at the conference.

Unofficial information from various sources had it that the Chinese Government planned to select 1,200 students annually for the next several years to study in the United States, 600 to be Government sponsored to prepare for future Government posts and 600 to be privately supported. The Government ministries planned to send students in three categories: (1) mature men with long experience in the ministries who wished to update their previous training; (2) younger men of three or four years' service in the ministries needing practical training; and (3) graduate students coming for advanced study, the majority for scientific training but a large minority for study of economics. Students of the other social sciences and humanities would be few, because the Chinese Ministry of Education ad-

vocated that study of these fields be pursued in Chinese institutions. (American observers in Chungking had commented that this policy stemmed from the C–C Clique's determination to quash any independent thinking which might question Government controls or support leftist deviations.)

The most pressing problems faced by the universities at the moment and anticipated for the future in view of the ever-growing flood of applications arriving from China, the conferees agreed, were the following: how to get adequate information regarding applicants' education on which to base admissions, how to determine the current standing of Chinese universities, how to deal with new arrivals whose English was inadequate for study purposes, how to orient them to the new ways of life they would encounter, and how to assure that their health and financial support were adequate and, further, that financial reserves were available to cope with a possible breakdown in health.

In the course of the two days' discussion, solutions were propounded for each of these problems. The CU representatives presented to the meeting samples of an application form, printed on airweight paper, which had been framed in consultation with the universities present to provide them with the necessary information. A printing of 2,000 copies had been prepared and the majority of these had been flown to China recently in Vice President Wallace's plane for distribution through the American Embassy and Consulates there. (A new printing of 5,000 copies for use in India and elsewhere had been run off in response to requests received from the universities.) The U.S. Office of Education, which had for many years evaluated the credentials of foreign institutions, was asked to supply to the universities copies of their small leaflet on Chinese education compiled from sources in America and, in effect, to revise and improve it in consultation with suitable educational and governmental agencies.

The university representatives urged that the State Department appoint an Educational or Cultural Attaché for each country from which students came to the United States in substantial numbers to serve "as a counselor on educational problems both to inquiring students and to universities in the United States and abroad." This recommendation was welcomed by the CU China staff which had been of the same mind since the inception of the China program but had been unable for two years to convince the American Ambassador in Chungking that such an appointment would assist, not complicate, his already pressured existence.

Regarding the problem of students arriving in the United States with inadequate knowledge of English, the universities agreed that special training could best be handled by the receiving institutions,

but that, since this frequently involved them in considerable expense "whenever any private or governmental agency, foreign or American, is considering sending large numbers of students to the United States for study, an additional appropriation should be included to cover the cost of special training in the use of the English language."

Orientation was also thought to be most effectively provided by the receiving institution. In this connection, however, I had the pleasure of announcing to the group that a gifted young Chinese sociologist, C. K. Yang (Yang Ch'ing-k'un), was at that very moment involved in writing an orientation handbook for foreign students, to be entitled "Meet the USA." He was preparing it in Chinese and English at the instance of the CU China staff for the use of Chinese students in America, but the Institute of International Education which handled the printing and distribution of it for the Department found it so refreshingly bright and informal as well as informative that they subsequently used the English edition as a handbook for students from other foreign countries as well.

Visa officers in the U.S. Consulates abroad were expected to grant visas only on condition that students applying were able to show evidence of being in good health and having adequate financial support. The conference passed a (somewhat patronizing) resolution urging the consular officers to "take great care to enforce these stipulated visa requirements for students." But after I reached remote Free China in 1945 I soon came to understand why such enforcement was uneven at best. The absence of x-ray equipment and other sophisticated means of determining invisible pathology meant that the best of doctors could only testify to the superficial health of a student applicant. In addition, the desperation to get to America as the educational and political situation worsened led some students to resort to various kinds of duplicity to convince the overburdened visa officers of the adequacy of their health and finances. On student health insurance, the group was referred to the Institute of International Education for guidance.[4]

While the American university administrators meeting in Chicago in July 1944 were preoccupied with these practical problems they would face as the expected student influx from China reached flood stage, the flow itself had in fact been brought to a dead stop in Chungking by order of the Generalissimo. He was outraged over the response of certain American professors and other educators to regulations promulgated by his Ministry of Education for Chinese students going abroad for study.

The conflict arose over the Ministry's declared intention to control the thoughts of such students. The two weeks' political "training" in Kuomintang ideology which CU's Chinese professor invitees had been required to undergo in 1943 was a foretaste of more stringent developments to come in the near future. But while "thought control" by Kuomintang agents supervising Chinese studying in American institutions was abhorrent to citizens of our free society, the view from Chungking was altogether different.

With no inkling that this affair would attain near-scandal proportions when the U.S. reaction reached Chungking, the Ministry was simply extending overseas its domestic moves toward an increasingly all-pervasive and rigid control of the thought of students in the institutions under Kuomintang authority. By March 1943, Minister of Education Chen Li-fu had succeeded not only in overextending the number of institutions of higher learning established in Free China but also in nationalizing them all with the exception of the mission-supported colleges and universities and Kwang Hwa University (private) in Chengtu. According to a prominent Chinese educator in that city, the Minister had become "an educational dictator who mixes Kuomintang politics with his administration of the schools. And because of his dictatorial policies Mr. Chen is feared and cordially disliked by Chinese educators, and especially institution presidents, who must bow and scrape to him and perhaps compromise their political convictions, in order to obtain the funds to operate their institutions." His manipulations reached well inside the institutions in an attempt to regiment the teaching by controlling the appointments of and allowances to faculty members.

Meanwhile, he was also attempting to gain a measure of control over even the mission-supported colleges and universities. The weapon he used was his power to grant subsidies to them at a time when they were in dire financial straits due to the inflation and to the grossly unrealistic and, needless to say, unfavorable exchange rate maintained by the Ministry of Finance for the dollars and pounds on which these Christian educational establishments largely depended for their support.

According to the same informant, Minister Chen was "also deeply concerned in regard to exercising control over the 'political thought' of Chinese college and university students and often makes a point of inquiring of college and university presidents in this regard. Moreover, he has the party organizations maintain a close watch of the trend of thought among college youth and report their findings to him. And in addition there is of course the San Min Chu I Youth Corps [5] whose purpose is to foster proper political thought among Chinese students and more particularly to combat the rise of communist ideologies among Chinese college youth." ". . . The

students," he commented, "resent his activities in this direction; they are little inclined to take his strictures and pronouncements seriously." [6] This reaction was all very well for those who were either apolitical or wily enough to keep out of sight or at least out of trouble. But for students or teaching staff who wished to go abroad for further education there was no place to hide.

The indoctrination undergone by the Department's invitees before going abroad was also forced upon prominent educators who remained in China. "Dr. Chiang Mon-lin and Dr. Y. C. Mei, Chancellors of National Southwest Associated University, have been required to enter the Central Training Corps for instruction, which in effect is simply training in party principles under military regimen. One Chinese official expressed to the Embassy the opinion that it was absurd to expect Chinese intellectuals to undergo such training at the hands of youths who had been their students and he added that the training was nothing more than San Min Chu I principles and party propaganda." [7]

A more intimate glimpse of the indoctrination process was reported by Second Secretary of the Embassy John S. Service:

> "The reaction of intellectuals who have been required to attend the Central Training Camp, a political training course, is embarrassment and obvious dislike. One man, an engineer trained in the United States, remarked after 'graduation' that the course was 'hard on the muscles but easy on the brain.' He and a group who had also finished the course ridiculed the extreme military discipline, the childish way in which they (all mature men of considerable rank and responsibility) are treated, the reading aloud of names for such offenses as not making beds in just the required manner, the elementary digesting of lectures into simple slogans that had to be learned by repetition . . . . The requirement that everybody going abroad must first attend this political training course is laughed at." [8]

Not everyone attending the course was able to laugh at it. According to Professor George Cressey, one of the Americans sent to China by CU, who himself visited the Central Training Corps, its program "is very strenuous, with rigorous military drill, rifle practice, and long hours. It is reported that some would almost rather give up their positions rather than attend. . . . Before leaving the Corps it is almost essential to join the party, and I have only learned of two who successfully refused. . . . Hereafter all students and officials without exception must attend before leaving the country. . . . University people certainly find it an inconvenience, and far too strenuous for their present physical condition." He observed in conclusion for the benefit of the Embassy and the CU staff:

> "China certainly needs intelligent coherence, but this party

program appears too dangerously fascist and anti-democratic. Several people have commented on the Corps as an indication of the extent to which German ideas still dominate. It will be remembered that German military officials remained in China during the early years of the Sino-Japanese war." [9]

By the beginning of 1944, many hundreds of Chinese students, teachers, and officials were pressing to go to the United States for further education or training. As already mentioned, Government ministries were interested in sending chosen employees for advanced technical training necessary for reconstruction work in the immediate postwar period. At the same time, the fixed 20 to 1 artificial exchange rate between Chinese yuan and U.S. dollars made the latter so fantastically cheap in the mounting inflation that many students could aspire to study in America on the basis of private financing.[10] Their motivations were various, but war weariness, despair at the low level of educational standards and equipment in Free China, and a desire to escape from possible military service were widespread.

The Kuomintang Party for its part had an interest in having large numbers of young men take advantage of advanced education and training in the United States so long as it could be certain that such a move would strengthen the Party in its future grip on the country. Any left-wing deviation or even individualistic self-betterment by students studying abroad would be therefore regarded as evidences of dangerous defiance. Cressey noted,

> "There is hereafter to be close supervision of all Chinese going abroad, and I find that enrollment in the San Min Chu I Youth Corps has increased as it is reported to facilitate one's permission to go abroad. Prior to departure for any foreign study, all Chinese must join the Central Training Corps for six weeks and live under spartan military rule. While abroad they are to be subject to periodical enquiry as to the correctness of their political views by a representative of the Chinese Ministry of Education. After their return they may again have to go through the Central Training Corps." [11]

From the point of view of the Kuomintang, it must have seemed entirely suitable that they should promulgate regulations governing Chinese citizens proceeding abroad for study at their own expense, without considering the impact of such regulations on the American academic circles where many such individuals intended to study. It turned out to be a blunder.

The Chungking edition of the leading newspaper, *Ta Kung Pao*, published on February 25, 1944, the Ministry of Education's "Regulations Governing Professors and Instructors of Universities Proceeding Abroad for Advanced Education at Their Own Expense." The section relating to "control and direction of the professors and instructors during the period of their advanced education abroad"

was to be the same as already promulgated (November 14, 1943) for self-supporting students, namely,

> ". . . the foreign office of the Superintendent of Students of the Ministry of Education shall be responsible for the consideration of the scholastic work of the students and for the examination of their thoughts and deeds. Prior to the establishment of the office of the Superintendent of Students, the Chinese Embassy in the foreign country shall undertake this responsibility for the Ministry . . . *all the thoughts and deeds of self-supporting students residing abroad must absolutely be subject to the direction and control of the Superintendent of Students and the Embassy.* [italics added] If their words are found to be contrary to the *San Min Chu I* or their actions are irregular, they shall be immediately disqualified for study abroad and shall be summarily recalled to China." [12]

In Chungking, Ministry of Education officials earned their pay by controlling the thoughts and deeds of students. It was the normal and expected procedure, presided over by Minister Chen Li-fu in the interest of the Kuomintang Party and of his patron, the Generalissimo. But in the United States, a basic war aim, constantly reiterated, was our determination to safeguard the individual freedoms, most notably freedoms of speech and thought, which were the foundation of our nation. The two freedoms were of course inseparable; only thoughts that surfaced in speech, writing, or other forms of expression could be subjected to external control.

Suppression of freedom of speech was one of the major means of enslavement by the Nazis not only of nations they conquered but also of their own population. The United Nations, rallying to oppose the Nazi threat to dominate and enslave the world, specifically included "Freedom of Speech" in the "Four Freedoms" which capsulized the war aims on which they mutually agreed.

Just a few months before the Ministry of Education promulgated its Regulations controlling the "thoughts," "deeds," and "words" of Chinese students studying abroad, Madame Chiang Kai-shek herself subscribed publicly to the Four Freedoms in an address on April 4, 1943, before 30,000 Americans at the Hollywood Bowl. The *New York Times* reported her speech, the last scheduled talk of her wartime U.S. tour, as being delivered in "a voice ringing with courage." In cold print, the published extracts from her speech are found to employ the peculiar idiom which marked all her talks on that tour:

"We in China," she said, "through these years of suffering, have not turned to indiscriminate, gally hate of the enemy. We shall not abrade the sharp, stony path we must travel before victory is won. But we, like you and the other United Nations, shall see to it that the Four Freedoms will not assume the flaccid statues [*sic;* "statutes"

in the headline; "status" intended?] of ethical postulates no matter how belated may be the final victory." After her ringing defense of the Four Freedoms, the audience accorded Madame Chiang a "tumultuous accolade," according to the *Times*.[13] But her message which fired the crowd at the Hollywood Bowl failed to reach her own Ministry of Education.

In prewar years, the promulgations of a Chinese ministry might never have come to the attention of the American public. But in 1944 several leading American newspapers had war correspondents based in Chungking. Guenther Stein, correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor*, saw the significance of the story for the American public and sent it back to his paper which published it as a front page story on March 25, 1944. The *Monitor's* report in turn came to the attention of a committee of strongly anti-fascist Harvard professors which had actively lobbied for American entry into the war under the sobriquet "American Defense-Harvard Group." They had continued after Pearl Harbor to support the war effort and to guard against totalitarian threats to American freedoms. They took action on the *Monitor's* story at once.

The Steering Committee on March 29, 1944, adopted a resolution reading in part as follows:

> "In view of this report, American Defense-Harvard Group urges the American Government and the colleges and universities in this country to ascertain the truth of this report.
>
> "If the report is found to be correct, it urges the American Government to represent to the Chinese Government that it will refuse admission to Chinese for the purpose of studying in this country and will cancel permission to remain to those in this country who accept the conditions; and it urges the colleges and universities in this country to refuse to continue the instruction of those students who submit to the control." [14]

This resolution was a resounding call to boycott the anticipated influx of Chinese students into the United States rather than accept fascist-type controls in this country. It was reported in several Boston and New York papers and was the subject of a supporting editorial in the *New York Times* on April 14, 1944. It received considerable attention throughout the country not only in the press but in other educational institutions and among private persons and organizations interested in China.

The chairman, philosopher Ralph Barton Perry, prepared a further memorandum subsequently "reciting the facts, now fully confirmed," which stated in part that the Regulations

> ". . . are contrary to the best traditions of American education and scholarship, and to that liberty of thought and of teaching to which American colleges and universities are dedi-

cated. It is believed that if students from abroad are to profit by the opportunity of study in the United States they should be allowed to enjoy and to imbibe this atmosphere of intellectual liberty, without fear and without the sense of constant official scrutiny.

"Those who subscribe to this Memorandum, representing a section of the American academic world, most earnestly hope, therefore, that the regulations announced by the Chinese Ministry of Education will be rescinded or revised to the end that China and the United States may be bound together, both in the war and in the difficult years to come, by close ties of friendship and mutual understanding."

The response of leading American educators and institutions to the call to action embodied in the Harvard Group's resolution and memorandum was the subject of a column by the *New York Times*' education editor in the May 11, 1944, edition. It bore the provocative headline "Colleges May Bar Chinese Students." Duly noting that the Harvard Group's memorandum had been sent to leading educators and colleges throughout the country and, according to Chairman Perry, "unanimously approved by the universities involved," the editor surmised that

> "American colleges and universities are becoming reluctant to admit more Chinese students until these rules have been removed. . . . Several institutions are making freedom from interference a condition for admission. . . . Although . . . reluctant to take specific action in barring Chinese students, American universities are greatly concerned with the issues involved, and are hoping that the regulations will be modified so as not to interfere with the standards of academic freedom considered so important in this country."

Yet the *Times*' quotations from individual spokesmen for leading institutions did not justify the drastic implication of the headline. Dean Payson Wild of Harvard University declared that "the whole problem is being studied by the university authorities," and Dr. Carrington Goodrich, Acting Director of Admissions at Columbia University, disclosed that his university was "now notifying prospective Chinese students that when they arrive at Morningside Heights they are expected to be free of outside interference . . . this is being done informally, as the college has taken no official action, though those in charge of the admission policy have considered possible steps." Dr. Goodrich, Professor of Chinese History, who had spent much of his life in China, added: "I think we should not pick out China as a special sinner," pointing out that students from many authoritarian lands were attending classes in American institutions and "I think we will get nowhere if our universities permit anyone to control the thought of these students or keep them from saying

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what they think they ought to say." The Massachusetts Institute of Technology had likewise not adopted a formal policy on this question, according to its dean, but favored giving visiting students "complete intellectual freedom." [15] The Department wired a full summary of this news story to the Embassy.[16]

The *Times* story makes clear, despite its provocative headline, that the response of leading American institutions of higher learning was not a sharp rebuff to or drastic rejection of Chinese students. In the liberal American academic tradition, the spokesmen for the universities cited were not slamming the door on Chinese students, as proposed in the Harvard Group's original March 29th resolution, but were pointing out that if such students were to profit from their study in America they must, in the words of the Perry memorandum, "be allowed to enjoy and imbibe this atmosphere of intellectual liberty, without fear and without the sense of constant official scrutiny." Further, this was desirable so that the two countries might be bound together now and in the future "by close ties of friendship and mutual understanding." To this end, the signers of the memorandum, representing a section of the American academic world, expressed only an earnest hope that the Regulations of the Ministry of Education would be rescinded or revised. The response from other universities to the Harvard initiative had been widespread, aided by America's rapid communications systems, but all were essentially eager to welcome the students and to persuade the Ministry that its proposed controls were not just repugnant to Americans but would in fact thwart the efforts of the Chinese students themselves to benefit by an American education.

News of the American reaction to the thought control aspect of the Ministry's Regulations did not reach Chungking until April 9.[17] When it did, it had the force of a bombshell. Headlined "U.S. Ban Asked on Chinese Pupils," it was based on the Harvard Group's radical resolution of March 28 calling for a boycott. The opening paragraph struck the blow:

> "The American Government was asked last week to prevent the admission of further Chinese students into the U.S. for study at American colleges and universities until what was described as Chinese Government 'thought control' through overseas agents is halted."

The impact of this news story in Free China can be imagined. It was bound to affect the immediate plans of hundreds of individuals who were expecting to go to the United States for advance training on official or private arrangements. Beyond these, it shook the upper echelons of the Chinese Government. A boycott such as was urged by the Harvard Group in its resolution and for the reasons given

was a direct insult to the Ministry of Education. Harvard's prestige made the slap more insulting. Further, the various ministries were competing among themselves for postwar power and position and this boycott, if it was achieved, would frustrate their efforts. At the very highest level of Government, the regime's current dependence on U.S. Government loans and military aid for its very continuance was all too obvious. It could ill afford the conflict threatened by the resolution. In view of what happened in the days immediately following the publication of the news story, one must assume that the Generalissimo gave sharp orders at the outset.

Within two days of the bombshell, the Central News Agency published an interview on the subject with the Generalissimo's protege, Minister of Education Chen Li-fu. He was quoted as flatly declaring, "I have never believed in thought control; nor has the Ministry of Education made any such attempt." He was then asked, "What does it mean, then, by the supervision and control over the students' thought and action as provided in the regulations . . .?" To this he replied, "That the educational authorities have the responsibility of supervising the thought and controlling the action of the students is clear to everybody." With this remark he once again reiterated the authoritarian doctrine which underlay the American protest. The discrepancy between his two consecutive statements was so glaring that a correction was published by Central News the next day. It drew further attention to his apparent lapse by maintaining lamely that his reply should have been rendered into English as, "That the educational authorities have the responsibility of guiding the thought and supervising the conduct of the students is clear to everybody . . . ."

That same day, April 12, three leading spokesmen for the Government, H. C. Liang, Minister of Information, Dr. K. C. Wu, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Dr. P. H. Chang, Counselor of the Executive Yuan, held a press conference which inevitably dealt largely with the question of "thought control" of Chinese students in America. The American correspondents stationed in Chungking who had been fighting the strict press censorship and other "thought controls" there took the opportunity to importune these high officials on the subject. Brooks Atkinson of the *New York Times*, Guenther Stein of the *Christian Science Monitor*, and John Matthew Hlavacek of the *United Press* were well aware of the threat posed by this American academic protest to the Chinese Government's grandiose plans of sending hundreds of officials and specialized students to the United States on American lend-lease funds to prepare for postwar reconstruction. The journalists pressed their advantage and momentarily at least put these three leading officials on the defensive. Wu

tried to mollify his interrogators by noting that the present plan was no different from his own student days in the United States in the twenties when he was "responsible to a supervisor whose only duties were to send him checks each month and to keep a record of his scholastic record." Liang averred that "anyone who has a modicum of sense knows that thought cannot be controlled. . . . We would not tolerate a Minister of Education who would advocate control of thought" and he appealed to the journalists: "We hope that our friends here will assist in giving a shrewd (*sic*) picture of China abroad." Finally, Chang said that the spokesmen would recommend to the Education Ministry that Articles 4 and 14 (of the Regulations) be rewritten to eliminate reference to control over thought. The Embassy reported the controversy in full to the Department and noted, with regard to this press conference, that "Several correspondents referred to the Ministry of Information interpreter's use of the word "shrewd" and said [sardonically] that they were attempting to prepare reports of that type."

The same Embassy despatch recounted a conversation of Embassy officers with an influential Chinese university president who expressed the opinion that "the action of the correspondents and foreign press in bringing the matter to the attention of the Chinese government through criticism and questions would have a very salutary effect and would force the Ministry of Education to clarify the situation both in its own mind and for the public of both countries."

The final paragraph of this long summary despatch on the subject of "Control of Thoughts and Conduct of Chinese Students in the United States" set forth the Embassy view that, despite the fact that strict control over Chinese students' thinking would be an impossible task, "the Regulations in their present form offer a very real threat to any free expression of thoughts on the part of the students while in the United States and that the possibility of summary recall to China may serve to keep in line those students whose political beliefs are somewhat in variance with the Kuomintang." [18]

The agitation, uncertainties, and defensiveness aroused by the news of the Harvard Group's recommended boycott lasted less than three weeks. These responses were then deepened into general gloom at the imposition of a ban on any Chinese going abroad for study for an indefinite period—in effect a counter-boycott. The thunderbolt was hurled by the Generalissimo himself.

The exact date and circumstances of the imposition are unclear, but the ban was evidently in force before April 26, 1944. On that date Ambassador Gauss talked with Foreign Minister T.V. Soong at the latter's request. Soong had been instrumental in negotiating the arrangements for 1,200 Chinese Government trainees to have

advanced instruction in the United States under lend-lease. The ban would have the effect of wrecking these plans, at least for the moment. Incredibly, Soong told the Ambassador that he did not know officially of any order to suspend students going to the United States or elsewhere; no such order had reached the Foreign Office; but that he had heard of the ban from persons who had intended to go but now said they had been told they could not go. According to Gauss, Soong "was plainly worried about the position. He asked me whether in the reports I had heard there had been any assignment of reasons for not permitting students and technicians to go to the U.S." Gauss, in reply, cited current rumors of the speculation in Chinese circles, which must have been well known to Soong, that "some had assigned the action as the result of the recent publicity in the U.S. on 'thought control' of Chinese students; others had maintained that 'some of the leaders of the Government (I avoided saying the Generalissimo) had for some time been considering whether it was desirable to send Chinese students abroad to foreign universities at a time when the young men of military age who were attending such universities were serving their countries in the war.' "

Asked by Soong for his opinion of these reasons for the ban, Gauss said that to bar students from going to the United States because of the recent publicity on "thought control" would simply give emphasis to the subject. He avoided comment on the delicate question whether young Chinese men should be studying rather than serving in their military forces but said that Chinese students and technicians would be welcome in the United States, reiterated his urging that advance information on all plans should be furnished the Embassy to enable the U.S. Government to be helpful, and said that an agency, perhaps attached to the Chinese Embassy, to administer the student-technician plans in the United States would be welcome "to exercise administrative functions but not political control of students." He stressed in particular the need for assurance of adequate financing, and referred in this connection to the Department's emergency financial assistance given to Chinese students stranded in the United States at the outbreak of the Pacific war but added that a number of Chinese students had arrived since then and applied for U.S. Government assistance.

The implication was that China had no business sending hundreds more unless she took financial responsibility for them. Soong remarked defensively that the Chinese Government had spent some $200,000 or $300,000 within the past three years on an arrangement made by Soong himself through the China Institute to aid Chinese students stranded in the United States by the war but that the fund

was now about exhausted and that he had turned the matter over to Chen Li-fu to work out. In conclusion, Gauss noted that "Dr. Soong said he wanted to talk to the Generalissimo on the whole question and wanted it all straight in his mind before doing so. I could not but feel that he was concerned over the whole matter but hesitated to approach the Generalissimo and had been dealing through Chen Li-fu. (Such is the state of affairs in the Government at Chungking at this time.)" [19]

Further speculation regarding the ban was reported from Chengtu by Second Secretary of the Embassy James K. Penfield:

> "In a speech to the students now undergoing training at Chungking Chen Li-fu is said to have explained the ban as due to (a) transportation difficulties, (b) American opposition to thought control measures, and (c) the unfavorable reaction in the United States to Chinese students proceeding there in war time."

He had also heard that "Upon his return to China Wang Shih-chieh strongly recommended to the Generalissimo that students be prohibited from going abroad because of the very unfavorable reaction in the United States to their presence there." [20]

From Kunming, Consul General Langdon reported that a Chinese faculty member of Peking University told him that the Generalissimo had

> ". . . issued a directive that for the time being students were not to be given facilities for proceeding to the United States for study in view of the Government's program of enrolling *all* [English-speaking?] graduates in the 'Allied Armies' Interpreter Corps. If exceptions were to be allowed . . . students from wealthy families might use study in the United States as a pretext for evading interpreter service, with the result that the main burden of staffing the interpreter corps would fall on students of poor families, which would be unfair."

Langdon pointed out that the cessation of the student flow to the United States was more than offset by the stream of young Chinese going as aviation cadets for whom he had issued over 200 visas in May.

> "It should also be remembered that American practical education is being brought to thousands of adult and young Chinese by the American Army in the form of training in preventive medicine, care of animals, automotive maintenance, mechanical repair, et cetera. . . ." [21]

In Washington itself the Chinese Ambassador, Wei Tao-ming, was impelled by the American agitation against the Regulations and its devastating impact in China to have a long, confidential conversation with Willys Peck, Chief of the CU China program, his

friend of many years' standing. Wei repeated Chen Li-fu's defense that control of thought was impossible and in any case there would be so many Chinese students that a ministry-appointed superintendent would find it impossible. Peck observed that there might be a few students who would be willing to report on thoughts expressed by their fellow students. Both Peck and Wei well knew that this was the spy system on which such controls were based. Wei made no comment. Toward the end of their conversation, the Ambassador put into words what must have been in the minds of many of the Kuomintang officials concerned in this matter: "Mr. Wei wondered whether the protest of the Harvard group of professors against the Regulations for the control of Chinese self-supporting students had not been prompted directly by Communists." [22]

And in New York, Dr. H. H. Kung, brother-in-law of both the Generalissimo and T.V. Soong and a high official in his own right, made a speech to the Board of Trustees of the China Institute in which he maintained that the ban, far from being a sign of displeasure over the American protest, had in fact been planned long before. He reiterated that it would be "inequality of sacrifice" for Chinese students to be studying in America while Americans were serving in the armed services, that student interpreters were needed for the American and Chinese forces in China, that all available transportation was needed for war purposes, that there were already 3,000 Chinese students stranded by the war in the United States; and he capped the list with a unique addition, that each student would cost the Government $5,000 for the first year and this could become a severe drain on China's educational budget, "particularly *in view of the exchange rates*" [italics added]. Considering the scandalous undervaluing of the American dollar at the Chinese official rate, the huge American loans that supported the Chinese Government and the fact that in April the U.S. Congress had voted $4,800,000 of lend-lease funds to pay for the training of 1,200 Chinese technicians, this remark seemed entirely gratuitous.[23]

Kung in his address listed all the ostensible reasons given by other spokesmen to account for the ban. Nevertheless, it seems probable that the sudden imposition of the ban so shortly after news reached China that the Harvard Group had recommended a boycott of Chinese students was in fact a countermove by the Generalissimo to "save face" in a very awkward and internationally publicized situation.

Two documents provide evidence leading to such a conclusion. The first is a May 14, 1944, editorial in the *Washington Post*, of which a summary with direct quotes of some passages was radioed to the Embassy by the Department. Symptomatic of press com-

ments of the time, it significantly tied the proposed "thought control" to the current attacks against the Chinese Government by American journalists in Chungking as well as by Chinese Communists on grounds of its increasing fascistic tendencies. According to the summary, the editorial "alludes to 'drastic censorship obtaining in Chungking' and states enough information has leaked out to give China's American friends real cause for concern. 'In particular, Americans cannot help being disturbed by the persistent reports that the governing bureaucracy in China is increasingly under the domination of its most reactionary and illiberal individuals and they are far more interested in maintaining their power and their privileges than in fighting Japan.'" Setting this highly critical tone, the editorial then went on to describe the plan for student supervision in the United States and to assert "there is in other words a ban on 'dangerous thoughts' which when introduced by Japan in that country produced only scorn and derision in essentially liberal China. This conversion in Chungking to Japan's 'thought control' is not pleasant to contemplate." Though stressing our friendship for China, the editorial cautioned: ". . . but this friendship for China does not extend to those illiberal elements in that country who in the midst of a war against fascism seem to have adopted an ideology all too similar to those preached and practiced by our enemies. It is time that the story of what has been happening inside China is told and it is more than time that the Chinese leaders be told that the quickest way she can lose American sympathy is to permit her reactionary forces to rule the roost." [24]

That the Generalissimo regarded such attacks as personal effrontery is witnessed by the second document. It is a personal letter handwritten in English on May 27 by T'ao Hsi-sheng to an American attached to the Embassy in a wartime agency. T'ao had been at one time a professor at Peking University. He had allied himself with the Wang Ching-wei puppet regime at Nanking upon its establishment. Later he fled from Nanking, denouncing the Wang regime in strong terms. He went to Chungking where he was welcomed. There he joined the Generalissimo's Secretariat where he was situated at the time he wrote the letter. He is generally reputed to have been the ghost writer of the Generalissimo's book *China's Destiny*.

After a personal opening, the letter offers to divulge the secret cause

> ". . . why the National Government stops to send students studying in U.S. and other countries. I know that you have much concern with this case. How to lift out this prohibition is the problem of which our Ministry of Education can do nothing.
>
> "You still remember of course that China started this war against Japan just because of her refusing the Japanese de-

mand of her participating [in] the Anti-Comintern Pact, which has the common front of the Nazi and Nipponism against the Democracies and Soviet Union. China fights for the democracy and Socialism for seven years. But under the influence of the Communists, some newspapers in U.S. and Great Britain have published many articles which attack the Generalissimo as a dictator and the Kuomintang as Fascists. The Generalissimo's mind is hurt, but he endures what he cannot endure anymore. In the 12th session of the Central Committee of Kuomintang, the Generalissimo opens the meetings with an oration in which he says that other criticism from our friends in our friendly nations must be sincerely accepted, except the proposition of attacking us as Fascists, but we must still endure. This statement is not published in newspapers today.

"Why the Generalissimo does not speak publicly, and only protests silently by stopping to send students abroad, we must appreciate his personal character before we search out the cause. His philosophy is to do one's own duty and not to demand any right. He takes up the task of fighting the Japs for it is his and China's duty. He does not demand the Democracies to appreciate it. He stands against the Fascists for seven years and yet his regime is spelled to be fascistic. He will not demand the appreciation, he will be satisfied to do his duty to the utmost—duty to the Democracies and Soviet Union without consideration of any kind." [25]

The dubiousness of T'ao's historical interpretations might lead one to question both his explanation of the ban and his motive for revealing the secret to his American correspondent. However, T'ao's divulgence of the Generalissimo's sensitivity to criticism from his allies—"hurt" to be considered a "dictator" and a "Fascist"—is no startling revelation, and the statement that he "only protests silently by stopping to send students abroad" is merely too inert a description of what was in fact a major act of defiance. That he did not "speak publicly" seems to be borne out by his Foreign Minister's apparent (official) ignorance first of the ban and second of the reasons for it. As for T'ao's motive in writing it to an acquaintance at the Embassy, he must certainly have anticipated that it would be passed on to Washington (as it was) and thus he insured that, despite the many *ex post facto* justifications for the ban which had been put in circulation, the Generalissimo's "silent protest" reached the U.S. seats of power.

The ban which had caused so much consternation in April when it was imposed lasted only long enough to satisfy the needs of face-saving. By late August the Embassy had learned privately from a high official of the Ministry of Education that the ban on private students going to the United States would soon be lifted, that 1,200 students would proceed to the United States in the autumn after further local training, that a maximum of 30 percent of these would

be members of the Kuomintang or San Min Chu I Youth Corps, and that no efforts would be made to control their thought while in the United States. No mention was made of how transportation was to be arranged for the students, and the Embassy commented that the acute problem of surface transportation from India was apparently unchanged.[26]

On September 20, 1944, Central News reported that the ban on Chinese students going abroad for study had been completely lifted and this was confirmed by the Ministry of Education. Those going at their own expense were to be permitted to leave as soon as they had completed a certain procedure which, according to the Embassy, "though unspecified is not expected to be onerous or obstructive." Examinations for Government scholarships were, according to Central News, to take place the first week in December in seven cities to provide the basis for selection of 181 students for advanced study in the United States.[27]

Less than three months later, the requirement that Chinese studying abroad should submit to thought control by agents of their Government was quietly dropped. On December 12, 1944, Central News published the revised "Regulations Governing Students Going Abroad" which had been approved by the Executive Yuan on October 11 and promulgated by the Ministry of Education. Both Government and private students were required to pass an examination before being permitted to depart, but any mention or intimation of thought control was absent. Instead Regulation No. 20 stated that students would be disqualified and recalled if during their stay abroad they were guilty of "misconduct to the disgrace of their fatherland, neglect of studies, or violation of the laws of the countries in which they reside." [28]

Thus both the ban and the thought control proviso had been rescinded by the end of 1944. Yet contrary to expectations the flood of students to the United States did not immediately take place. The Embassy explained that the "Ministry of Education's plans for holding examinations for self-supported students intending to study abroad remained indefinite" and that "Since mid-December visa applications of self-supported students have been negligible with but little prospect of normal resumption until end of war and availability of normal transportation facilities." [29]

The end of war with Japan came less than eight months later. But the ensuing turmoil of civil war and revolution precluded the longed-for return to prewar peacetime conditions including "avail-

ability of normal transportation facilities." The problem of surface transportation from India to the United States, described above as "acute" in August 1944, was succeeded a year later by the critical problem of finding surface transportation just from Chungking to Shanghai, as the end of the war prompted thousands of wartime refugees in the western provinces to mass migration homeward. Many of the refugee universities chose to remain in the west for months or as long as a year rather than compete in the rush, and the students had little choice but to remain with their institutions. Even after the universities had moved back to their home campuses, those students who had passed the special examinations and met the other Ministry of Education requirements for permission to study in the United States faced the difficulty of obtaining passage on the few passenger liners plying across the Pacific. The *General Gordon* and the *Marine Lynx* are ships that come to mind for travelers remembering those days. The two were liners which had been converted by the U.S. Government to transports by installing in large common rooms triple-decker bunks where one slept cheek-by-jowl with one's unfortunate neighbor. Nevertheless, the discomfort of two weeks rolling and pitching across the Pacific in such tightly packed troopships was regarded as a small price to pay for the prized opportunity of advanced study in America. In fact, for many the conditions were no worse than the wartime crowding of their dormitories in the refugee universities, while the quantity of food proffered three times a day in the ships' mess was beyond belief.

The flow of Chinese students to American institutions of higher learning after 1944, slowed at first by Chinese bureaucratic hurdles and transportation shortages, did, however, consistently swell and reached flood tide within the next five years. The figures are elusive, but the Institute of International Education compilation for the academic years from the autumn of 1943 to the spring of 1949 are at least indicative of the annual increase of Chinese students attending American colleges and universities in this period:[30]

1943–44	706	1946–47	1,678
1944–45	823	1947–48	2,310
1945–46	1,298	1948–49	3,914

They came as individuals on private funds or as members of selected groups sponsored by various official or private organizations. The numbers and complexities of these sponsorships, the plans that succeeded, and the plans that fell through are as confused as all other operations in China in this time of civil conflict and social disintegration. They can probably never be disentangled. The grandiose planning of the ministries in 1944 to send personnel to the United

States for advanced training preparatory to postwar reconstruction has already been mentioned. A sampling of the plans afoot in late 1944 gives an idea of the heterogeneity of schemes and opportunities being seized at any one time.

The withdrawal of the ban had revived the dormant plans for individuals and groups to proceed to America. Some had been long dormant. The 326 students who had passed in December 1943 the first examination set by the Ministry of Education for students who intended to study abroad on their own resources had waited almost a year, but were all proceeding to the United States in November 1944 according to Minister T.V. Soong. He notified the Embassy also that the Ministry of Education planned to send 50 persons to the United States in 1944 on Chinese Government support for investigation and research in education, science, technology, medicine, and agriculture.

An additional 41 assistant research fellowships for Chinese technicians had been found by one of the engineering professors sent to China under the CU program, Professor Frank Brown of Notre Dame University, upon his return to the United States. Through Professor Brown also, the International Harvester Company in Chicago had offered scholarships for 20 Chinese students. The Ministry of Education was preparing to select by examination those best qualified for these opportunities, and according to plan they were to leave for the United States in the spring of 1945.

However, the single program of bringing 1,200 Chinese for technical training in the United States on funds from the 1945 appropriation for lend-lease to China far outnumbered such groups of less than 50. The Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) of the U.S. Government was in charge of this program for which $4.8 million was budgeted for an average cost per trainee of $4,000 to include transportation from India to the United States and return, as well as transportation within the United States, tuition, and laboratory fees, and subsistence for an average of 12 months but not to exceed 18 months. FEA indicated that the Ministries of Economic Affairs, Communications, and Education and the National Health Administration would each select a quota of trainees under this program. FEA hoped that 30 percent of the trainees selected would have had teaching or other practical experience in fields where they would continue their training. A project for training 110 railway engineers provided for in the previous year's lend-lease appropriation had been arranged but still not started.[31]

Similarly the selection of the 1,200 officials and technicians to take advantage of this opportunity was slowed, whether by circumstance or inertia, and the unexpectedly early end to the war was followed by the termination of lend-lease on June 30, 1946. From that

time on, the support of official trainees in America was the responsibility of the Chinese Government.

The Department of State joined on a small scale the sponsorship of groups of Chinese students coming to the United States in the immediate postwar period. The President's Emergency Fund, which had supported the CU China program through the war years, was terminated at the same time as lend-lease on June 30, 1946. Before that date, the Department granted funds to the China Institute in America to administer the round trip travel, tuition, and stipends for 10 agricultural fellows and 25 liberal arts graduate students to study for two years at American institutions. Selection of the latter group was worked out by the Embassy's Cultural Attaché on a basis not unlike that previously employed for selection of CU's visiting Chinese professors.

Open competition, preferably by competitive examinations, would undoubtedly have been the fairest way of awarding fellowships for foreign study to Chinese students. But the difficulties of administering such examinations in view of the tremendous demand were obvious. Instead, 25 leading universities and professional schools were invited to appoint 2 students each, making a total of 50 persons to compete for the 25 fellowships. Each applicant had to submit a manuscript or printed example of his independent research as evidence of his accomplishment. In addition, he submitted the usual college record, health certificate, *curriculum vitae*, letters from his college president and major professors, and a letter written by himself setting forth his purpose in desiring foreign study. The evidences of his accomplishment were turned over to leading specialists in his field, Chinese or foreign, who remained anonymous. On the basis of their assessments, considered in conjunction with the other papers submitted, the State Department made its awards. Applicants were limited to persons within the ages of 30 to 40. These limitations were set to assure that the benefits of the fellowships would reach the young generation of scholars who had completed their preliminary training during the war and had shown promise of original ability but had missed the peacetime opportunities for advanced study abroad. Students of all fields except engineering and technology could apply. The latter fields were excepted because Chinese Government and United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) fellowships stressed these subjects, leaving scholars in the humanities, social sciences, and pure science underprivileged. It was decided that the State Department fellowship program should supplement rather than reinforce these other programs.[32] (Appendix VI lists the successful applicants.)

One among this carefully selected group was perhaps at the farthest remove from the utilitarian types sought out and supported by UNRRA and the Chinese Government. Wang Hao was a budding symbolic logician. Professor Chin Yueh-lin, CU visiting professor in the United States in 1943–44, had been his teacher and considered Wang his most promising student. His faith has been amply justified. After receiving his Ph.D. degree at Harvard in 1948 and teaching for several years in the Harvard philosophy department, Wang was invited to Oxford and there spent seven years. Harvard won him back for a period of six years during which he held the Gordon McKay professorship of mathematical logic. In 1967 he moved to New York where he occupies a prestigious chair at Rockefeller University.

The Department also paid travel expenses from China to the United States for a limited number of Chinese professors and graduate students whose living expenses in this country were guaranteed by the institutions to which they were coming.[33] (See Appendix VII.)

The July 1944 Chicago conference already mentioned, which was concerned with the impending flood of students from China, had not anticipated that the influx would coincide with the flood of American GI's returning from war service. Yet, despite the problems foreseen and unforeseen at the conference, the Chinese students in their rapidly increasing numbers were absorbed into the American academic scene without most of the expected difficulties. As in the tradition of the Chinese family system, the new arrivals were cared for by the Chinese students who were already established.

Emotionally, however, the five years from 1944 to 1949 were painful ones for many of the students who had achieved their ambition of coming to America to complete their studies. Whatever their motives for leaving China, few, if any, had contemplated becoming lifetime exiles from their native land. But news despatches from China supplemented by personal letters from home made plain to them that the constantly escalating civil war, the deadly and deepening inflation, and the disintegration of the society as the Nationalist Government crumbled had already destroyed the futures for which they were preparing themselves. By 1949 the choice lay between taking refuge in Taiwan with the defeated government or returning to the People's Republic to take their chances under the Chinese Communists. It was the start of the cold war in the United States. Communism was denounced as diabolical; Chinese communism, whether bad or good, was unknown. The vast majority of students opted to stay on in America, though the hope of some day returning home persisted for years.

The collapse of the Nationalists in 1948–49 caused a financial

crisis for the estimated 3,900 Chinese students in America, a crisis very similar to that which had led to the Department's emergency assistance program for Chinese students stranded in America in 1942. At first the educational institutions themselves extended what help they could in the way of scholarships, loans, and employment. But it was soon evident to all that the proportions of the crisis were greater than could be met by these resources. Again, as in 1942, Chih Meng, Director of the China Institute in America, brought the problem to the attention of the Department of State. The large influx of Chinese students after the end of the war had enormously increased the scale of the financial burden. Whereas the emergency aid to Chinese students in America from 1942 to 1946 had totaled only $800,000, the Department spent for analogous aid, from 1949 to 1955, $7,899,879 from a total of $10,500,000 voted by Congress. Of the estimated 3,900 Chinese students enrolled for the academic year 1948–49, 266 received grants. In 1949–50 there were 2,400 grantees, and 2,817 in 1950–51. In 1951–52 the number fell off sharply (1,236). It diminished rapidly thereafter, and the program ended June 30, 1955.

These funds were granted to cover expenses of tuition, subsistence, transportation, and emergency medical care. But equally important as time went on was the need for an adjustment in the Immigration and Naturalization regulations to permit the students after completing their studies to accept employment. The Attorney General was empowered to arrange for granting such permission under the China Area Aid Act of 1950. With that, the possibility of building a career in the United States opened up for those who could take advantage of it.[34] Through the years since 1955, some of the Chinese who came as students in those years have returned to the People's Republic of China, others have gone to Hong Kong or Taiwan. But the majority have stayed in the United States and become American citizens.

The two U.S. Government programs of emergency aid to Chinese students, 1942–46 and 1949–55, were intended to benefit China by enabling her gifted scholars and technicians to complete their training and return home to devote their skills to the people and land of their birth. By now, many of those gifted Chinese students of 20 and 30 years ago are leading doctors, teachers, scholars, engineers—professionals in many fields and in many institutions across our country, which is now theirs too. Indeed, two of them, Professors Tsung Dao Lee and Chen-ning Yang, shared the Nobel Prize in physics in 1957.[35] It is ironical that, of these well-meant attempts to develop talented leaders for China, we should ourselves have become the major beneficiaries.

Notes

CHAPTER SEVEN

1. *The Program of Emergency Aid to Chinese Students*, 1949–1955 (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of State publ. 6343, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956). Also, *A Survey of Chinese Students in American Universities and Colleges in the Past One Hundred Years* (New York: China Institute in America, 1954).
2. Haldore Hanson, *The Cultural-Cooperation Program, 1938–1943* (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of State publ. 2173, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944).
3. Fook-tim Chan, "An Experience in Cultural Education," thesis for the degree of Doctor of Education at Teachers College, Columbia Univ., 1946. Unpublished.
4. Minutes of Meeting held in Chicago, enclosure in Secstate to Amemb, Chungking, Instr. 799, Sept. 1944, NA, RG 842–Education.
5. The "San Min Chu I" were the "Three Peoples' Principles" of Sun Yat-sen, embodying his vaguely democratic doctrines. The San Min Chu I Youth Corps emulated the German model.
6. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 1149, May 6, 1943, NA, RG 84, 842.
7. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 1150, May 6, 1943, *ibid.*, 842–AID.
8. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 1241, June 8, 1943, *ibid.*, 842–Education.
9. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 2052, Jan. 22, 1944, *ibid.*, 842.
10. Brooks Atkinson reported from Chungking that while the official rate was held at 20 yuan to US$1, the open market rate varied between 300 to 400 to 1. *New York Times*, Mar. 4, 1944.
11. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 2031, Jan. 15, 1944, NA, RG 84, 842–AID.
12. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 2245, Feb. 29, 1944, NA, RG 84, 842.
13. *New York Times*, Monday, Apr. 5, 1943.
14. Report of the Chairman, American Defense-Harvard Group, for May 15, 1943, to June 15, 1944. Harvard Univ. Archives: HUD 3139.244.
15. Benjamin Fine, *New York Times*, May 11, 1944, p. 21.
16. Secstate to Amemb, Chungking, Tel. 649, May 13, 1944. NA, RG 84, 842.
17. In the Chungking edition of the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*.
18. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 2447, Apr. 18, 1944. NA, RG 84, 842.
19. Memorandum of Conversation, Ambassador Gauss and T. V. Soong, Apr. 26, 1944, *ibid.*
20. J. K. Penfield to Ambassador Gauss, Chungking, No. 55 from Chengtu, May 19, 1944, *ibid.*
21. Wm. R. Langdon to Ambassador Gauss, Chungking, No. 19 from Kunming, May 24, 1944, *ibid.*
22. Memorandum of Conversation, May 17, 1944; enclosure in Secstate to Amemb, Chungking, Instr. 666, May 27, 1944, NA, RG 84, 842.
23. "Dr. Kung Tells Reasons for Student Ban," New York edition of the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, Aug. 4, 1944, *ibid.*, 842–Education.
24. Secstate to Amemb, Chungking, Tel. 665, May 17, 1944, *ibid.*, 842.

25. T'ao Hsi-sheng to Dr. George Kates, Chungking, May 27, 1944, enclosure in Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 2899, Aug. 23, 1944, *ibid.*, 842–Education. I have made three minor spelling corrections.
26. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Tel. 1450, Aug. 24, 1944, *ibid.*
27. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Tel. 1606, Sept. 24, 1944, *ibid.*
28. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Desp. 18, Dec. 19, 1944, *ibid.*
29. Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Airgram A–107, Dec 29, 1944, *ibid.*
30. *A Survey of Chinese Students in American Universities and Colleges, op. cit.*, p. 18. (See Note 1, p. 142.)
31. Informal note from Dr. T. V. Soong to Ambassador Gauss, Chungking, Nov. 3, 1944, and letter, George Atcheson, Jr., to Dr. K. C. Wu, Chungking, Oct. 20, 1944, with enclosed summary of FEA training program for 1,200 Chinese. Both, NA, RG 84, 842–Education.
32. W. Fairbank, Report to UNESCO, A Study of Chinese Educational Needs and Programs of U.S.-Located Agencies To Meet Them, 1948 (unpublished), p. 28, CU/H. Also, Amemb, Chungking, to Secstate, Tel. 512, Mar. 18, 1946, NA, RG 59, 811.42793 SE/3–1846.
33. Secstate to Amemb, Chungking, Tel. 1095, Aug. 19, 1944, NA, RG 84, 842–AID.
34. *The Program of Emergency Aid to Chinese Students, 1949–1955, op. cit.*
35. S. W. Kung, *Chinese in American Life* (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1962). Surveys the contributions and achievements of this group, pp. 237–252.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

Phase-Out of War Emergency Programs

NEWS of the victory over Japan which brought World War II to an end in August 1945 reached Chungking in the evening. I was there and participated in the happy hysteria. The population poured out into the streets, and the uproar of a million human voices vied with the honking of truck horns and the shrilling of sirens whose wails, I observed, could still strike terror momentarily in those conditioned by the Japanese bombing-raid alarms. Jeeps and weapons-carriers loaded with American GI's inched their way through the crowds. The overwhelming joy at the news transcended all unfamiliarity, irritation, hostility on either side. Americans and Chinese expressed the shared exultation by shouts and grins and hands stretched out to clasp.

For the Chinese "downriver people" and the GI's, jubilation over the victory was overlaid with the more personal rejoicing: "It's over. Now we can go home." For that one evening, the future was refulgent with dreams coming true. But the future for both groups was being decided by their governments. The Kuomintang was to opt for renewed fighting, this time against Chinese, in Manchuria; it expected to deliver a quick defeat to the rebellious Communist armies. The American Government, responding to public demand, prepared to bring home and demobilize posthaste its Armed Forces from non-enemy territories and to return as soon as possible to peacetime status.

As the Armed Forces were demobilized, so were the specifically wartime civilian agencies which had supported them. The Office of War Information (OWI) was one of these. Its story is beyond the scope of this study but must be briefly mentioned insofar as it relates to CU's China operations. The various roles of the OWI included psychological warfare against the enemy and the "projection of America" to allied and neutral nations. During the war years it had become a large and far-flung bureaucracy which, in its purely informational role, distributed news and features, motion pictures and filmstrips, produced radio programs, circulated exhibits, established

libraries and reading rooms, and made translations of American books. The permanent value of certain of these functions had been recognized by the U.S. Government in a contingency plan which went into effect on September 1, 1945, shortly after the Japanese surrender. The OWI ceased to exist. President Truman, by an Executive order, transferred certain of its informational and cultural operations to the State Department where they were merged with the Department's own cultural program in what was eventually known overseas as the United States Information Service (USIS).

In China the merger resembled the legendary specification for horse-and-rabbit stew: one horse, one rabbit. The OWI by 1945 had an American staff there of some 200 in addition to its Chinese personnel. It was equipped with a radio network, photo labs, movie projectors, duplicating and other office machines, and all the technicians necessary to operate and service them. Its branches in the leading cities of Free China had hostels and libraries, offices and reading rooms, sedans, truck and jeeps, and much more. Suffice it to say OWI was rich in American hardware, talent, and funds. The CU China program at the time of the merger was by contrast operating on a shoestring. A cultural relations officer and secretary were the American staff; a Chinese clerk assisted. One room in the chancery of the American Embassy in Chungking served for the reception and counseling of Chinese visitors, fellowship applicants, CU American experts, and others, amid a confusion of typing, packing and unpacking shipments, and other noisy operations of a busy office.

Prior to the merger there had been, through the war years in China, friendly relations but relatively little collaboration between the OWI and CU. This was not surprising since the OWI was essentially an organization employing the mass media with the aim of reaching as wide a segment of the population as possible, whereas CU concentrated on assisting within its limited budget individuals and institutions in the professions, particularly education. In only one aspect of the Department's program had the two cooperated to any extent, namely, the CU motion picture program.

Educational and scientific motion pictures produced both by agencies of the U.S. Government and by private agencies had been selected by CU and sent to the other American republics for several years before the China program was inaugurated. The value of pictures, and particularly motion pictures, to carry ideas across language barriers was obvious. The reader will recall that an item of $15,000 for sending to China two light trucks each equipped with projectors for showing films had been recommended by Grummon in his original 1942 telegram to the Chungking Embassy proposing the program.[1] Shipping the trucks and bulky equipment proved im-

practical but the selection of films useful for educational purposes in China, to be projected on such equipment as was already there, proceeded according to the discriminating judgment of Haldore Hanson.

Hanson soon concluded that the addition of Chinese titles or in some cases Chinese soundtracks would greatly enhance the usefulness of the motion pictures in China. He was fortunate to find a well-trained and imaginative young Chinese, H. C. Weng (Wango Weng), a 1940 graduate of Purdue University in engineering, who had joined the Harmon Foundation in New York to study motion picture techniques. Weng had produced some 20 reels of pictures for the Foundation, doing his own photography, script writing, film editing, and soundtracking, when he was picked up by the War Department to work in Hollywood with Anatole Litvak and Frank Capra on the orientation film, "The Battle of China." Hanson set him to writing the Chinese script narration for a film being made of Chinese air cadets training in Arizona, entitled "We Fly for China", and sent copies of the finished film to China through various channels. In January 1943 Weng was appointed a consultant to CU to translate and adapt for Chinese audiences the explanatory titles for more than 50 reels of silent educational films produced by the U.S. Departments of Agriculture and Interior and others, as well as soundtrack scripts for an additional 100 reels. He also produced two short films himself for the CU China program under contract at the Harmon Foundation.[2]

Five to 25 prints of each film were forwarded to China. One print, in every case, was turned over to Swen Ming-ching, head of the Motion Picture Department of the College of Science, Nanking University, then situated in Chengtu for the war period. The purpose was to get these educational films into the schools and colleges where they could be used as teaching aids, and it was hoped that this could be accomplished by a well-equipped professional department of a university. How effectively this end was achieved is far from clear. The other prints were turned over by the Embassy to OWI for projection on their equipment and for loan to educational institutions.[3]

The concern to get the films into school and college classrooms for use in connection with regular teaching arose from the fact that, for the most part, the educational films selected and processed for China had not been created for either the amusement or the enlightenment of mass audiences. To read Chinese character captions required education; even explanatory soundtracks necessarily demanded a certain sophistication. Since the Chinese population then was about 70 percent illiterate, so presumably were the large general audiences which gathered for the free showings by OWI movie teams, but they were not deficient in the traditional wisdom. It was just that American

practice, developed in a very different society half way around the world, required interpretation.

To illustrate this point, let me cite an instance from my personal observation. I was present in Chengtu in the early autumn of 1945 when an OWI movie team set up its projector in a public park to give an outdoor showing of one of its "projection of America" films. The subject was hog raising in Iowa. The park had begun to fill up by late afternoon and by the time the darkness had deepened sufficiently to start the picture, there were as many onlookers stationed behind the large sheet stretched for a screen as more conventionally in front of it. Many of the hundreds in the audience were city folk, but it was a market day and farmers from the neighboring agricultural districts in the rich Szechwan basin could be seen all day on the roads to town wheeling their pigs to market on wheelbarrows so that no precious (pig) weight would be lost before the sale.

The Chinese who came to watch the film were uninhibited in their reactions. Their spontaneous comments on the huge size of the American hogs, the sloshing of feed mash into their troughs in what seemed to be careless overabundance, and the climactic scene of the fattened hogs crowding up chutes into trailer trucks for delivery to the packing plant expressed not admiration or envy, but suspension of belief. The sequences were too remote, too ridiculous, perhaps even stupid and pointless in a society where hogs were raised on refuse and wheeled to market on wheelbarrows by manpower and the people themselves never rode in a trailer truck in a lifetime. Now, 30 years later, China raises huge hogs and feeds them scientifically; such a film might well now be found interesting and relevant. But in 1945, out of context and without interpretation, it could only bewilder.

However, it was not the nature of the impact but the size of the audiences that fascinated the users of the motion picture medium. "More than a million viewers monthly" in May, June, and July 1943 were claimed for showings of "American nontheatrical motion pictures" sponsored by the Department, the OWI and the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs on several continents, and for August the total was given even to the implausible last digit: 1,227,991.[4]

Fortunately, Hanson and Weng both knew the China they were trying to reach and selected those films to be captioned or soundtracked in Chinese which complemented the work of the American experts whose help had been urgently requested by the Chinese Government. Such well-known Department of Agriculture films as *A Heritage We Guard* on soil conservation, *Power and the Land* on rural electrification, and *The River* on Mississippi flood control were processed and sent out as well as films from other sources on agriculture, industry, science, health, and the like.[5] After the war some scientific films provided with Chinese commentaries (perhaps dupli-

cates of the above) as well as others related to fiction and drama were sent by the Department directly to the Ministry of Education in response to a request from Vice Minister Han Lih-wu who planned to "distribute them equitably to schools." [6] As with so many other aspects of the CU China program, we are in the dark as to what happened to these films during the long breach between our two countries after 1949 or even in the period of turmoil preceding it.

The merger of CU with OWI to make USIS was real enough in Washington. But it had an air of insubstantiality in China in 1945. What else could one expect, for, within weeks of the announcement of the reorganization, the two components which were to have become one were separated by many hundreds of miles.

The Embassy remained in Chungking with the principal agencies of the Chinese Government until May 1946. Since most of the Chinese schools and universities remained at their wartime locations in the west through all or part of the 1945–46 academic year, it made sense for the CU office to remain in Chungking for a time. It moved to Nanking with early units of the Embassy in March 1946.

The OWI half (or 99 percent) of the merger, on the other hand, had every reason to rush for the east coast as soon as possible after the end of the war. Stockpiled equipment for 10 postwar branches to be established in the leading cities recovered from the Japanese was being forwarded by ship from India to Shanghai. Office space and housing had to be found in Shanghai, Nanking, Hankow, Tsingtao, Peking, Tientsin, Mukden, Changchun, Taipei, and Canton. Continuation of the OWI news operations, at that time still its primary preoccupation, demanded instant communication between the far-flung offices. The USIS radio network was quickly extended and proved its usefulness to the scattered U.S. Consulates in that chaotic period when thousands of armed Japanese troops were still stationed in the cities of east China awaiting repatriation, mass movements of Chinese troops as well as officials and ordinary citizens were taking place from the far west to the newly liberated east, and normal communications were disrupted or nonexistent.

There were psychological reasons, too, for the urgent desire of the OWI staff to go downriver to Shanghai at the war's end. With the signing of the surrender, the east coast was "where the action is" and Chungking, Chengtu, Kunming, and Kweilin in the west were once again backwaters. Like their eastern coprovincials, the refugees dominant in the Chinese staff longed to return from their wartime exile to the bright lights and creature comforts of their prewar life. The American staff with characteristic restlessness wanted principally to move on. Tall tales of prewar Shanghai made

it a lodestone for the moment. But USIS was bound to be a much smaller operation than OWI; there was mounting pressure to get back to the U.S.A. ahead of the rush, to recover former peacetime jobs or find new ones. By the time the stockpiled equipment had arrived from India and the 10 centers in large eastern cities had been established, there was only a skeleton American staff to have charge of them.

In such circumstances, the few remaining Americans in the USIS offices were barely able to sustain their accustomed OWI functions, much less the personal contact with the community vital to a cultural relations program. Their plight is made plain in a report I wrote at the request of the Minister-Counselor of the Embassy in August 1946 after visiting the USIS offices at Mukden and Peiping:

> "Both Directors appear to be occupied nearly full-time with supervising the operations of their Chinese staffs in receiving and distributing news, pictures, movies, etc. The actual contact with the recipients of these materials is confined entirely or almost entirely to members of the Chinese staff. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that the Director's job appears to be to sit in the office and see that the money and materials are forthcoming.
>
> "This, as one of the Directors said himself, follows the traditional comprador pattern. Americans import the goods and smart Chinese handle their sale to the 400,000,000.
>
> "The situation seems to me to have several dangers. First, it is difficult to judge the effectiveness of our distribution unless the office Director is in constant personal touch with the final recipient. If the operation becomes merely routine, he can easily fall into the habit of invoicing packages received and sending statistical weekly reports which look impressive but may have no significance. Secondly, our chief purpose in having American personnel in the offices is to make sure that the program is really fostering relations between China and America. Half the value of the Director and his American assistant is lost if he delegates to his Chinese staff the contacts with the USIS public. Thirdly, unless very careful supervision over the staff is maintained, it is possible for individuals to carry on activities under cover of the USIS which may jeopardize the whole program.
>
> "As an instance of the second point, we suggested in Peiping that the weekly student meeting held at the Cultural Center in the West City which the USIS sponsored might very well include some Americans every week, and a young Chinese employee who handles this part of the program replied 'But they are not interested in meeting Americans. They just want to have a good time, and most of them can't speak English anyway.'
>
> "The outstanding instance of the third point is the recent debacle in Mukden when a USIS employee in editing a journal founded by the local Cultural Institute reprinted extracts of liberal and left-wing material which had not been allowed into Manchuria by the National Government censors. As a result,

the publication was banned, the young man had to flee to Peiping without warning, the Institute will probably have to close since its officers are about to resign in any case, and the USIS itself is put in a very delicate position.

"I recommended in my talks with the Directors in both places that they should try to allocate the work within the office to relieve them as much as possible of routine administrative work and should get out to visit local educational institutions and their own operations and make a point of developing wide contacts among the Chinese personnel in their areas." [7]

No doubt my advice as described in the final paragraph was more harrowing than helpful, and I blush now to remember that I was then young and brash enough to sweep into town and out again pausing en route just long enough to make my diagnosis and prescribe my panacea before turning my back on the problem and heading for home base at the Embassy. However, I had plenty of problems of my own.

While the former OWI component of what was now USIS was fading away, the CU China program reached the end of its tether with the expiration on June 30, 1946, of the President's Emergency Fund which had financed it throughout the war years. To be sure, programs initiated and funds committed before that date kept the small CU staff occupied with administrative duties through the following months, and counseling and reporting duties never slackened.

But 1946, the year of the Marshall mission, was a fateful year for Chinese-American relations. It had begun with renewed hopes for peace when General Marshall achieved a truce agreement between the Communists and the National Government on January 10 shortly after his arrival. It had witnessed resumption of the fighting between the two parties, first sporadically, then in earnest, and had ended with his blast against both parties and brusque return to the United States.[8] Perhaps the most fateful move of the year was the immediate appointment of Marshall as Secretary of State which saved us, through his wisdom based on his personal experience of the Chinese situation, from embarking on a military adventure in China under political pressures to rescue the discredited regime of Chiang Kai-shek.

There was no doubt that these events had seriously strained the traditional friendship between America and China at the beginning of 1947. That there was the possibility of launching a new program of cultural relations which would be successful for the brief period before China was closed to America was beyond imagining. Yet before the end of 1947 just such a program had been initiated.

Notes

CHAPTER EIGHT

1. Secstate to Amemb, Chungking, Tel. 55, Jan. 29, 1942. NA, RG 84, 842.
2. *CU Monthly Report*, Jan. 1943, pp. 30, 31, and interview with Weng, Sept. 11, 1973.
3. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Tel. 962, June 12, 1946, O/FADRC, microfilm.
4. *CU Monthly Report*, Aug. 1943, p. 4.
5. Secstate to Amemb, Chungking, Desp. 832, Oct. 3, 1944, NA, RG 84, 842–AID.
6. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Tel. 1482, Sept. 14, 1946, O/FADRC, microfilm.
7. W. Fairbank to W. Walton Butterworth, Nanking, Aug. 19, 1946. Memorandum: "Cultural Relations Work in the USIS Offices at Mukden and Peiping." Author's file.
8. General Marshall's recall was announced on Jan. 6, 1947. He was appointed Secretary of State the next day, Jan. 7.

CHAPTER NINE

The Pioneer Fulbright Program

ON NOVEMBER 10, 1947, Nanking was the scene of a historic event. "Desiring to promote further mutual understanding between the peoples of the U.S.A. and the Republic of China by a wider exchange of knowledge and professional talents through educational contacts," Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart for the United States and Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh for China signed an executive agreement as stipulated by Public Law 584 of the 79th Congress.[1] The Fulbright Act, as it was commonly known, had been signed into law by President Truman in Washington on August 1, 1946, but not until some 15 months later did it actually take effect when the first of the far-flung bilateral agreements was officially contracted with China.

Senator J. William Fulbright's personal experience of the benefits of international education as a Rhodes scholar at Oxford and his remembrance of the troubles encountered by Congress in dealing with World War I debts had led him to introduce his legislation hoping to achieve the values of the former and at the same time avoid the bane of the latter at the end of World War II.[2] According to his plan, a portion of the payments made by foreign governments in their own currency to the United States for purchase of surplus war property was to be used in the case of each country to finance educational exchange activities between that country and the United States. Professors, teachers, research scholars, and students of each of the two nations were to receive travel and/or subsistence grants plus educational expenses for study in the other, insofar as such outlays were payable in the foreign currency concerned.

There were three provisos written into the act, all of which had an important bearing on its implementation in China as elsewhere. First, the total of foreign currency acceptable from any one country for this purpose could not exceed the value of US$20 million nor be expended in excess of US$1 million annually at the official rate of exchange; second, a Board of Foreign Scholarships of 10 representatives of American cultural, educational, student, and war veterans' groups was to be appointed by the President of the United

States to select grantees and supervise the program; and third, among American applicants war veterans were to be given preference.

The industrial capacity and accelerated war production of the United States had manufactured and delivered to American bases and allies all over the world hardware of myriad types poetically dubbed "the sinews of war" while the fighting lasted but degraded to "surplus property" after the victory. We had armed and supplied lavishly from our seemingly unlimited resources the military forces of Britain, Russia, China, and other nations on our side in addition to our own widely dispersed fighting men. When the war ended, it was considered not worth the cost to retrieve the trucks, jeeps, bulldozers, quonset huts, roofing, blankets, medical supplies, and other items of equipment, large and small (except our planes and ships, arms and ammunition) which we had sent across the oceans of the world before and after we entered the war. So we conducted a series of bargain sales, of materiel useful to civilians, to the governments of our erstwhile allies to be paid for in their own currencies.

The sale to the Chinese Government was concluded on August 30, 1946.[3] The materiel sold was named in the agreement as "moveables in China, Okinawa, Guam, Saipan, Tinian and other islands" of the western Pacific of which the original procurement cost had been roughly $500 million; an estimated one and a half million tons of civilian items urgently needed in China. General Marshall was then in Nanking directing the efforts of his mission to combat the two major threats: outbreak of full-scale civil war and collapse of the Chinese economy. He hoped that a flood of American goods would help prevent the latter, and so consented to terms of payment by the Chinese Government which had little relation to the intrinsic value of the equipment purchased. There were three principal items of payment. Outstanding Chinese currency debts of the U.S. Government for supplies and services to U.S. troops stationed in China were canceled. The Chinese equivalent of $35 million was made available for purchase of buildings and grounds for U.S. Embassy and consular use in China. The third item, which appeared in the various drafts throughout the negotiations leading to the agreement, read in its final form: "China also agrees to establish a fund equivalent to $20,000,000 (U.S.) for promoting research, cultural and educational exchange with the United States."[4]

Thus the Surplus Property Agreement between the United States and China was not only signed within the same month, August 1946, that the Fulbright Act became law but by its wording China actually agreed from the outset to finance the proposed exchange program to the maximum extent allowable. Yet nearly 16 months went by before the Fulbright agreement between China and

the United States, the first Fulbright agreement with any nation, was signed in Nanking on November 10, 1947. Why the delay and what had happened meanwhile?

Undoubtedly there were many different reasons for the delay. In Washington the Department of State had to obtain the necessary clearances from various Government agencies concerned with the income from surplus property sales. The President had to select and appoint the members of the Board of Foreign Scholarships. Finally, the Board had to set up the required machinery for selection of and assistance to grantees in the United States. Meanwhile much time was consumed in China in negotiating the agreement with the Chinese Government. Of these, only the China end can here be traced step by step.

The negotiation of the Surplus Property Agreement with China, complicated as it was, had taken from the end of March to the end of August 1946 and its wording had, as already stated, specifically included agreement to establish a fund equivalent to US$20 million to finance what was to become the Fulbright program. Yet the negotiations leading to the Fulbright agreement with China, not initiated until nearly a year later, in early April 1947, extended over seven months and were not concluded until early November. The reasons for this final delay will not startle the reader of the previous chapters.

To open the Fulbright agreement negotiations, the Acting Secretary of State had sent a letter to Ambassador Wellington Koo on April 5, 1947, enclosing a draft agreement for Chinese Government consideration. One paragraph of the letter read:

> "In view of the traditional friendship between our two countries, and particularly in view of the long history of intellectual association between the people of our countries, this government has expressed a desire that China be the first nation with which it will seek to negotiate an agreement for the execution of such a program." [5]

Senator Fulbright had cited the Boxer Indemnity scholarships in presenting to Congress the long-term value of putting funds owed to the United States to such a use. This was certainly in the minds of many of the Americans concerned with setting up the program. It was also in the minds of many Chinese and, in fact, was the cause of considerable confusion on their part.

As early as September 1946, the Embassy reported to the Department that Ambassador Stuart had received a wire from New York from H. C. Zen, Executive Secretary of the China Foundation (which administered the Boxer Indemnity Funds), saying that the China Foundation trustees think that the US$20 million China surplus property fund which the *New York Times* announces will be

allotted to educational and cultural exchange should be entrusted to the China Foundation to administer.[6] Eight months later the same misconceptions were in the minds of high Chinese officials who should have known better. "The Vice Minister of Education," reported the Embassy, "has spoken in general terms about a large-scale research program to which the entire fund would be devoted, completely under Chinese control, and perhaps administered in somewhat the same fashion as the Boxer Indemnity Fund."[7]

The Department's telegram in response directed the Embassy to emphasize to the Chinese that these funds were entirely different from the Boxer Indemnity remissions.

> "They are U.S. credits to be spent by U.S. Government in China primarily to benefit U.S. citizens but which will also aid indirectly some Chinese institutions and some Chinese citizens who will receive grants to study at American institutions in China or travel to U.S."[8]

This message was apparently made clear to the Ministry of Education officials with whom negotiations were being carried on. They agreed, in the context, that far from having control of the funds Chinese should be merely advisory to the Board of Directors which would be constituted entirely of Americans. By the end of June 1947 the negotiations with the Ministry of Education appeared to be very close to successful completion.

At this point, however, to the consternation of the Americans, the Chinese Foreign Office stepped in and repudiated the agreements made by the Minister of Education. A number of significant changes were proposed, among which, not surprisingly, two were intimately related to the Boxer Indemnity analogy. The first of these was that the name of the Foundation which was to administer the Fulbright program in China should be changed from "United States Educational Foundation in China" to "Sino-American Educational Foundation in China." The second was reported by the Embassy as a statement on the part of the Foreign Minister that

> ". . . he realizes that this Foundation differs from the Boxer Indemnity remissions and that the funds to be utilized are credits of the U.S. Government for which the Government of China has no direct responsibility, but that it will be impossible to explain these distinctions to Chinese public opinion which will consider the Chinese Government has in fact a direct responsibility since the credits were made available by the Chinese Government and further that a lack of Chinese vote on the board would be interpreted as a lack of interest. He therefore insists that there shall be three Chinese votes and states that he cannot entertain a proposal that Chinese participation be solely advisory."

In other words, the Foreign Minister acknowledged that the Boxer Indemnity remission was not analogous, but protested that the Chinese public would not see it that way and for reasons of national dignity both the title change and the Chinese votes must be conceded. The Embassy commented that extremely heavy pressure from various Chinese organizations to have a hand in the expenditures from the fund was an additional consideration and that if the Chinese had three out of seven votes, the seventh being the U.S. Chief of Mission, they could "present to their own countrymen a Chinese versus American bloc with readily exploitable possibilities." [9] Given the climate of the time in China, the conflict and embarrassment that would inevitably ensue in such circumstances was quite clear. On this point the Americans dug in their heels. The negotiations were not completed until the Chinese withdrew their opposition to an all-American Board with Chinese educational leaders as advisers. The name change was also dropped in the end, as being inappropriate and misleading.[10]

Another headache for the negotiators was pointed out to the Department by the Embassy at the outset, namely, the rapid economic deterioration, the inflation, and the unpredictable exchange rates in China at the time. This would preclude, the telegram warned, accurate planning of the budget. Currency requirements for subsistence of American professors and students would change from day to day. "Almost certainly the amount needed at the end of the year will be many times that needed today." [11]

The same economic circumstances naturally influenced the Chinese negotiators. The Embassy reported on May 27 its general impression "that the Chinese Government is not at moment any too anxious to conclude this agreement. There are undoubtedly serious struggles between various factions desiring control of the fund, but there is also an apparent reluctance to undertake in the current inflationary situation any program which, from a Chinese financial standpoint, simply involves printing large additional quantities of money." [12]

The already galloping inflation was playing such havoc with the exchange rate between U.S. dollars and the Chinese national currency (yuan, dubbed for the convenience of foreigners: CNC) that for the protection of the Fulbright program it was finally agreed between the two countries to accept the par value between Chinese dollars and U.S. dollars established by the International Monetary Fund or, in the absence of such a par value, to substitute the open market rate as established by the Central Bank of China.[13] The CNC equivalent of US$250,000 at the exchange rate thus determined was to be deposited with the Treasurer of the United States within 30 days of the date of signature, followed thereafter by further amounts on demand up to the value of US$1 million a year.

It was typical of the fiscal instability in China at the time that before the 30 days were up the Embassy had to request authorization from the Department to accept only a $5,000 equivalence of CNC instead of the stipulated $250,000 worth as an initial deposit. "This action was taken to protect the financial interest of the United States in a period of rapid exchange fluctuations . . . . (Subsequent to December 31, 1947, a check bearing the date of December 19, 1947, has been received from the Government of China in the amount of 627,000,000 Chinese national dollars equivalent to 5,000 United States dollars.)"[14] Clearly, aside from minor immediate administrative costs, program expenditures had not yet commenced. A December check for the entire US$250,000 worth of yuan, though 50 times the size of the CNC $627 million they did receive, might well have melted away before the three months of operations it was intended to cover had been completed, or perhaps even started.

According to the agreement, the United States Educational Foundation in China was to be situated in the capital city, Nanking, and have a Board of Directors consisting of the Chief of Mission as chairman with two members of the Embassy staff and two nonofficial Americans, one representing U.S. business interests and one U.S. educational interests in China.

Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart made a most appropriate chairman since he had spent his long lifetime in China as an educator, the major portion as President of American-founded and -supported Yenching University in Peking. The Embassy staff members were John F. Melby, Second Secretary, and George L. Harris, Cultural Attaché. Melby was a political officer with experience in Latin America and the U.S.S.R. as well as China. As a Ph.D. in international relations from the University of Chicago, he was understanding of and sympathetic to educational and cultural activities. He had been supervising the dwindling USIS operations in addition to his political reporting duties and had been the principal negotiator of the Fulbright agreement. Harris had done advanced work in Chinese anthropology at the University of Washington before joining the Army and had served with the Air Transport Command in the China-Burma-India Theater during the war in both Assam and Yunnan. He was a civilian consultant on China in the Pentagon in Washington when he was selected to go to China to succeed me as Cultural Attaché in 1947. He and his wife reached Nanking in April but were sent almost immediately to Peking to take over the USIS office and remained there until approximately the date of the signing of the Fulbright agreement in November at which time his presence was much needed in Nanking.

Dr. Robert B. Watson, Acting Regional Director for the Far East of the Rockefeller Foundation represented American educational interests in China on the Board and George H. Greene, Jr., submanager of the Shanghai Branch of the National City Bank of New York, represented the business interests.

The Chinese Government appointed as advisers to the Board three leading Chinese educators. Dr. Hu Shih, President of Peking University and former Ambassador to the United States, headed the group. He was joined by Dr. Wu Yi-fang, the well-known woman President of American-founded Ginling Women's College, and Dr. Sah Pen-tung, Secretary-General of Academia Sinica who was, incidentally, a former visiting professor to the United States under the CU program. Han Lien-ching, Chief of the Department of Cultural Relations of the Ministry of Education, completed the advisory panel of four persons named at the time, though the agreement authorized the appointment of five.

With the appointment of the Board of Directors and the Chinese advisers, the United States Educational Foundation in China was well prepared to preside over the operations of the first Fulbright program. Only one element was missing: the operators.

The selection and hiring of American and Chinese personnel to administer a complex million-dollar-a-year program was the responsibility of an as yet unnamed and in fact undiscovered executive secretary. To complicate the search for him and his staff, all salaries were to be paid entirely in inflated and unpredictable Chinese yuan.

The Department had recommended early in the negotiations that the Embassy select a local American as executive director and offer him a salary equivalent to US$10,000.[15] The Embassy's response was uncompromisingly negative regarding:

> ". . . the necessary first step, namely, the appointment of an executive secretary. This individual should not, in the Embassy's opinion, be someone employed locally, because any such individual would necessarily have past ties as well as future associations making difficult impartial and effective administration of the program. . . . Embassy, therefore, recommends that the executive secretary be selected at the earliest possible date and sent out to China at once. The quality of the man, not the preconceptions of the blueprint, will determine the efficiency of a program which has great possibilities. He will need an able assistant to handle routine administration, since much of his time will necessarily be devoted to travel, and a clerk-secretary." [16]

Six months later, after the signing of the agreement, the Embassy reiterated in a telegram to the Department "the imperative necessity that an executive director be sent to Nanking at earliest possible moment." Meanwhile, in the attempt to recruit other American

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staff locally the Embassy was discovering, not surprisingly, that individuals' U.S. dollar obligations at home disinclined them to accept positions paid entirely in Chinese national currency.[17]

The Department was undoubtedly encountering the same problem in approaching various candidates in the United States for the position of executive secretary. In addition, where were the dollars to be found to transport him and his family to Nanking? To be sure, the Smith-Mundt Act was signed into law on January 28, 1948; it provided U.S. dollars for educational exchange which were used to supplement the Fulbright program in other times and places. But, by chance, the only Smith-Mundt grant for the Eastern Hemisphere in 1948 was made to a Dr. Siang-feng Ko of the University of Nanking who was in Washington as a result of a British Council grant and spent his period working on population problems at the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Funds for this grant, the Department explained, "were from small 1948 appropriation intended to help implement the program in 1949. No appropriations were, however, approved for 1949. No more funds available until 1950 fiscal year at earliest." [18] Since the China Fulbright program came to an end just as the 1950 fiscal year was beginning, it never had the accessory use of Smith-Mundt dollars.

The brief duration of the China Fulbright program—a mere 20 months at the outside—requires examination at this point. The story of its accomplishments must be told in the context of the political and military developments which plagued it throughout its existence and finally brought it to an end.

Just a month after the Fulbright agreement was signed in Nanking, the Chinese Communist People's Liberation Army (PLA) launched in mid-December 1947 a major offensive in Manchuria. They isolated huge Nationalist forces in the principal cities, Changchun and Mukden. Supplies could reach the Nationalists there only by air. American military advisers urged Chiang Kai-shek to yield Manchuria and withdraw his troops within the wall. He was determined, however, to possess its important natural resources and the industrial base built there in the previous 20 years by the Japanese. As a result of his stubbornness he suffered a terrible defeat. The PLA surrounded and captured his crack troops with their equipment, arms, and ammunition. Changchun was taken on October 20, 1948, Mukden on November 1.

Months before this debacle, the Embassy was reporting that a deeply pessimistic and defeatist psychology was growing in Chinese Government circles, becoming ever more widespread and profound as the situation continued to deteriorate.[19] Not surprisingly, Communist propaganda took advantage of this defeatist psychology to stir up anti-American feeling by reinforcing the common conviction "that the Generalissimo is, in fact, leading the country to ruin and chaos, and that he could not do so if it were not for the support which the American Government has given him." [20]

This situation was exacerbated by the China Aid Act of April 3, 1948, which authorized US$570 million for economic assistance to China paralleling the Marshall Plan for the economic reconstruction of Europe. In the mood then current in China, the aid program was, according to the Embassy, "condemned even by its direct beneficiaries, as a factor prolonging the civil war. . . . In the eyes of many Chinese, we bear the onus for supporting and keeping in power an unpopular regime which does not have the interests of the country at heart. We are blamed for preventing its replacement by a government which promises, as they see it, to be an improvement." [21] May and June saw widespread anti-American riots. The people, having suffered through eight years of war with Japan, had no stomach for indefinite continuance of the bloodshed in civil war. As for the Nationalist troops, the repeated reverses, despite superiority in arms and numbers, were undeniable evidence that they had no will to fight.

Meanwhile, five months after the inception of the China aid program the economic deterioration had reached such serious proportions that the Chinese Government promulgated on August 19, 1948, a series of drastic reform decrees to stem the tide. The gold yuan was instituted as the new currency with an exchange value of 4 to 1 American dollar. More telling was its exchange value with the Chinese national currency previously in circulation, namely, 1 gold yuan to 3 *million* CNC. The Embassy commented cynically

> ". . . the only real change is, first the acceptance and legalization of the black market rate as the new official exchange rate. . . . The second accomplishment is nominal. It is the removal of the daily inconvenience which has been entailed in handling bales of CNC for even minor transactions." [22]

Nevertheless, the change was real—and devastating. Among other requirements the decrees made mandatory the surrender of all gold, silver, and foreign currency held in China to the Central Bank in exchange for gold yuan notes and the registration of all foreign exchange assets held abroad by Chinese nationals. Upon registration, such assets had to be transferred to the Central Bank.[23] How to enforce this last extortion was a problem, but the authorities were

equal to it. Setting a thief to catch a thief, the Government offered "a whale of an informer's fee: to wit, 40 percent of the Government's recovery in any individual case." [24] By this one move, Chiang destroyed whatever remaining support he may have had among his victims, the long-suffering survivors of the war years who saw their final pitiful savings fade to nothingness with the inevitable dwindling value of the new currency. By October 15, 1948, the gold yuan note issue was estimated to have reached 1.25 billion "which represents a quantity of money say five times as great as that in circulation on August 19." Chiang Ching-kuo, the Generalissimo's son, who had been charged with enforcing the decrees in Shanghai, resigned on November 1 with a public statement admitting his failure and offering his "deepest apology to citizens of Shanghai." [25] As for the citizens themselves, one may assume they were concluding they had nothing further to lose and any Government must be preferable to this one.

The end was not far off. The PLA swept down through the Great Wall after their conquest of Manchuria and captured Tientsin on January 15, 1949. A week later, Chiang Kai-shek retired from the Presidency and Vice President Li Tsung-jen became Acting President. Peking fell on January 31, but the southward drive continued. Several Nationalist divisions defected in the crucial battle at Hsuchow. On April 20 the victorious troops of the PLA crossed the Yangtze without effective opposition and on the 24th Nanking fell. Hankow was occupied on May 17 and Shanghai on May 25.

Many Government bureaus had evacuated Nanking for Canton in the preceding months. On April 23, just ahead of the Communist troops, the Acting President, the Prime Minister, and the remaining officials of the Ministry of National Defense departed Nanking for Shanghai, where they took ship for Canton.[26] But Canton proved to be no safe haven.

Throughout 1949 institutions and families as well as Government bureaus had been moving by ship across the straits from the China mainland to the island of Taiwan. Chiang Kai-shek, retired from his presidency and, purportedly a private citizen, was said to have taken to the island more than 300 million dollars in gold belonging to the treasury of the National Government, leaving the Acting President without funds to pay the troops.[27] On December 8, 1949, the Nationalist Government moved to Taiwan. Taipei was declared the capital of the Republic of China, but across the straits a new republic had been proclaimed on October 1 in Peking. The People's Republic of China had, in its own word, liberated almost the entire country. The United States, long-time supporter of Chiang's Nationalist cause and current protagonist in the cold war against international communism, was now the enemy.

This digression, running ahead of the story, is intended to give the reader a capsule perspective of the circumstances, political, economic, and military, in which the first Fulbright program operated for its short life from November 1947 to August 1949. Looking back 25 years later, these circumstances are fairly clear despite the distortions foisted upon a credulous American public by Senator Joseph McCarthy and the China Lobby in the early 1950's.

Naturally, the sequence of events and the timetable recounted here could not be foreseen with equal clarity in Nanking at the end of 1947. But Second Secretary John Melby had been witnessing and reporting the progressive deterioration of the Nationalists for the previous two years. Although as a political officer he had pressing duties to perform outside the Fulbright program, he was named Acting Executive Director of the U.S. Educational Foundation in China (hereinafter: USEFC or the Foundation) for the first two months of the program's existence.

George Harris, the Cultural Attaché, newly returned to the Embassy in Nanking from his temporary assignment to USIS Peking, was made Secretary of the Board of the Foundation. His months in Peking had acquainted him with the political, economic, psychological, and educational difficulties under which all the Chinese universities labored, whether Government-supported or private. This knowledge proved invaluable in the period ahead as he became more and more deeply involved with responsibility for the Fulbright program in China and was finally named its executive director. This outcome did not, however, eventuate for nearly a year. Meanwhile, Melby being occupied with political reporting, Harris carried the main burden of day-by-day administration of the Foundation's activities in addition to his duties as Cultural Attaché.

It had been obvious for some time that the recruiting of staff for the Foundation could not await the arrival from the United States of the will-o'-the-wisp executive director, long since requested by the Embassy and constantly promised by the Department. Harris undertook the recruiting and managed somehow to surmount the obstacle of having no dollars to offer even as supplementary pay. By January 10 he had found for the United States Educational Foundation in China three Americans who proved efficient and devoted throughout the short life of the Foundation.

Shirley Duncan, program assistant, had worked for several years up to 1941 at American-supported Yenching University in Peking which had given her a competence in the Chinese language and acquainted her with Chinese educators and educational conditions. During the war she was interned by the Japanese invaders. After repatriation in 1943 she was assigned to Chinese affairs in the Office

of War Information (OWI) and the Department, and she was employed by the Regional Director of the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (CNRRA) in Shanghai when she accepted the USEFC position. Pardee Lowe, a third generation Chinese-American born in San Francisco, was taken on as administrative assistant to handle fiscal operations and "responsible technical duties" of the Foundation. His ability as a fixer to get things done in the chaotic times was invaluable. He was a Stanford graduate with business and academic experience and had had war service in China. He came to the Foundation from a job with an import firm in Shanghai, and some years later was cultural relations officer in the American Embassy in Taipei. Marybelle Bouchard was the third member of the team. She had worked in the Orientalia Division of the Library of Congress, then in the China Section of CU in the Department and later as a cultural relations officer in the Embassy in Nanking. Her title was "assistant for exchange of persons" but her specialized knowledge of China and of the workings of the Embassy and the Department were important supplements to the qualifications brought by the others.[28] Harris' very competent wife, Elaine, had been in wartime Washington assistant to the OWI Deputy Director-Far East. She was drafted from time to time to augment the Foundation staff during crises.

The mere listings above cannot adequately convey the office atmosphere created by the interplay of these personalities. They were all young, in their early or middle thirties. They were all deeply interested in China. And they all liked their jobs despite the endless headaches involved. These characteristics of the team made for high morale. Nevertheless, the determining factor in the surprising successes of the brief Fulbright program in China was undoubtedly the leadership of George Harris backed by the political advice of John Melby.

These men, too, were young and the search for an executive director in America was aimed at finding an older, presumably wiser, hopefully prestigious figure to head the Foundation. A potentially suitable candidate was located and inconclusive negotiations dragged on for months when suddenly in October 1948, nearly a year after the signing of the agreement, his appointment was withdrawn without explanation and the Department authorized the designation of Harris as the Executive Director "if the Embassy concurs."[29] In reply the Embassy expressed ". . . great pleasure in wholeheartedly concurring . . . and wishes to add its commendation for his excellent performance during the difficult organizational period of the Foundation."[30] Harris had been operating the program from its inception and acting as Secretary to the Board as well. He was the logical choice.

So much for the staff; how did the USEFC operate and what was its program? The Foundation was located in Nanking outside the Embassy but connected by an umbilical cord of Embassy-Department telegraphic communications with its maternal parent, the Board of Foreign Scholarships in Washington, which governed its actions. (Senator Fulbright himself filled the role of the fond father.)

Without laboring further this metaphor, the Foundation in Nanking and the Board in Washington shared the purpose of promoting international intellectual cooperation by the exchange of persons. The process involved recruiting them, selecting them, moving them, placing them, supporting them, sometimes housing them, often counseling them, frequently introducing them, soothing them in their troubles, dealing with their problems, and finally getting them home at the expiration of their fellowships. In the most favorable circumstances, administering a program of this sort is complicated. But to the usual human foibles normally encountered, the China setting in 1947 to 1949 added such major difficulties as an active civil war being won by the insurgents, an uncontrollable inflation, growing anti-American feeling, impoverished educational institutions and disheartened citizenry. Minor by comparison, but baffling, were the difficulties of administering in a country where communications, (telephones, postal service, trains) were limited, unreliable, or cut off entirely. In this predicament the USIS radio network between the principal cities (the existence of which inside Chinese territory had aspects of an infringement of sovereignty) proved a godsend in making arrangements for and keeping track of the scattered Fulbrighters.

The Foundation in Nanking had all these problems to cope with but a reading of the telegrams makes clear that not infrequently its own directorate, the Board of Foreign Scholarships (BFS), caused it the greatest frustration. The Board, consisting of distinguished American representatives of various groups appointed by the President, had the unprecedented responsibility of selecting the persons and institutions to participate in the Fulbright programs and of supervising the programs themselves. Since the Board met only at intervals of one month or several, the State Department provided it with a full-time executive staff and whatever other services were needed to help carry out its decisions on selection and program policy.

Friction between the home office and field operators is endemic in far-flung organizations. Distance makes for incomplete understanding in both directions. The Board and its executive staff in the Department seem never to have understood how critical was the political and military (not to mention educational) situation in China,

how little time was left, how prompt must be decisions if anything was to be accomplished. The Foundation in Nanking, on the other hand, could not envision what was revealed in the minutes of the early meetings of the Board, namely, the extreme (and therefore time-consuming) conscientiousness with which the BFS regarded its responsibility to maintain the highest standards, to select persons of outstanding ability, to insure that participating institutions were fully qualified, and to lay down policies and general directives that would guarantee the continuing excellence of the various binational Fulbright programs. Most of the time of the initial meetings in 1947 and early 1948 was taken up with framing long-range policies for programs that did not yet exist and creating orderly procedures that could be applied in future in every binational program.

Thus on November 8, 1947, two days before the signing of the executive agreement in Nanking which established the China Fulbright program, the Embassy received a long and detailed telegram requiring for the December 7 meeting of the Board lists of institutions in China deemed eligible by the (still nonexistent) Foundation to participate in the Fulbright program, and also a draft of the China program recommended for the calendar year 1948 with estimated number of grants in each category and dollar estimates of costs.[31]

This pressure from Washington for action was over-hasty. Not for two weeks could Harris, who had to leave his temporary post in Peking and get to Nanking to proceed with setting up the Foundation, assume his duties there, on November 24. Yet by December 5 he had framed and sent off a detailed reply to be presented to the Board of Foreign Scholarships. At this early date, Harris was still expecting an executive director to come from the United States and suggested that it would be unwise to crystallize too many details of the program prior to his arrival since he would have responsibility for their implementation and continued planning. Meanwhile, Harris had mailed to the Department the Ministry of Education's list of 213 institutions of higher education and 20 libraries but warned that it was an inadequate index of eligibility since it gave "no indication of the enormous variation in resources and actual standards of the institutions included." In a hurried attempt to meet the requirements of the BFS, he listed some national and independent universities, libraries, teaching hospitals, research institutions, and museums "which have been tentatively described as eligible by USIS officers." He listed as American institutions the 13 colleges supported by the (Protestant) United Board for Christian Colleges in China and added to them, as equally eligible, the Catholic University

and the College of Chinese Studies, both in Peking. (The Peking Union Medical College was later appended.)

As for the draft 1948 program requested, Harris made passing reference to the need for staff for the Foundation (he had none on December 5) but then continued uncomplainingly to suggest that grants would be useful in the following categories listed in tentative order of priority: (1) American professors to teach in Chinese institutions in the fields of educational techniques, English language, and American literature and history. (2) American graduate students specializing in Chinese area studies. Since a number were already studying in China, he urged the desirability of making a certain number of grants right away "to give tangible public evidence the program is under way." (This turned out to be his most fruitful suggestion.) (3) Grants to Chinese students to study in American colleges in China. (No such grants were made in 1948, but there were 83 in 1949.) (4) Grants to American research scholars to do special research or field projects in China. Harris noted he had given this category a relatively low priority because of the complex problems of evaluation but hoped that "one or more special projects can be initiated before the end of 1948." (They were.) (5) Travel grants for Chinese coming to study in the United States. This group was given the lowest priority because the likelihood of any steamship company accepting payment of trans-Pacific passage in Chinese national currency was "unanticipated." (Yet in a moment of optimism over the financial reform of the following summer both the Chinese airline, CNAC, and Pan Am agreed to accept gold yuan for trans-Pacific flights.) Finally, Harris estimated administrative expenses for calendar 1948 to be equivalent to $87,000 exclusive of housing (staff housing was to remain a recurrent problem).[32]

The Board meeting in Washington, the second BFS meeting, for which Harris had prepared these thoughtful recommendations, took place not on December 7 but on December 13. Senator Fulbright attended and "expressed his concern over delays in concluding executive agreements . . . and urged the Board to use its influence to hasten the negotiation and signing of the agreements." Most of the balance of the meeting was spent in considering procedures for the screening and selection of applicants for grants as proposed by the Institute of International Education (for students), the U.S. Office of Education (for teachers), and the Conference Board of Associated Research Councils (for professors and researchers).

The Fulbright program in China, the only already existing program, was not considered until the end of the meeting.

> "The Board was asked if it would be willing to give approval to certain projects and activities recommended as priority items

by the Embassy in China so that screening and recruitment procedures could be started on these activities. The Board stated its preference for evaluating the first year's program as a whole but indicated its willingness to consider some specific projects at its next meeting if it were not possible for the Foundation in China to submit a complete program budget at that time. This action was agreed upon in the belief that it is essential to initiate the program as soon as possible in view of the prolonged delay which has preceded the conclusion of the executive agreement. The Board therefore requested that the Foundation in China submit a 'list of priority projects with some indications of the basis of selecting them on which the Board can take specific action by way of approval of certain projects.' " [33]

The very next day, December 18, Harris received a telegram from the BFS executive staff in the Department summarizing the comments of the Board and its disappointment that it had not and apparently would not receive a complete program outline before being called upon for final approval of specific grants. Nevertheless the USEFC was urged to recommend "types and number grants and special projects which could be initiated soonest" as well as lists of the American students, GI and other, in China who had been cited in the Embassy's December 5 telegram as being available and recommended candidates. This information was required for the third meeting of the BFS on January 17, 1948. The Department's telegram wound up with an uncharacteristically human cry for help: "Both Senator Fulbright and BFS impatient with Dept for 18-month delay initiating 23-country program under Fulbright Act. Dept appreciates USEFC has no staff but urges USIS and outside help to ensure completion of part of program recommendations by Jan. 17." [34]

Again pressure for action was coming from Washington. The Foundation in Nanking had no executive director and no staff but, without outside help, was already busily at work. On December 16 and 17 its Board of Directors had held its first three sessions and framed a set of proposals to be forwarded to the BFS for immediate consideration.

The general dimensions of the program for calendar 1948 were recommended to be: 20 U.S. professors, 20 U.S. graduate students, and 10 U.S. research scholars to work in China; 30 Chinese professors and students to travel to the United States for study and 100 Chinese students to study in American institutions in China; and an English language training institute to be established at Yenching University in Peking.

Two of the three meetings of the Board of USEFC were attended by the Americans only, but the four Chinese advisers, attending one meeting, joined in advancing the following proposals:

1. The American professors should be primarily in the field of the humanities and should come at the specific invitation of the host university. This caveat is understandable since any such visitor would inevitably be a burden on the host institution in the current circumstances.

2. American students receiving grants should be on the graduate level and have a certain Chinese language competence. Again, in such difficult times, only mature students who knew what they wanted, who could read and speak Chinese and pursue their studies without special shepherding would be welcome. A half-dozen such American students already in China who wished grants for the second semester of the current academic year should be given scholarships now. This would be a useful public gesture, signaling the immediate inauguration of the Fulbright program instead of postponing all exchanges until the 1948–49 academic year. Such postponement might damage the public image of the program as dilatory or even as yet another example of hopes kindled by America only to fizzle out before any benefit reached China. The names and pertinent data regarding the proposed graduate student grantees were forwarded to the BFS for immediate consideration.

3. Worthy Chinese students at American institutions in China who would otherwise have to drop out of school during the current academic year should be given scholarships to continue, as temporary aid in this hardship period. The point was: Why delay for the lengthy selection and recruiting process when there were able students already enrolled who were about to lose through no fault of their own the very opportunity the Fulbright program was designed to provide?

4. Travel grants for Chinese professors and students to go to the United States for study were precluded for the moment by the notorious weakness of the Chinese national currency which was unacceptable by trans-Pacific carriers. There was no sense therefore in wasting time at present on planning and selection for such a program.

5. American-founded Yenching University in Peking should be the site for establishment of an English language institute for the training of middle-school English teachers in new and better methods. The USEFC argued that the deterioration in English language teaching and the drop in English language facility among the Chinese educated public were both marked. The unprecedented skill in using the Chinese language shown by U.S. Army language officers trained by newly developed methods gave promise of finding ways to improve and speed up the process of English language acquisition.[35]

The Board of Foreign Scholarships, meeting in Washington on January 17, 1948, approved the dimensions of the 1948 program

recommended by the USEFC Board. But despite Washington's pressure for action and Nanking's prompt response, the BFS was wary of the dangerous precedents that could be set by plunging ahead.

Regarding the six American graduate students already in China whom the USEFC recommended for second semester grants at once, the BFS staff in the Department had warned even before the Board met that it would need not only the papers of the students recommended but also a "brief statement on total U.S. students studying in China now, number of applications received by USEFC and selection process followed." Consideration of the recommendation was deferred to the March meeting of the BFS.

Furthermore, the selection of Chinese students to attend American institutions in China "must be on nationwide competition on basis scholastic ability and not limited to students now enrolled American institutions." To this was added the depressing conclusion: "BFS requirements will probably make impossible awards to Chinese students before fall semester." [36] As the months ran out, this conclusion proved accurate.

Obviously, the BFS was concerned to make sure that in this, their first program, their responsibility for setting and maintaining the highest standards both of scholarship and of fairness would be carried out to the letter. Yet, despite a very conscientious Board and advisers in Nanking and the hard-working and indomitable staff collected by USEFC, the circumstances in China in 1948 time and again militated against achieving the correctness insisted upon by the BFS so far away in Washington. Only face-to-face explanations seemed to convince.

An example was the infeasibility of a nationwide competition for Chinese student grants. It was not until August 1948 that Shirley Duncan, on home leave in Washington, was able to attend an Interim Executive Committee meeting of the BFS and describe

> ". . . factors which render the program in China different from those in other countries. . . . Although the Ministry of Education receives the third largest budget of the Chinese Government, Chinese professors are so poorly paid that the majority of them must teach in several universities at one time in order to subsist. Students are also in financial straits and it may be expected that all eligible students will apply for any fellowships being offered. This situation is particularly acute in the American institutions in which tuition is about twenty times that charged in national universities."

Whether she went on to spell out the overwhelming problem that would result from open nationwide competition in a country the size of China is not reported in the minutes of the meeting but the implication cannot have escaped the committee.[37]

Action was deferred "without prejudice" on the English language institute proposal at the January 17, 1948, meeting, while the BFS asked for a policy paper to be presented at the next meeting in March regarding the desirability of using Fulbright funds for the teaching of English. The explanation for this deferral was that such a use of funds would evoke an accusation of cultural imperialism.[38]

The Foundation sent back a prompt rejoinder, expressing its regret that the BFS took this attitude regarding the proposed English language institute, and its conviction that this project would not provoke charges of cultural imperialism in view of the manifest desire of all Chinese cultural circles for the extension of language teaching. "In any event," the telegram asserted, "charge of cultural imperialism has already been made, as Department is aware, and will continue to be made as long as current unsettled conditions in China continue. The Foundation does not believe this should be governing consideration." [39] A month later the "policy paper" requested by the BFS justifying the use of Fulbright funds for an English language institute was sent off to Washington by Harris in the form of a long telegram detailing the lamentable state of English knowledge after the war interruption, the need for it as a basic educational tool, and the expressed desire for it by Chinese educators. A telling point was "If fundamental purpose of Fulbright Act is to be achieved in China, it is an urgent necessity that general level of understanding and expression of English be raised." [40]

At its March 20, 1948, meeting in Washington, the BFS at last approved not one but two English language institutes, one to be at Yenching and the other at a national institution, possibly Central University in Nanking. In addition, it approved the recommendations of the the Foundation's Board in Nanking that three analogous institutes for training librarians, as proposed and carefully worked out by Dr. Charles Brown of the American Library Association on a recent visit to China, should be established in Peking, Soochow, and Canton. Each institute was to be staffed by two American librarians, one senior and one junior, the individuals to be approved by the Chinese host institutions and presented later for BFS approval. All five institutes were approved for one year only.[41]

The green light for establishing these five institutes in China came four months after the signing of the China Fulbright agreement but even so it proved too late. The recruitment, selection, security clearance, and employment of the American specialists who were needed to man the institutes proceeded with all the deliberate speed which characterized Government procedures. A representative of the Library of Congress assisted the Board in screening candidates for staffing the library institutes and five well-qualified American librarians were appointed on December 18, 1948.[42] By that time

Manchuria had fallen. Americans in north China had been warned to leave and the institute personnel were told that their grants were suspended until the unfavorable situation in China had cleared. This it never did.

Meanwhile, in addition to the Chinese military and political developments which frustrated efforts to get the program moving, the Foundation was having problems with the Department. These were no doubt characteristic of the first period of a pioneer effort which necessarily departed from the well-worn grooves of bureaucratic administrative procedures. They merit at least brief mention in an account of the first Fulbright program.

Haldore Hanson, the young "China hand" who had been a member of the CU China program staff from the outset in 1942 and had subsequently risen through a series of ever more responsible positions to be Executive Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, arrived in Nanking in April 1948 on a brief tour of inspection of field activities. He attended the Foundation Board meeting on April 5 and spent three days with the staff. That he listened attentively to their grievances is evident from the long telegram he drafted to the Department. It not only detailed the problems but suggested common sense solutions. Parts of it are worth quoting for an outside view of the complexities faced by the small Foundation staff in Nanking even before the first grantee arrived.

> "Department's decision that USEFC is not a government agency [DEPTEL* 227, February 11] and various instructions concerning what Embassy may not do for Foundation gives impression that two branches of Department are working at cross purposes, one trying to carry out educational program and other completely indifferent whether USEFC given any status or facilities. Embassy has received no instructions concerning status of a bi-national organization which was established on initiative of the Department and US Congress and derives all its funds from US Treasury. My impression from reading through telegraph file in Nanking is that Foundation is a stepchild which Department has now disowned. Result here is that Embassy often precluded by instructions from giving aid which Foundation requires and employees of Foundation are treated as kind of stateless persons in diplomatic community."

Hanson recommended that the Department review precedents such as the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission to determine whether the Department furnished personnel, office space, supplies, transportation, and appropriate status for employees. (He seemed to assume it did.) If such expenses were borne by a special allotment in the Department's appropriation, then he suggested an amendment to the 1949 appropriation act might be obtained transferring to such

*DEPTEL=Dept. of State Telegram.

an allotment limited USIS funds which could thus be available for Foundation expenses. Hanson noted that the status accorded American personnel employed by a binational organization was important to the American staff of the Foundation, since on it depended such local perquisites as commissary privileges, access to U.S. Army health services, and Foreign Office passes, all of which affected their daily lives.

The Department had ordered on March 4 that the Foundation purchase office supplies and transportation (a jeep and a station wagon were minimum necessities) in China with local currency regardless of cost. This apparently irked the Foundation staff in view of the prohibitive prices due to the inflation and the scarcity of goods. Hanson agreed.

> "Departmental appropriations and USEFC funds are both property of US Treasury. Why does Department require purchase of secondhand typewriter at Nanking for US $500 or new one for US $800 rather than import one from US? Steel file with lock costs US $150 here. Calculating machine costs US $1500 to US $2500 here. Since Congress is being asked to appropriate funds for exchange of persons, supplementing Fulbright, any such wasteful use of USEFC funds for local procurement ultimately decreases program fund here and increases the request for appropriations in Washington."

Again he urged that, if the 1948 appropriation language did not permit such expenditures, suitable 1949 appropriation language should be obtained.

Housing for the Foundation staff was another headache. Hanson cited the eviction of a Foundation employee from Embassy housing and the Department's "inconclusiveness of approval for USEFC to provide its own housing" which prolonged the individual's hardship. He pointed out that no Americans could accept the Foundation's salaries (paid in local currency) unless housing was furnished at a reasonable rate. He recommended immediate approval in principle for the Foundation to rent or buy necessary housing and an immediate decision on purchase of a desirable building for its headquarters.

Finally, the persistent problem of streamlining the procedure for currency transfer was broached.

> "As Department knows, $3,500 requested by USEFC on February 27 was received from Treasury on April 6, involving 39 day delay. Money received April 6 based on exchange rate March 22 which was date Chinese Government delivered funds to Treasury. Fortunately exchange rate was stable during period of delay. Foundation must ultimately be able obtain funds within one week of request if it is to protect itself against currency fluctuations."

Hanson suggested that the Department arrange with the Shanghai Consulate General to work out a solution through the U.S. Treasury officer there. As for the possibility, always hoped for, that U.S. dollar appropriations might be available to supplement the Chinese currency, particularly to pay travel from the United States to China after July 1, 1948, for American professors and students, Hanson asked the Department to telegraph the current likelihood so that the Foundation's plans could be made more realistically.[43]

Hanson's effort to get the Foundation's problems settled by the Department in a reasonable way was thwarted by circumstance. "There has been no alternative to local purchase," reported the Foundation 10 months later of its 1948 expenditures, "in the absence of supplementary U.S. dollar funds which it was hoped might be available under the Smith-Mundt Act . . . . purchases of real property, vehicles, office equipment, office supplies, furniture and maintenance services were made on the local market with Chinese currency. Prices have averaged from 5 to 6 times those in the U.S." [44]

The Department was limited in its freedom of action not only by external legal constraints but also by its own officials and employees in their rigid adherence to prescribed routine, the proliferation of necessary approvals at all levels, and the tangles, delays, and dead ends implied by the phrase "red tape." These characteristics sprout in a bureaucracy to insure caution and accountability in important matters, and develop into rank weeds choking all action if uncontrolled.

The BFS, at six months of age, could hardly be termed a bureaucracy yet it was composed of experienced and responsible citizens to each of whom the accountability of the Board was a very real obligation and caution was therefore mandatory. Better to postpone a decision for a month or two than to damage the infant program with a precedent-setting mistake. So despite all the time and effort invested by the Board in Washington and by the Board and staff of the Fulbright Foundation in Nanking, there was still no Fulbright program in being in China as late as March 1, 1948.

This situation was amended with uncharacteristic suddenness by the Washington Board itself. Professor Derk Bodde of the University of Pennsylvania received a telephone call in March from Washington. "Would you be prepared to go to China as a Fulbright Fellow?" the voice asked. "We would like an immediate decision, if possible, so that we can make a press release today to say that the Fulbright Program has been started." According to Bodde: "I swallowed my surprise, remembering from wartime experience in Washington that when things happen there, they usually do so

explosively. 'I'll be tremendously happy to go,' I replied. 'Please tell me the details.' " [45]

Notes

CHAPTER NINE

1. Quoted from the wording of the executive agreement.
2. Interview with Fulbright by Roger Swanson: "Fulbright Plan Was Wise Solution of War Materiel Disposal Abroad," *Kansas City Star*, May 17, 1952; cited in Walter Johnson and Francis J. Colligan, *The Fulbright Program: A History* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1965).
3. Text of the Shanghai Sino-American Surplus Property Agreement: Dept. of State publ. 2655. See also *Foreign Relations*, 1946, X, pp. 1033–1059.
4. Congen, Shanghai, to Secstate, Tel. 1615; Aug. 31, 1946, *ibid.*, pp. 1058–59.
5. Acting Secretary Dean Acheson to Ambassador Koo, Washington, Apr. 5, 1947, *Foreign Relations*, 1947, VII, pp. 1263–64.
6. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Tel. 1428, Sept. 6, 1946, O/FADRC, microfilm.
7. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Tel. 1155, May 27, 1947, *Foreign Relations*, 1947, VII, p. 1269.
8. Secstate to Amemb, Nanking, Tel. 710, June 13, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 1270–71.
9. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Tel. 1483, July 8, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 1279–80.
10. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Tel. 1743, Aug. 19, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 1282–83. Subsequent Fulbright agreements established binational commissions of both U.S. and foreign voting members to supervise the programs in the countries concerned. The abnormal situation in China in 1947 necessitated a different arrangement, in the Embassy's view.
11. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Tel. 966, May 4, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 1265–66.
12. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Tel. 1155, May 27, 1947, *ibid.*, pp. 1269–70.
13. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Tel. 2089, Oct. 17, 1947, *ibid.*, p. 1291.
14. Report to the 80th Cong., 2d sess., on the Operations of the Dept. of State, H. Doc. 562, Mar. 8, 1948.
15. Secstate to Amemb, Nanking, Tel. 439, Apr. 16, 1947; *Foreign Relations*, 1947, VII, p. 1264.
16. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Tel. 966, May 4, 1947 *ibid.*, pp. 1267–68.
17. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Tel. 2308, Nov. 28, 1947, O/FADRC, microfilm.
18. Secstate to Amemb, Nanking, Tel. 1253, Aug. 31, 1948 and Tel. 1105, Aug. 2, 1948, *ibid.*
19. *United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944–1949* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State publ. 3573, Far Eastern Series 30, U.S. Government Printing Office, Aug. 1949), p. 902.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 906.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 913.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 915.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 878.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 915.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 880.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 307.

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27. Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China, 1941–50* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 497–98.
28. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Tel. 76, Jan. 10, 1948, O/FADRC, microfilm.
29. Secstate to Amemb, Nanking, Tel. 1471, Oct. 20, 1948, *ibid.*
30. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Tel. 1993, Oct. 25, 1948, *ibid.*
31. Secstate to Amemb, Nanking, Tel. 1366, Nov. 8, 1947, NA, RG 59, 811.42793 SE/11–847.
32. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Tel. 2341, Dec. 5, 1947, O/FADRC, microfilm.
33. "Educational Program Under the Fulbright Act: Proceedings of the Second Meeting of the Board of Foreign Scholarships," Dec. 13, 1947, Typescript.
34. Secstate to Amemb, Nanking, Tel. 1531, Dec. 18, 1947, O/FADRC, microfilm.
35. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Tel. 2470, Dec. 30, 1947, NA, RG 59, 811/42793 SE/12–3047.
36. Secstate to Amemb, Nanking, Tel. 20, Jan. 7, 1948, O/FADRC, microfilm.
37. "Minutes of the Meeting of the Interim Executive Committee of the Board of Foreign Scholarships," Aug. 17, 1948, CU/BFS.
38. Secstate to Amemb, Nanking, Tel. 79, Jan. 19, 1948, O/FADRC, microfilm.
39. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Tel. 154, Jan. 23, 1948, *ibid.*
40. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Tel. 359, Feb. 25, 1948, *ibid.*
41. Secstate to Amemb, Nanking, Tel. 442, Mar. 24, 1948, approving Embtel 488, Mar. 18, *ibid.*
42. Beatrice Holt, Marion Lang, Janet Lockhart, Miriam Tompkins. Fifth name unrecorded. Approval noted in minutes of BFS meeting Dec. 18, 1948, CU/BFS.
43. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Tel. 643, Apr. 10, 1948, O/FADRC, microfilm.
44. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Airgram A–38, Feb. 13, 1949, NA, RG 59, 811.42793 SE/2–1349.
45. D. Bodde, *Peking Diary, A Year of Revolution* (New York: Henry Schuman, Inc., 1950), p. 1.

CHAPTER TEN

The Fulbright Year: August 1948 to August 1949

Derk Bodde, the University of Pennsylvania's learned Professor of Chinese Intellectual History, was the first American Fulbright fellow in the long series who have since been awarded these grants to study or teach abroad. He had lived as a student in Peking for six years in the 1930's and spoke and read Chinese with great facility. He was accompanied by his wife, Galia, and 8-year-old son on his return to the city. Fortunately for us, he kept a record of the family's experiences during the Fulbright year, later published under the title, *Peking Diary*.[1]

Bodde notes in his book that after reading in November 1947 that the Fulbright agreement with China had been signed, he wrote the Department outlining the project for which he would like to be sent to Peking.

> "Some time later a reply came saying the Board was much interested in my project and formal application blanks would be sent as soon as printed. . . . Nothing happened for weeks. Then the phone call. It was only afterward that the forms were finally sent me. Such was the unorthodox beginning to an unorthodox journey which was to culminate in a decidedly unorthodox year in China." [2]

That a policy of caution and deliberation should give way to unorthodoxy was inevitable during this period of revolutionary upheaval in China. But that this departure from orthodoxy should be initiated in the United States by the Board of Foreign Scholarships (BFS) and the Department was astonishing. The Foundation had been urging the Board for months to get the Fulbright program going by awarding grants to qualified American students already present in China but the Board had repeatedly postponed action in deference to its prescribed procedures. Then, without warning, it appointed Bodde in what appeared to be a capricious flouting of its previous caution.

The Foundation staff brought this matter, too, to Hansen's attention during his Nanking stop. He telegraphed the Department that the Board's policy toward the American students in China

> ". . . seems inconsistent with BFS decision to give Bodde a grant without waiting from (*sic*) complete list of American applicants or even for adequate publicity of available fellowships. USEFC issued press release announcing possible grants to Americans in China February 20. Total 22 applicants received result of this release and personal inquiries by this staff in all major university centers." [3]

The Department replied in a tone of injured dignity.

> "Student selection not considered parallel. Actually Bodde is one of group of scholars who have applied to Conference Board and was screened in normal process. Since USEFC had previously recommended him (March 5) and his security clearance obtained, it was possible to make grant immediately following his recommendation by Conference Board. Applications other research scholars now being processed by Conference Board and Dept and additional awards will be possible soon." [4]

"Unorthodox" the procedure may have seemed to Bodde but the Department assumed a stance of uncompromising rectitude.

No matter. The choice of Bodde as a research scholar was excellent and once he had been appointed, whether by orthodox or unorthodox procedure, the program did begin to come alive. The first visiting professor was appointed a month later, in April, and another in July. By August the first grantees were at work in Peking and the screening agencies and the Board itself were operating the China selections in high gear. Before the end of 1948 a total of 41 Americans had been awarded Fulbright grants. Of these, however, only 27 were able to take up their grants: 4 visiting professors, 7 research scholars, and 16 graduate students. These were the fortunate ones who left the United States promptly on notification of their awards or were already in China. The 14 others, with few if any exceptions, fell into the category "awards suspended due to conditions in China" and missed a unique experience. (Appendix VIII lists the American Fulbrighters who did reach China.)

It was natural that the majority of the grantees should elect to spend the Fulbright year in Peking, the historic capital in the north which had remained the cultural capital of China after Chiang had established the actual seat of Government at Nanking in the Yangtze Valley in 1927. The war with Japan and World War II had seriously disrupted and in fact put a temporary end to Peking's preeminence in the educational field from 1937 to 1946. But by 1948 the great national universities, Peita (Peking University) and Tsinghua, had moved back from their wartime refugee location in Kunming, and

Yenching University, the foremost of the private universities founded and supported by American Protestant missions, had reopened its doors on its beautiful campus west of the city. Of special interest to those American grantees whose linguistic skills needed further development was the reestablishment of the mission-founded Chinese language school, the College of Chinese Studies.

The seven graduate students who were in China when they received their grants were all already enrolled in institutions in Peking. Seven others, of the nine who came from the United States, joined them there, the majority arriving in October. The final two did not reach China until December by which time access to Peking was cut off. They chose alternative destinations outside the immediate path of the advancing Communist forces.

The American visiting professors and research scholars tended to be scattered more widely than the students since they came for the most part at the invitation of specific institutions located not only in Peking but also in Shanghai, Nanking, and Hangchow in central China, Chengtu in the west, and Canton in the far south. Nevertheless, two of the professors and two of the scholars, including Bodde, settled in Peking. Thus altogether 18 of the 27 Fulbright fellows were established in that one city by the end of October—a large proportion of eggs in one basket.

On November 1, 1948, Mukden fell to the Communists, marking the final defeat of the Nationalist forces in Manchuria. The imminence of the southward advance on Peking was obvious.

This developing crisis demanded some prompt action by the Foundation. Order the Fulbright fellows out of Peking? Send a rescue plane to move them and their few dependents to safety? Perhaps even send them home in view of the increasing hopelessness of the military outlook for the Nationalists? The Fulbright program was, after all, financed by Chinese Government currency which was not only plunging rapidly to new lows but would certainly not be accepted in areas controlled by the Communists.

It was at this critical moment that the Foundation threw caution to the winds and chose the unorthodox solution. The program had been in operation only some three months. Yet well-qualified and in several cases outstanding American scholars had been selected. Most of them were settled and had begun study, research, or teaching of potential value not only to themselves but ultimately to China also. The idea of cutting this short by heavy-handed orders seems never to have entered the minds of Harris and his coworkers in Nanking. Instead, they concentrated on devising whatever means possible to enable each grantee to stay in whichever location he chose for the full duration of his year's grant.

This was not easy. The first step was to send a plane to Peking to evacuate to Nanking on November 16 those grantees and their dependents who wished to leave for another, safer location. Six of the grantees took advantage of this means of exit and moved from Nanking to other cities in the south or west. Four others made their way independently out of Peking within a few days or weeks. Eight chose to stay.

The next problem was to find a means of assuring each grantee that, no matter what might happen in Peking, Nanking, or elsewhere in China in the remaining months of his appointment, his flight home across the Pacific would be paid. This was more difficult. However, Pan American Airlines, after some negotiation, agreed to accept prepayment in Chinese gold yuan of trans-Pacific tickets for every grantee, to be held until they were picked up by the individuals named.

Finally, and most important, how to assure payment of the monthly stipends for the duration of the grants? This was the most difficult of all. The last stipend of the last arrival would be payable for the month of September 1949 and who could tell where he or, for that matter, China would be then? Certainly Chinese Government currency would do the grantees no good in many, perhaps all parts of China. If the award to the grantees was to be honored, and the Foundation never doubted for a moment that this must be done, the balance of his year's grant must be given to each grantee in a currency that would remain valuable. The details of this transaction have never been written down. All we know is that in a fiscal summary it was noted that grants to the American grantees were prepaid in their entirety in December 1948. To cover the prepayments of monthly stipends and of trans-Pacific air passage, the equivalent of nearly US$100,000 was withdrawn in December. This sum was received in gold yuan, which in July had been exchangeable with the U.S. dollar at 4 to 1 but which had sunk by early December to 47½ to 1 and by the end of December to 110 to 1.[5]

According to Bodde he received his prepayment in American dollar bills and they saw him and his family comfortably through six months of living and working in Peking under the Communist Government. If the grantees were paid in American dollars, this was the final unorthodoxy since the China Fulbright program never did have any American dollars to spend.

But here a quote from Bodde's book seems to me particularly relevant:

> "In conclusion I wish to express deep gratitude to the organizers of the Fulbright Program who appointed me a Fellow, and above all, to its administrators in China, who, under extraor-

dinarily difficult conditions, made it financially possible for myself and seven other Fulbright Fellows to continue working in Peking throughout 1948–49 despite political change. It is a tragedy that this program has now been forced to cease in China, after only one year of very successful operation." [6]

The year to which Bodde refers was the 12-month period from August 1948 to August 1949 during which he was in China. The operation he praised was enabling American scholars to pursue their studies or researches in China, all within the same period. Was it "very successful"? The reader of the foregoing pages well may ask. The answer must be an unqualified "yes."

To understand this requires some perspective. The opportunity for Americans to study or do research in China had been interrupted essentially for 10 years from the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict in 1937, and absolutely during the American involvement in World War II from 1941 to 1945. Many American specialists in various aspects of Chinese studies had been drafted by the U.S. Government into wartime service, military or civilian, to use their accumulated knowledge or pursue designated research for immediate wartime aims. They had a hunger, and a real need, to turn again to the pursuit of their own special interests, to the completion of half-finished studies, or to the exploration in depth of new insights or hypotheses.

Meanwhile, in this decade of disjunction a new generation of young Americans had been trained in Chinese studies. They outnumbered their predecessors most of whom had stumbled into the field by chance. Chance, too, had produced the new generation. The majority were war recruits who, often entirely ignorant of China, had been assigned to intensive study of the Chinese language for military purposes by a Government which found itself involved in warfare in East Asia and woefully lacking in the requisite informed personnel.

When the war was over, many of these newcomers to the field naturally returned to their prewar jobs or other interests. Some of the ablest, however, were caught for life by the fascination of the language, the civilization, and the people. A number of these enrolled in Chinese universities for concentrated study. Some were among the American students already studying in China who received Fulbright grants, since the Fulbright legislation gave special preference to veterans.

Members of these two generations of China scholars were preponderant among the 27 who formed the first American Fulbright contingent. This resulted from the wise policy of selecting candidates in this difficult time who had prior knowledge of the Chinese lan-

guage. None of the students and only two or three of the others were exceptions to this criterion.

For individuals with such qualifications, the opportunity to live and study in China in 1948 was a stroke of incredible luck. Not only was it the first chance in a decade but also, as some could foresee, very possibly the last chance for years to come.

The fact that plans for quiet concentration, in classrooms, or with Chinese tutors or confreres, were disrupted by the momentous events of the year was undoubtedly annoying to some. Yet for others, no matter what their politics, the exceptional occasion to be present at the creation of a new China, in a historic moment of revolutionary change, outweighed all personal inconveniences.

All in all, it is remarkable that much of a scholarly nature was accomplished by the grantees in this unsettled 12-month period. Every one of the 27 grantees listed in Appendix VIII had experiences worth telling, but space limitations forbid. The following few brief accounts are intended to provide an inkling of the harvest of that "very successful year."

If we measure the accomplishments of the Fulbright year by number of volumes produced, Derk Bodde himself is easily the winner. He not only published shortly after his homecoming his full and interesting memoirs of the experience, *Peking Diary*, but also his translation of the second volume of Professor Feng Yu-lan's *History of Chinese Philosophy*. He had earlier collaborated with Professor Feng of Tsinghua University in translating the first volume; completion of the second volume with Professor Feng in Peking was the project he had outlined in his application for a Fulbright grant. These two important volumes were subsequently published by the Princeton University Press.[7]

I might add to the remarks already quoted from Bodde's *Diary* some comments he made to me in 1974 about his fruitful year in Peking so long ago. It was very lucky for him and quite remarkable in general, he told me, that the opportunity for going to China for scholarly work was made available at that time. He inferred that the Washington end of the Fulbright operation could not have realized how serious was the military situation in China at the time he was appointed. The Fulbright office in Nanking must have known but presumably did not alarm Washington. It was incongruous, he felt, that grantees kept arriving in Peking through September, October, and November 1948 only to have to be evacuated within days or weeks to other parts of China as the armies drew near. (This raises the question: was the program set into action, after the months of delay in early 1948, without reference to the political and military situation? Just, so to speak, because "it was there"? If so, that was

another unorthodoxy stemming from Washington!) Bodde, who with seven other grantees elected to stay in Peking since only there could his project be completed, had to work on it independently in the city from mid-December 1948 until April or May 1949, sending his manuscript to Tsinghua University in the outskirts for Professor Feng to check. The *History*, invaluable to Western students of Chinese philosophy, is now, in the turn of the ideological wheel, repudiated by Feng himself.

Robert Redfield, Dean and Chairman of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Chicago, was undoubtedly the most eminent of the visiting professors appointed in the pioneer Fulbright program. He reached China with his wife and son on October 25, 1948, and went directly to Peking to work with Professor Fei Hsiao-t'ung at Tsinghua University on plans for strengthening the teaching and research in anthropology and sociology there. This was the trip to China planned in 1944 when Fei was a CU visiting professor in the United States. Redfield had actually embarked but, due to an untimely illness, had had to leave the ship at a domestic port for home.

Arriving at last on his second try, Redfield made himself available to faculty and students at Tsinghua with Fei as sponsor, disciple, interpreter, and caretaker. Fortunately Redfield's experience and wisdom transcended his deanship and anthropological expertise, since the late autumn of 1948 was no time for the quiet academic appraisal and reorganization originally planned. "Peiping was ringed by Communist forces," he wrote later, "and the fall of the universities and of the city itself was expected within a very short time. In December, 1948, most of the students and many of the faculty of the university looked forward to the coming of the Communists as a relief from hardship and oppression and as a new opportunity to apply intelligence to the improvement of social and political conditions in China. There was apprehension too; but, with the abundant knowledge of corruption and tyranny under the Nationalist Government, the hope outweighed the apprehension."[8] In these circumstances the Redfields shared intimately for six weeks the hopes and fears of the Tsinghua community as it awaited its engulfment momentarily by the revolution.

It is the more remarkable that during these same critical and emotionally unsettling six weeks, Mrs. Redfield (Margaret Park) and Fei Hsiao-t'ung were able to work together steadily on preparing, for publication in English, articles illuminating Fei's views of China's gentry which he had contributed to Chinese newspapers in 1947 and 1948. In Redfield's words:

> ". . . he dictated to my wife a rough translation of these articles, stopping as he did so to talk over with her the substance of the dictation and in part rewriting and enlarging the text in the course of these discussions. The work was done hastily, with enthusiasm, and in the tense anticipation of the coming of Communist control." [9]

This collaboration was not their first. Its success was undoubtedly due to their previous extended experience translating and editing for publication Fei's research materials at the Redfield home in Chicago during his 1943–44 visit to the U.S.A. It produced a volume, *China's Gentry*,[10] which takes its place with the truly remarkable spate of publications of permanent value which resulted from the single year of the pioneer Fulbright program. "At the time he dictated a translation," according to Redfield, "Fei wanted the essays to be read by English-speaking people. Like other intelligent people of good will, he wanted China to be understood by Westerners, and he believed that he had something to say about China that was not said in other books." [11] True. Yet what he then wrote, the Redfields had to put in final form and publish without the opportunity for further contact with him. He now repudiates it just as Feng Yu-lan repudiates his *History of Chinese Philosophy* translated by and with Bodde. Redfield's introduction makes plain that the book "is an expression of Fei's views and judgments as he was about to step over the threshold between revolutionary China and Communist China. It was written when his students (many of whom I knew) moved in an excitement of fresh opportunity to remake their country—and moved without dogma. Few of them had read a line of Marx. Most of them saw the Nationalist government as their oppressors, the Communists as their liberators." [12] Since then those students, and Fei and Feng among unnumbered others, have read Marx and Mao and accepted a new set of values. Yet not the least of the contributions of the Fulbright year in China was to make available to the English-reading public the views held by significant Chinese individual thinkers while they were still addressing us in our terms.

Among the established China specialists who were enabled by Fulbright grants to return to China for further research were Professors H. Arthur Steiner of the University of California at Los Angeles and Knight Biggerstaff of Cornell. Steiner published his *Chinese Communism in Action* in 1953. Biggerstaff could observe such action first hand as he studied in Nanking from March to September 1949. George Kennedy, Professor of Chinese Linguistics at

Yale, taught at the College of Chinese Studies in Peking and was reported to have given lectures on his specialty, the analysis of Chinese grammar, at Peking University.[13]

There was only one natural scientist among the group who were in China during the Fulbright year. Gordon F. Ferris (1893–1958) was regarded by his peers as "one of the 'giants' of taxonomic entomology of the twentieth century."[14] He spent the 42 years of his career at Stanford University where as an influential professor he taught and pursued researches, particularly on the morphology of scale insects. Since these are major crop destroyers, his work became of prime importance to agriculturalists the world over whose efforts to control insect pests had to be based on such fundamental researches. Ferris applied for a Fulbright grant to collect scale insects in China. Lingnan University sponsored his visit and served as his headquarters during the greater part of his stay in China which lasted from October 1948 through May 1949. In that time he made extensive field trips in Yunnan and Kwangtung Provinces, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. According to his own account, "The material which was obtained represents one of the largest collections of scale insects that has come out of Asia (more than 950) and it is to be expected that a very considerable extension of our knowledge of the scale insects of that continent will eventually result from it." Still, he deplored that his freedom of movement to collect was limited by the unsettled conditions. Nevertheless he discovered numerous new species including a gall-forming insect found near Kunming which he named *Fulbrightia gallicola* "to commemorate the Fulbright Act which made this collecting expedition possible and in honor of Senator Fulbright, the author of that Act." He published detailed descriptions and illustrations of his Yunnan finds in three issues of *Microentomology* under the title "Report Upon Scale Insects Collected in China (Homoptera: Coccoidea)" in 1950–52. He also makes clear his indebtedness to the various Chinese and American scientists who accompanied and assisted him on his collecting expeditions. His wife, Roxana S. Ferris, Curator of the Dudley Herbarium at Stanford University, joined him in China in the early spring of 1949 and herself made a small collection of some 200 plant specimens. She has written an entertaining popular account of their stay in a temple in Kunming while collecting in the environs.[15]

Most of the graduate students with special training in Chinese language and culture who were in that first Fulbright contingent went on to positions in the academic world. There were two, however, who chose careers in the Foreign Service: Donald Toussaint and Alfred Harding IV. Toussaint had come to China after serving in the Navy 1945–46 and receiving his B.A. from Stanford in 1947. He was

awarded his Fulbright grant in China when he was already enrolled at Yenching University for graduate study of Sino-American relations. He stayed on after the change of government in Peking to complete his work for the M.A. degree which he was awarded in 1949. In 1956 after receiving his Ph.D. from Stanford he joined the Foreign Service and through the years since has made himself an expert in Indonesian language and politics. He is currently assigned to the Bureau of International Organization Affairs.

Alfred Harding first encountered China when he was sent there in Army service in October 1944. He was assigned to the U.S. Army Observer Group, the so-called "Dixie Mission," at the Communist headquarters in Yenan and there began his study of Chinese. His remarkable skill at the language, developed over the next few years, has played the determining part in his subsequent career. After securing his B.A. at Cornell University in 1948, he hastened back to Peking to enroll at the College of Chinese Studies and Peking University for serious and extended study of the language and civilization of China. He was awarded a Fulbright grant in November and like others among the student grantees chose to stay on in Peking. In November 1949 he joined the staff of the beleaguered American Consulate General in Peking. When it closed in April 1950, he was transferred to Hong Kong. This was the first move in what was to be a widely traveled Foreign Service career. It took him to Macao and Taiwan for language study and to Poland to interpret the Sino-American ambassadorial-level talks in Warsaw from 1962–66. A stint of political reporting in Hong Kong followed, but after 1971 he was stationed in the Department on an assignment peculiarly appropriate for a former Fulbright grantee in Peking. He was the individual designated to represent (1971–75) the Department (CU) in negotiations and arrangements regarding the (unofficial) cultural exchanges between the People's Republic of China and American agencies.[16]

Though she chose a Foreign Service officer rather than a Foreign Service career, Esther Haviland's life since her marriage in Peking has been as mobile and varied as those of her two fellow Fulbrighters just discussed. After graduate study of Chinese archeology at Columbia under Professor Carrington Goodrich, she went to China in the summer of 1947 on one of the five scholarships offered to American students by the Chinese Nationalist Government that year. She had studied the Chinese written language but went immediately to the College of Chinese Studies in Peking to work on her spoken Chinese. As soon as she had developed this adequately, she enrolled at Tsinghua University to study ancient Chinese inscriptions under the eminent scholar, Ch'en Meng-chia. She applied

for a Fulbright grant to enable her to remain in China to continue her archeological studies and received it in August of 1948. The approach of the Communist armies that fall made her realize that commuting from the city out to suburban Tsinghua would become difficult so she moved out there, taking a position as an English teacher to enable her to live in the instructors' compound. As the year progressed, the English of the texts she was handed to teach became so execrable (she described them as "propaganda translated from the Russian into English by a Chinese") that she finally gave up her teaching job though continuing her studies. In July 1949 she married John Farrior of the Peking American consular staff. Since then she has lived in many parts of East and Southeast Asia, been a guest archeologist on a dig in Malaysia, and has lectured on Shang history and civilization in Japan and the United States. Her special interest, she finds, is an open sesame to persons and experiences not normally available to diplomatic wives.[17]

Frederick Mote, a young veteran with war service in Burma and China, had a unique record among the group of graduate students. He had had Army interpreter's training in spoken Chinese but first started reading the language on a long slow transport voyage to India during the war. Chinese fellow-passengers loaned him a novel by Pa Chin and served as oral dictionaries to guide his reading. He turned to the more difficult classical language in his spare time after his arrival in China, and after the war ended he enrolled as an undergraduate at Nanking University. He graduated in June 1948 having established "one of the highest records of any student of any nationality ever to enroll in the Arts College of the University of Nanking although two-thirds of his courses were in the Chinese language. For this reason he is the first American, if not the first non-Chinese, to be elected to Phi Tau Phi, the Chinese equivalent of Phi Beta Kappa." Dr. Wu Yi-fang, President of Ginling College and Chinese member of the USEFC endorsed his application for a grant with the statement that he was "fully capable of entering any Chinese university graduate school on an equal footing with the Chinese students." [18] He proceeded to do just that on receiving his Fulbright grant in August. He enrolled in the Peking University graduate school to study Ming and Ch'ing history. By the end of November, the teaching was so disrupted that he left Peking for Lanchow and eventually Nanking where he studied at the graduate school of Chinese studies of his old university and supported himself by teaching English. He was in the end employed by the Embassy as a translator and left with the others when the Embassy was closed in April 1950. He is now and has been for many years Professor of Chinese History at Princeton University. Asked recently

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to comment on his Fulbright year, he expressed heartfelt gratitude: "If it hadn't been for my Fulbright grant I might have had to come home!" He commented, logically, that all his subsequent publications have partly grown out of his studies that year but he cited his biography of the celebrated Ming literary figure, *The Poet Kao Ch'i: 1336–1374* (Princeton 1962), as being most intimately related to that opportunity.[19]

Other young scholars who knew what they wanted and applied themselves with diligence to their researches in the Fulbright year would probably agree with Mote that all their subsequent publications have developed from ideas they began to formulate then. W. Theodore de Bary said as much in almost the same words. He studied Ming Neo-Confucianism at Yenching and Lingnan Universities and, like Mote, has made important contributions to our understanding of Chinese intellectual history in the years since. Several chapters of his *Sources of Chinese Tradition* stem directly from his 1948–49 researches in China on his Fulbright grant. He is now Provost of Columbia University.[20]

The far western province of Szechwan was a refuge of relative quiet for a time as the revolutionary storm swept the northern and eastern provinces. The American mission-supported West China Union University in Chengtu hospitably welcomed several Fulbright scholars who were able to work there under fairly normal conditions prior to the fall of Chengtu at the end of December 1949.

Richard Rudolph, professor and sometime chairman of the Department of Oriental Languages at the University of California at Los Angeles, was one who took excellent advantage of this opportunity when he had to leave Peking in November 1948 after barely a month there. With Chengtu as a base, he traveled to Lanchow in neighboring Kansu Province and also visited the lamasery of Labrang near the Tibetan border. His most fruitful period, however, was spent examining reliefs in cave tombs near Chiating, and in Chengtu itself collaborating with Professor Wen Yu to study and prepare for publication their joint book: *Han Tomb Art of West China; A Collection of First- and Second-Century Reliefs*.[21]

Szechwan was rich in Han Dynasty reliefs both on the walls of rock-cut tombs and carved on the stone slabs of sarcophagi. They naturally interested Rudolph who, while teaching Chinese at the University of Toronto from 1945 to 1947 had been simultaneously "Assistant Keeper of Far Eastern Antiquities" at the Royal Ontario

Museum in Toronto. The museum's superb collections of Chinese art included excellent examples of Han tomb-tile designs and other important archeological materials of the period. Rudolph came with a prepared mind to his encounter with Professor Wen and his introduction to Wen's extensive collection of rubbings of Han reliefs from the Szechwan area. Many of these were little known or newly discovered. It was plain that publication and interpretation of these and any available supplementary examples would be very useful. Rudolph's researches with Wen had to be cut short in May and he left for the United States via Canton at the beginning of June 1949. But the book was completed and published within two years thereafter.

In his book Rudolph expresses his gratitude to Richard Edwards for providing photographs of some of the original bas-reliefs from which the rubbings he published were made.[22] Edwards was a younger man, a graduate student of Chinese art who had proceeded directly to Chengtu on his Fulbright grant and remained there for nearly two years. He was preparing himself for a teaching career in which he has subsequently distinguished himself at the University of Michigan, giving special attention to the study of Chinese painting. But the west China setting of his Fulbright period led him, like Rudolph, to give his attention to the local Han cave tombs and their interesting reliefs. He chose to examine in depth one particularly interesting tomb, one mile down the Min River from Chiating, which was complex both in architecture and in decorative elements. Concentrating on interpretation rather than description of the reliefs which had been the province of his precursors, he set forth original and stimulating theories on, for example, the importance of the horse in Han China as a "machine" to control the Hsiung-nu barbarians and on relationships of the mural motifs to Indian sculpture and west Asian archeology. The monographic article which presented his findings was one of the important contributions of the Fulbright year.[23]

Margaret Portia Mickey was the only woman in the research scholar category in the Fulbright year. Unlike Rudolph and Edwards, she was an ethnographer, but like them she headed for the West China Union University in Chengtu where her application for a Fulbright grant had been sponsored by Dr. Li An-che, then director of its West China Frontier Research Institute. She was returning to China with the intention of extending previous field

studies she had made of a tribal village in the southwestern province of Kweichow.

In the course of years spent in China as a missionary before World War II, Portia Mickey had learned to speak and read Chinese, though the extent of her reading knowledge is not clear. Just when and why she changed from her missionary calling to take up field ethnography is lost in the mists of time, but late in 1940 she had gone to Kweichow with the intention of living among and studying the daily life of the Miao tribe, a non-Chinese minority people. With a Chinese woman research assistant and a necessary introduction she settled in a Miao village, Yang-chia-chai, about 30 miles southeast of the city of Kweiyang. She stayed there for two months in early 1941 with her research assistant and later, in the spring of the same year, for two further months alone. The next year she returned to the village on the first of February and stayed until December.

Her report of this year and a half of study of a little known people in a remote part of China tells much about the Miao but almost nothing except by inference about Portia Mickey. Fortunately, Professor Carleton S. Coon, who supervised the final draft and publication of her researches at Harvard's Peabody Museum, gives us a glimpse of her in his preface:

> "Aside from her linguistic qualification, she is a natural field ethnographer. Quiet and unobtrusive, she masks with her mild personality keen powers of observation, discrimination and persistence. To go alone into the most backward part of the most backward province of China in war time, to live there under local conditions of nutrition and sanitation, and at the same time to keep detailed records of everything that went on, was a feat of no little courage and endurance for a small woman no longer young, on her first anthropological expedition. Thanks to her, we are able to publish the first detailed, factual account of a Miao community." [24]

The text of Miss Mickey's publication describes painstakingly all aspects of the life of the village which she was able to observe and is refreshingly free from professional jargon. It was published in 1947 five years after she had left the Miao village. She must have been eager to return to Kweichow to check some of the lacunae which had turned up in the final writing and to learn what might have happened in the intervening years. Her Fulbright grant made this possible.

She reached China in mid-October, 1948, and took a ship up the Yangtze for Chengtu, celebrating her 60th birthday aboard. With Dr. Li's permission she went to Kweichow in December. There the President of Kweichow University provided her with the necessary

credentials and introductions and with a young male assistant, a Miao of another tribe who had had university training in sociology and linguistics. Together they proceeded to "her" village of Yang-chia-chai where she spent most of the period from January 8 to March 21, 1949. She left with apparent reluctance only because of the assistant's poor health and impatience, and passed through Chungking on July 11, 1949, on her way back to Chengtu. She must have left China before the end of the year, reportedly via Canton, and returned to Cambridge where she prepared a typed manuscript of "Additions and Corrections to *The Cowrie Shell Miao of Kweichow*" of which one copy, dated 1950, exists in the Tozzer Library of Harvard University but which seems never to have appeared in print. Professor Coon remembers that she left for a position with the Merriam-Webster Dictionary Company in Springfield, Massachusetts, but knows nothing further of her later years.

A number of the 16 graduate students have made their mark in the academic world. Michael Rogers and Arthur Link, both of whom were studying Buddhism in China in 1948–49, are now professors: Rogers at the University of California, Berkeley, and Link at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver. James Parsons is a professor of modern Chinese history at the University of California, Riverside; Frank Bessac teaches Mongol anthropology at the University of Montana; Harriet Mills teaches Chinese language and literature at the University of Michigan; and W. Allyn and Adele Rickett are both on the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania. The last three stayed on in Peking until 1955 and each has produced a book based on researches undertaken in the Fulbright year.[25]

On the very day that the Communist troops took Peking, January 31, 1949, the Foundation sent a telegram to the Department in which it expressed satisfaction at having recently completed emergency prepayments of grants and return travel for all the 1948–49 American Fulbright fellows in China but questioned the prospects for the remaining two projects of the 1948 program. The first, travel grants for Chinese to study in the United States would, "when approved," be feasible only to the extent that internal transportation facilities continued to function to enable the grantees to reach ship or plane. The advancing armies had already cut railway travel as far

south as the Peking-Tientsin area. The expected additional extension of the Communist-held area would also limit the second project, namely, the scholarships for Chinese students to attend the American-maintained institutions in China which were situated at widely scattered locations, several in the north.

The Foundation had submitted a plan for a second year (1949) program to the Board in Washington on January 22 for consideration subject to developments in China, but now, less than two weeks later, acknowledged that in "view uncertainties does not foresee early possibility initiate any phase proposed activities." [26]

Despite the Foundation's misgivings, the Board approved the proposed 1949 plan on April 26, 1949. Fate made a travesty of this decision which was voted just as Nanking's occupation by the Communist forces was taking place. The American Embassy and the Foundation were henceforth isolated there from contact with the Nationalist Government which had moved to Canton, access to its currency for continuation of the Fulbright program became difficult if not impossible and, in any case, no Fulbright funds were acceptable in Communist areas.

The gulf between Washington and Nanking—between the Board's well-meant resolutions and the Chinese realities—which has already been stressed in earlier pages was dramatically illustrated that day. The tentative 1949 program submitted on January 22 "dependent on political conditions in China" had proposed slightly increased numbers of grantees in all the previous categories plus five secondary school teachers, and had included grants previously approved but postponed. The nearly forgotten English language and library institute projects had reappeared. A USIS information officer, Paul Frillman, back from China reported to the Board that the Foundation had an emergency fund of $200,000 in Chinese currency for the current quarter but that no long-range planning was possible. In his view, "A limited program, depending on changing political conditions was the only alternative to outright suspension of operations in China." In the discussion that followed, the Board chairman "questioned whether the Committee should take action at this time in approving a limited program, or postpone action until the next meeting of the Board on May 28, 1949." (Shanghai fell on May 25!) A Board member advocated immediate approval of a limited program for its psychological effect. "He pointed out that a break-down of the Foundation and a complete hiatus in operations would seriously affect the morale of the Chinese people interested in the program." Other members concurred and the second year program, with limitations, was passed.[27]

It was, in the circumstances, a meaningless gesture. Such a motion passed in Washington in April 1949 was not only irrelevant to the swelling revolutionary tide in China but, in any case, the indomitable Foundation staff had no intention of having "a breakdown" and "a complete hiatus" in operations. They had their emergency fund equivalent to approximately US$200,000. They had their policy of doing everything in their power, orthodox or unorthodox, to carry through the purposes of the Fulbright program. Moreover, though undertaking a new program was impracticable, they had an obligation to achieve if possible the completion of the two remaining projects of the 1948 program already mentioned, and this they did.

A brief accounting of the 1949 achievements of the Foundation in China was included in the Secretary of State's report to Congress on all the Fulbright programs for that year. Though it stated that "The program in China, active during 1948, was suspended temporarily and no new program activities were initiated in 1949" it goes on to list by name and institution attended 107 Chinese students and scholars who received Fulbright grants during 1949. Round trip travel expenses to the United States were paid for 24 Chinese—3 professors, 11 research scholars, and 10 students; and scholarships or fellowships for study at American-sponsored colleges or universities in China were awarded to 83 Chinese students there. The expenditures for the year totaled the equivalent of US$191,500 of which $108,090 was spent for the program, $27,180 for administration, and $56,230 was lost by exchange. This loss was explained to the Congress in a note (p. 72) as having "resulted from rapid and uncontrolled devaluation Chinese currency, due to the emergency situation existing in China." [28]

There is little to say regarding the 24 travel grants for Chinese to come to the United States for study other than that it added in small measure to the flood of Chinese refugees who were fleeing at the last minute from the Communist advance. (Ten had proceeded to the United States before their selection was announced. On the other hand, three returned to China in the summer of 1949.) But the program of grants to Chinese to study at American institutions in China had certain unique features worth mention. These resulted from the emergency circumstances and have perhaps never been repeated in Fulbright programs elsewhere.

The principle of evenhanded universal competition for such grants had been abandoned as unfeasible. The Embassy and the Foundation had reported to the Department in July 1948 that

> ". . . a nationwide scholarship competition in China would mean the influx of tens of thousands of applications which could

> not possibly be serviced even by the combined facilities of the USEFC [Foundation] and the USIS. Experience does not indicate that the establishment of part-time nonsalaried regional screening committees would appreciably ameliorate this burden. . . . There is the added consideration that the crowded conditions and the lack of uniformity in academic standards make one institution reluctant to accept transfer students from another, particularly where such transfer might be temporary as determined by the duration of the scholarship."

Any universal competition in China would, they also feared, "have the effect of creating among Chinese students in government universities a wide interest in moving to the American institutions (however few the actual scholarships might be)" which would be undesirable. The probability of such a migration appeared to be contradicted in the very next paragraph which dealt with publicizing the scholarships.

> "In view of the present anti-American feeling among Chinese students and the fact that the scholarships are for study in American institutions only, any but the most carefully prepared and well-timed publicity could only too easily be distorted into material for a charge of American cultural imperialism. Recent press reports indicate that Yenching and Tsinghua University students and faculty members are refusing to purchase American rationed flour and National Peking University students have returned to the China Relief Mission money which had been allocated for work relief projects and food which had been made available to supplement student diet. All phases of the Foundation program would be affected should unwise publicity extend this attitude to include the Chinese student scholarship grants."

In view of these considerations, the only practicable procedure appeared to be the one originally proposed by the Christian colleges, namely, that grants should be awarded on the basis of merit to students already enrolled in their institutions who would otherwise find it necessary to drop out. Accordingly, the Foundation drew up regulations to govern the selection of such students by a screening committee in each institution which was to submit to the Foundation a panel numbering approximately twice the quota designated to that school. Thus the Foundation, the Institute of International Education, and the Board would each have a choice if a limited one. All candidates were to be in the upper 10–15 percent of each class (financial need to be a secondary consideration) and preference was to be given to students in fields which offered the greatest opportunity for contact with American faculty members. A sign of the times was the fact that all grantees were required normally to have security clearances, but since the Area Security Officer indicated that handling security clearances for Chinese students was unfeasible, the

Foundation and the Embassy considered that "recommendation by the American institution in question and personal references must suffice." [29] Such references could hardly be expected to vouch for the unyielding anti-Communism of applicants in residence in revolutionary China in the latter half of 1948!

Although the proposed regulations were sent to the Department in July 1948 and approved by the Interim Executive Committee of the Board in Washington on October 16 as temporary for the first year, the complications of the procedure and particularly the number of groups which had to participate sequentially in the selection process apparently delayed the awards so that they took effect only in the spring semester of 1949. By that time making grants to students in American-supported institutions in the Peking area was impossible. An offhand phrase explains why. "A total of 100 grants had been authorized under the 1948–49 program, but the interruption of mail communications between Peiping and Nanking from the end of January until May prevented receipt of application forms from Yenching University, Fu Jen (Catholic) University, and the Peiping Union Medical College." Aside from the quotas assigned to those institutions but unfilled, there were 73 scholarships for undergraduate study and 10 fellowships for graduate study actually awarded, 44 to men and 39 to women students. The majority were majoring in natural and social sciences, English, and medicine. The size of the individual grants varied according to local conditions but ranged in general between equivalents of $100 and $200 (total), the fellowships approaching the larger figure. With two exceptions, all the institutions received their funds for these grants through the United Board for Christian Colleges in China.[30]

Though the grantees were numerous and selected with overly painstaking care, their Fulbright grants supported them for only one term or not more than five months at the outside. Here, again, the Board's conscientious dislike of establishing precedents which might plague future Fulbright administrators produced the hesitations and delays which cut this program down to nearly meaningless proportions. The precedents which evoked this alarm were not only the abandonment of the principle of universal competition and the other unique features mentioned above but also the special favoring of American Protestant mission colleges and universities which formed the overwhelming majority of the American institutions. The program which was eventually adopted by the Board in time to give 83 students five months' support at American institutions in China was the very one which had been proposed by the Christian colleges and recommended by the Foundation as early as December 30, 1947.[31] Hindsight suggests that, if the Board had understood

the urgency and acted promptly, 100 Chinese students might each have had a year and a half of American-style higher education provided by Fulbright funds.

The end was near. By late May when Shanghai fell to the Communists' rapid southward advance, the mails and surface and air transportation were largely disrupted throughout the country. Even in the dwindling areas under Nationalist rule the use of the gold yuan was declining and being replaced increasingly as a business medium by Chinese silver dollars and illegal U.S. or Hong Kong currencies. It was unpredictable how much longer any withdrawals could be made anywhere in China. The Foundation's obligations to its grantees, American and Chinese, had been made in full but the final telegraphic transfer of funds to grantees in Canton (which took three or four days) had involved losing the equivalent of US87¢ on the dollar.[32]

Operating a program during a severe inflation had exasperated the fiscal officer and other responsible members of the staff from the outset. Yet it must be remembered that, outrageous as were the prices of necessary purchases and the losses from the unrealistic exchange rate, the annual budget authorized by the Fulbright agreement was the Chinese currency equivalent of US$1 million. In 1948, the only complete calendar year of operation, the Fulbright expenditures had totaled only $286,000. Of this, $150,000 had gone for administrative expenses. These were proportionately large since they included procurement of capital equipment for the anticipated 20-year program. Additionally, the economic crisis had necessitated stockpiling of supplies as well as advances to Chinese and American staff members to maintain them through the political upheaval. Expenditures strictly for the program consumed somewhat less: $136,000. This is explainable by the delays in awarding fellowships through the first six months and the emergency situation in China which precluded the arrival of additional grantees from America or the activation of the English language and library institutes.[33]

By June 1949 the Foundation personnel had been stranded in Nanking for six weeks behind the lines of the Communist advance and were facing the inevitable windup of the Fulbright operation. It was time for consideration of what had been accomplished and what, if anything, the future might offer.

Though the Fulbright agreement had been signed in Nanking a year and a half earlier the actual operations which I designate "the Fulbright year" in China were properly datable from August 1948 to August 1949. The Foundation summarized to the Department the grants to Americans and Chinese which have been described, and pointed out the side benefits which had accrued from the program. The point was made that these were not confined to the goodwill of the grantees, to the gratitude of the institutions concerned, nor to the

intellectual influence and personal friendships of the U.S. grantees in China. The cooperative character of the program and its association with such eminent figures as Dr. Wu Yi-fang (the President of Ginling College) and Dr. Sah Pen-tung (the late Director-General of Academia Sinica) had commanded wide respect and approval. The personal contact which had developed between Foundation officers and key individuals in the Chinese educational community were of continuing value to the Embassy. Furthermore, the participation of the USIS in the program for which it was co-opted to disseminate publicity, consult interested local institutions, advise applicants, and assist grantees had strengthened the USIS offices by providing for the first time since 1946 an actual exchange-of-persons program with which to give substance to the cultural phase of their activity. The Foundation argued that the proven value of the program, compounded by these supplementary benefits, warranted its continuation in the changed circumstances if at all possible. For this purpose, it recommended that the Department should consider making an allocation from any Smith-Mundt funds which might be appropriated for the Eastern Hemisphere in the following fiscal year since the Communists had repudiated such National Government obligations as the Surplus Property Agreement which provided the funds for the Fulbright program.[34]

The dogged maintenance of the program by George Harris and his coworkers despite the continuous and discouraging predicaments of the Fulbright year in China evidenced a stubborn devotion to the purposes envisioned by Senator Fulbright, and pursued in the earlier CU program, which even the revolutionary upheaval could not shake. A long despatch drafted by Harris in mid-July set forth justifications for urging the Department in the name of the Embassy to "undertake to assure the availability of funds for continued educational exchange activities in China should events render a program possible." He reiterated the value to the United States of the work accomplished by the Foundation.

> "That the returns of such activity are necessarily intangible makes them none the less real. The immediate benefits derived from the operation of the Foundation are obvious enough in the opportunity afforded the individual American scholars and specialists who received grants. These grantees, who have been enabled to study or teach in China by Fulbright support, in acquiring firsthand knowledge of China and in most cases proficiency in the Chinese language, have added to the body of Americans professionally qualified to deal with China matters on the levels of government, business and education. The handicap to the United States of the dearth of area-trained Americans and the implications of present developments in China for American interest and security in the future make evident the importance to the United States of an adequate reserve of qualified area experts."

Furthermore, he argued that cultural and educational exchange was not only of increasing importance as a positive instrument to achieve international understanding but also to counteract the efforts of totalitarian regimes to isolate their populations from contact with free information and free peoples. Citing the fact that in Peking and Nanking the American diplomatic communities had been effectively isolated from most of the Chinese individuals and groups with whom they formerly had friendly personal or official relations and that American businessmen and missionaries were similarly limited, he contrasted the experience of the Fulbright graduate students and scholars studying at the universities in the two cities who had still (at that time) remained free to move within Chinese student and academic circles largely on their merits as individuals.

> "Of high personal caliber, adaptable to Chinese conditions with a use-knowledge of the Chinese language, this small group of American students and scholars, in maintaining the friendship and respect of numerous individual Chinese, stands in some part as a living refutation of the virulent propaganda attack levelled on all things American throughout the Communist area." [35]

But within a month he conceded that Communist policy showed no hope for continuation of the program on the China mainland and "reluctantly requested discretionary authority" to close the Foundation's Nanking office at the end of September. Yet even at this final moment he expressed his belief that this measure should be considered "suspension only," leaving open the possibility of resumption of activity should events by any chance permit.[36]

The operations of the Foundation were in fact suspended as of August 31 due to exhaustion of its funds and inability to acquire more from the Nationalist Government. Real property and equipment were transferred to the Embassy and all staff, American and Chinese, were terminated as of that date. A contingency fund of Chinese silver dollars had been used in the final months to pay the Chinese staff who had shown outstanding loyalty and cooperation through a very difficult time. By October all the year's grants were finished and all the American staff of the USEFC had left for home. The official program of cultural relations between the United States and China had for the unforseeable future come to an end.

Thirteen of the Americans who had received grants for the Fulbright year deferred their departure and remained in China for shorter or longer periods. The majority of the grantees who lingered

a few weeks or months benefited from further study and suffered nothing more than minor worries or inconveniences. But for four of the graduate students the process of leaving China for home was a far more traumatic experience.

W. Allyn and Adele Rickett and their good friend, Harriet Mills, were still studying and teaching in Peking in 1950 and 1951 while the Korean war was raging. When the United States and China met there on the battlefield as enemies, all three of these young Americans were accused by the Chinese of having been spies against them. Rickett and Mills were arrested and imprisoned in Peking from July 1951 to 1955. Adele Rickett remained under house arrest until September 1952 but was then jailed for two and a half years. All were freed and repatriated in 1955.

The Ricketts published a book about these experiences.[37] In it they explained that Rickett had been a Marine Corps naval intelligence officer in World War II. In 1948 Seattle Naval Intelligence Headquarters had asked Rickett as he was about to leave for his Fulbright year in Peking to "keep my eyes open for them." He was "elated by the flattering idea that Naval Intelligence considered me somewhat of an expert on China and, since their request fitted right in with my plans to study conditions there while preparing my Ph.D. dissertation, I had readily agreed . . . . I had no really clear realization that my espionage activities would involve me in any serious danger."[38] The book is a curious revelation of personal naiveté as well as a vivid account of the process, once termed brainwashing but perhaps, in this case, more aptly termed guilt-cleansing, through which they passed step by step during their long imprisonments. In the process Rickett was quite logically led to confess to espionage, though the substance of his activity in this line seems to have been minimal, and that of the others even less. Still, one cannot read the book detachedly, for the success of such international cultural programs as the Fulbright fellowships depends on the recipients' being free from suspicion of using the program for ulterior purposes.

Finally, a dramatic and tragic ordeal marked for Frank Bessac the end of his stay in China. He had gone to China in World War II and after the peace had a job distributing grain in the Ordos region. There he became enthralled by the Mongols and their life on the open grasslands. While recovering in Chengtu from an operation for glaucoma, he applied for and was awarded a Fulbright grant for Mongol studies in Peking. He returned to Chengtu when the advancing Communists neared Peking and in the spring of 1949 took refuge in Tzehu, the citadel of the Alashan Mongols in western Inner Mongolia. He had been there only three months when the Communist forces broke out through northwest China and threatened

all of Inner Mongolia. With Mongol guides he made his way 16 days over the trackless desert to the motor road to Sinkiang, Chinese central Asia. Reaching the capital city, Urumchi, in September 1949, he settled in with the young Vice Consul, Douglas S. Mackiernan, who had been left to close the American Consulate there. Less than a month later, the province of Sinkiang was turned over to the Communist forces without a fight. The two young men burned records and drove out of the city in the Consulate jeep. There they were joined by three white Russian friends who were also fleeing and, abandoning the jeep, headed southwest by horse and camel caravan to cross Tibet from north to south and reach safety in India. They reached the east-west barrier of the Kunlun Mountains in November 1949 and had to spend the winter in a small settlement on the northern face of the range until the eight-week traverse of the mountains became feasible the following March. Once this had been accomplished with incredible hardships and they were safely crossing the border into northern Tibet, the final tragedy took place. Ignorant and frightened Tibetan border guards shot and killed Mackiernan and two of the three Russian companions. Bessac, suffering physically and mentally, pressed on with the remaining Russian, whose wounds he had tended, and completed the 1,500-mile trek to India by the autumn of 1950.[39]

Notes

CHAPTER TEN

1. Bodde, *op. cit.*, p. 177.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
3. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Tel. 643, Apr. 10, 1948. O/FADRC, microfilm.
4. Secstate to Amemb, Nanking, Tel. 627, Apr. 24, 1948, NA, RG 59, 811.42793 SE/1–1048.
5. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Airgram A–38, Feb. 13, 1948, *ibid.*, 811.42793 SE/2–1349.
6. Bodde, *op. cit.*, pp. xx.
7. The translation of Vol. I was completed by the two men in the 1930's and published in Peking by Henri Vetch in 1937. In 1946–47 Feng came to Philadelphia and worked with Bodde on the translation of Vol. II. After completion of the latter in Peking, the Princeton Univ. Press republished Vol. I in 1952 and published Vol. II in 1953.
8. Introduction to Hsiao-t'ung Fei, *China's Gentry* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 2
9. *Ibid.*
10. See note 8 above.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
12. *Ibid.*

13. Unless otherwise noted, data on the Fulbright grantees mentioned here are taken from a 10-page typescript in CU/H. It is a draft memorandum, untitled, undated, and unsigned which devotes one paragraph to each of the 27 grantees. Comparison with dated despatches, BFS minutes, etc., leaves no doubt as to its accuracy and authenticity. It is clear that it was written in Oct. 1949. ("Biggerstaff sailed from Shanghai . . . Sept. 24, 1949." "Bessac is at present in . . . Urumchi" which was his location in Sept.–Oct. 1949, according to *Life*, Nov. 13, 1950, pp. 130–136.) It summarizes for the Dept. the activities of the grantees in the Fulbright year. They are grouped according to the three categories of grants and each paragraph gives the name, U.S. institution, Chinese institution, dates of arrival (or commencement of grant) in China and of departure and a brief statement of activity undertaken during the year. Appendix VIII is based on this valuable memorandum.
14. Arnold Mallis, *American Entomologists* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Press 1971).
15. Part I, *Microentomology*, XV, No. 1 (1950), pp. 1–34; Part II, *ibid.*, XV, No. 3 (1950), pp. 70–97; Part III, *ibid.*, XVII, No. 1, (1952), pp. 6–16. The first quotation from Ferris in the text is from Part I, p. 2; the second is from Part I, p. 7. The first four pages of Part I give an interesting summary of his China travels and collecting experiences. Mrs. Ferris' article is: "Collecting on Sishan", *Pacific Discovery*, Vol. II, Jan.–Feb., 1952.
16. Based on personal interview, 1975.
17. *Idem.*
18. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Desp. 317, July 23, 1948, NA, RG 59, 811.-42793 SE/7–2348.
19. Based on personal interview, 1975.
20. Based on interview with his daughter, Brett de Bary Nee, 1975.
21. Univ. of California Press, 1951.
22. *Ibid.*, p. vi.
23. "The Cave Reliefs at Ma Hao." *Artibus Asiae*, Vol. 17, 1954, pp. 5–129.
24. "The Cowrie Shell Miao of Kweichow," *Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archeology and Ethnology*, Vol. 32, No. 1, Cambridge, Mass. 1947.
25. Harriet C. Mills with P.S. Ni, *Intermediate Reader in Modern Chinese* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1967); W. A. Rickett, *Kuan-tzu; A Repository of Early Chinese Thought* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Univ. Press, 1965); Adele A. Rickett, *Wang Kuo-wei's Jen Chien Tz'u Hua, A Study of Chinese Literary Criticism* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Univ. Microfilms, 1974), 1967 Univ. of Pennsylvania Ph. D. thesis.
26. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Tel. 280, Jan. 31, 1949, NA, RG 59, 811.42793 SE/1–31–49.
27. Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Foreign Scholarships, Washington, D.C., Apr. 26, 1949, CU/H.
28. H. Doc. 827, Report to the 81st Cong. 2d sess., on the Operations of the Dept. of State under Public Law 584, Mar. 14, 1950, p. 72.
29. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Desp. 292, July 6, 1948, NA, RG 59, 811.42793 SE/7–648.
30. Draft memorandum: "Scholarships and fellowships for Chinese students in American-maintained institutions in China (China Evaluation)," unsigned, undated, written by George Harris in the autumn of 1949. CU/H.
31. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Tel. 2470, Dec. 30, 1947, NA, RG 59, 811.42793 SE/12–3047.

32. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Tel. 1093, May 23, 1949, *ibid.*, 811.42793 SE/5–2349.
33. Amemb, Nanking, Airgram A–38, Feb. 13, 1945, *ibid.*, 811.42793 SE/2–1349.
34. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Tel. 1217, June 6, 1949, *ibid.*, 811.42793 SE/6–649.
35. Amemb, Nanking, Desp. 87, July 16, 1949, *ibid.*, 811.42793 SE/7–649.
36. Amemb, Nanking, to Secstate, Tel. 1696, Aug. 3, 1949, *ibid.*, 811.42793 SE/8–349.
37. Allyn and Adele Rickett, *Prisoners of Liberation* (New York: Cameron Associates, Inc., 1957).
38. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
39. Frank Bessac: "This Was the Perilous Trek to Tragedy," as told to James Burke. *Life*, Nov. 13, 1950, pp. 130–36. Illustrated.

Afterword

THE end of the Fulbright program marked the end of U.S. cultural relations with China until the early 1970's.[1] The rupture between the two countries which terminated the program not only prevented face-to-face access through the bamboo curtain but also caused a blackout of communications for over 20 years. The blackout is now only partially lifted and still obscures one entire side of the story. We know what has been China's impact on the American experts and Fulbright fellows who went there. But among the Chinese whom we reached, what, if any, have been the long-range survivals of that interrupted contact with Americans and American ideas? The answer we may never know. Yet as relations between our two countries resume, the stress on scientific and cultural exchanges, limited though they be, underlines the recognition by both parties of the continuing need for cultural contact.

For the moment at least, the international fellowship of science is in the ascendancy. Delegations from each country travel to the other to observe new developments in agriculture, scientific laboratories, medical practices, public health administration, and the like. It is heartening that the delegates exchange ideas, discoveries, observations, and technical suggestions free from the rancor of the cold war period.

Cultural relations between the United States and China in the next decade will obviously differ widely from the pattern evolved by trial and error in the decade of the 1940's. The drastically altered political relationships of the two nations make this inevitable. Consequently, what relevance America's cultural experiment in China 30 years ago will have to the current U.S.–P.R.C. cultural exchanges is uncertain.

Nevertheless, in a wider context, deductions from that brief and narrow experiment do have relevance today for all of us who are concerned with our Government's cultural relations policy. Let us conclude by citing a document in the official record which raises vital questions regarding the meaning and purposes of Government-

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fostered cultural exchanges as envisioned by Ben Cherrington, Senator J. William Fulbright, and others.

The late W. Bradley Connors, the tough and effective Acting Director of USIS in China in 1947–48, put forth proposals as to how the Fulbright funds should be expended in China in a confidential memorandum to the American Consul General in Shanghai. It was written in February 1948, approximately three months after the signature of the Fulbright agreement but more than half a year before the arrival of the first grantees in China. John Cabot, the Consul General, pressed by the Department, had asked Connors for his suggestions. Connors' memorandum slammed his cards on the table. It began:

> "I believe the Fulbright program should be utilized for long-range advantages at the same time USIS devotes its efforts to short-range problems.
>
> "Under the Fulbright program we should select exchange professors who will be able to explain our democracy and our way of life to their Chinese students, who will take an important interest in explaining to students the fallacies of their anti-American sentiments, making this phase of their work as important as their own courses and lectures. Only in this way can we obtain full value from such exchanges."[2]

The memorandum continued in the same vein for two more pages, but further quotation is unnecessary. The gist of his message is here. The brash commercial wording conveys the tough attitude of the cold warrior. Use the Fulbright grantees to fight anti-Americanism by the magic device of explaining the American way of life. Get full value for the taxpayers' money by having these Americans who are invited to teach in Chinese institutions seduce their students into compliance with American political goals.

Fortunately, the Board of Foreign Scholarships had been established for the express purpose of selecting grantees on their scholarly qualifications, not their usefulness for political ends. And in Nanking the personnel of the Board and of the Foundation were wholly devoted to furthering the scholarly aims of the grantees, which could be attained in the circumstances only by their remaining aloof from political involvement.

But, to return to Connors; he had worked for several years in OWI and was by training and inclination a specialist in public relations. His expertise was appropriate to his appointment in the USIS which was the public relations arm of the State Department and of the entire U.S. Government. Baldly stated, American democracy and the American way of life were his stock in trade. Convincing the Chinese of American excellence was his assignment; a hopeless task in 1948.

Yet, as already pointed out, the Fulbright year, 1948–49, was a fruitful time for the dedicated American scholars sent to China on Fulbright grants who pursued their studies without reference to national aims or rivalries. Furthermore, the Department's various projects of exchange of persons or of materials in the war years, described in the earlier chapters, were straightforward professional or technical undertakings. They succeeded or failed depending on the caliber and integrity of the individuals and the quality of the ideas received at the Point of Contact whether in China or the United States.

The U.S. Government expenditures for cultural relations programs were justified in Washington for various nationalistic and public relations ends—to make friends abroad, to enhance the American image, to counter Axis propaganda and, in the case of China, to give educational and technical assistance to a wartime ally.

But in the field, public relations was never the primary aim, and the enhancement of the American image in China occurred only as a byproduct of a job well done. What was actually taking place at the Point of Contact was a transference of ideas, skills, knowledge, understanding, and human feeling from persons of one culture to those of another, directly or through various media.

That cultural relations would be exploited for public relations purposes has worried dedicated proponents of U.S. official involvement in cultural interchange from the first. For this reason the merger of the wartime public relations and propaganda agency, OWI, with the Department's cultural exchange office to create USIS overseas at the end of World War II was viewed with considerable alarm. It is appropriate that the U.S. Government should have a public relations organization, but the time has long passed for using cultural relations to advertise America.

We are living in a time when "Interdependence is the reality; world-wide problems the prospect; and world-wide cooperation the only solution." For these reasons, the international transference of knowledge and skills—"creative mutual borrowing" by nations and peoples across national boundaries—is more imperative than ever as the task for today.[3]

In our society, the task is and will be the responsibility of both Government and private organizations. But neither can now afford to perform it for narrow and self-serving purposes. It is an essential public service. The aim must be nothing less than the promotion of international cultural cooperation for the benefit of all peoples; and the urgency of building an enduring world community must be the motivation.

Notes

AFTERWORD

1. A Fulbright program with Taiwan was initiated in 1958.
2. Connors' memorandum to Cabot, enclosure 2 to Desp. 17, Amcongen, Shanghai, to Amemb, Nanking, Feb. 11, 1948, NA, RG 59, 811.42793 SE/2–1148 CS/A.
3. *Reconstituting the Human Community: Cultural Relations for the Future* (New Haven: Hazen Foundation, 1972), pp. 13, 14.

APPENDIX I

On Missing Documents

The dismaying gaps in the official record of the Department's 1942–1949 cultural relations program with China are explained in the following extract of a letter to me, dated November 5, 1973, from Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs:

> "Since it is necessary to reduce the volume of the Department's indexed central files before they are transferred to the National Archives, they are 'screened' before transfer under a schedule which provides for the 'disposal' of papers considered least valuable for permanent retention. To put it less euphemistically, a large number of papers low on the ladder of retention priorities are destroyed. Eliminated are materials on such subjects as administrative operations, public comment, and (unfortunately) cultural relations. The schedules used for winnowing the files of the 1940's specifically called for destruction of all papers, except those thought by the screeners to have some permanent policy interest, under file numbers 811.42700 to 811.42796SE inclusive. The papers in case 811.42793, cultural relations with China, fell under this schedule."

That cultural relations documents have been considered "low on the ladder of retention" leaves unnecessary and pointless gaps in the story of American contact with China throughout a crucial decade. For example, I found that time after time reports by CU's American technical experts who had spent one or two years working closely with Chinese colleagues in uniquely interesting circumstances are indexed but missing from the Archives and must be presumed destroyed. It is, to say the least, jarring to come upon such ephemera as routine travel orders or wartime shipping priorities for these same experts which are unaccountably retained in the files.

I can only hope that the CU History Project may, by calling attention to the accomplishments and significance of the Department's cultural exchanges, put an end to such mindless destruction.

APPENDIX II

Report on Placement of Certain Manuscripts, CU China Translations Project

Enclosure in Secstate to Amemb, Chungking, Instr. 584, April 4, 1944

Title	*Author*	*Placement*
Some Old Chinese Loan Words in the Tai Language	Fang-kuei Li, Inst. of History and Philology, Academia Sinica	Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies
The Cretaceous Flora from the Pantou Series in Yungan, Fukien	H. C. Sze, Inst. of Geology, Academia Sinica	Journal of Paleontology
Growth Stimulation by Manganese Sulphate, Indole-3-Acetic Acid and Colchine in Pollen Germination and Pollen Tube Growth	Tsung-le Loo, Tsungchen Hwang, Chekiang Univ.	American Journal of Botany
A Form of Sporophlystis Rostrata with Ciliated Spores	San-chiun Shen	American Journal of Botany
Studies on Fusarium Diseases of Broad Bean	T. F. Yu, Inst. of Agricultural Research, Tsing Hua Univ.	Phytopathology
Studies in the Geoglossaceae of Yunnan	F. L. Tai, Tsing Hua Univ.	Lloydia
Some Problems of Chinese Law in Operation Today	Francis L. K. Hsu, Dept. of Sociology, Yunnan Univ.	Far Eastern Quarterly
The Date of Certain Egyptian Stratified Eye Beads of Glass	Tsoming N. Shiah, Asso. Research Fellow, National Research Inst. of History and Philology, Academia Sinica	American Journal of Archaeology
On Velocity Correlations and the Solutions of the Equations of Turbulent Fluctuation	P. Y. Chou (Pei-yuan), Prof. of Physics, Tsing Hua Univ.	Quarterly of Applied Mathematics

Title	*Author*	*Placement*
and		
Pressure Flow of a Turbulent Fluid between Two Parallel Infinite Planes	Same	Same
Influence of Pneumatic Pressure on the Photographic Sensitivity	Choong, Shin-Piaw, Research Fellow, Inst. of Physics, Academy of Peiping	Journal of Optical Society of America
The Size-Weight Illusion and the Weight Density Illusion	I. Huang, Prof. of Psychology, Chekiang Univ.	Journal of Genetic Psychology
The Size-Weight Illusion in Relation to the Perceptual Constancies	Same	Same

Placement Pending

Title	*Author*	*Placement*
The Long Wave Radiation in the Atmosphere	Kuo Hsiao-lan, Prof. of Meteorology, Chekiang Univ.	Monthly Weather Review
Distribution of Tin and Tungsten Deposits in Southern China and their Relation to Tectonic Patterns	W. Y. Chang, Inst. of Geology, Academia Sinica	Journal of Geology (pending revision)
Studies in the Santonin Series II; The Bromination Products of Desmotropo-santonins and Desmotropo-santonous Acids	Huang Minlon, C. P. Lo, Lucy J. Y. Chu, National Research Inst. of Chemistry, Academia Sinica	Journal of the American Chemical Society (conditionally pending addl. data)
5 Articles on Child Psychology	Dr. Huang I, Chekiang Univ.	Journal of Genetic Psychology

(Copy in CU/H)

APPENDIX III

Advice to Chinese Writers on Preparing Material for Publication in the U.S.

Letter from Pearl S. Buck to T. L. Yuan

R.D. 3
Perkasie, Pennsylvania
May 14, 1945.

My dear Dr. Yuan:

I have been thinking a good deal about our conversation on the morning you so kindly came to call on me, and about your suggestion that I should write out some of the ideas which might be useful to Chinese writers trying to find American readers.

Of course I feel embarrassment in doing this, since Chinese writers are so successful in their own country, and it seems very presumptuous of me. I can only proceed on two grounds, first that there may be some young writers who might be helped by knowing something of my own experience, and second, that I am so anxious that the work of Chinese writers should become known here in my own country, in order to further the understanding between our two peoples.

For the first, I may say that I, myself, began to write for Americans very much as a young and inexperienced Chinese might begin. I had lived so long in China that I had no knowledge of any other people, even my own, except by hearsay and the acquaintance of a few individuals. It was impossible for me to write about American life. I remember at first I had many rejections from American editors and I got quite in despair. Only a lifelong determination to write kept me trying again. The usual reply from these editors was that Chinese subjects would not interest their readers. I succeeded at last only by making the characters in my books primarily human beings and secondarily Chinese. I must confess that then I fell under the criticism of some Chinese, who did not like the human beings!

But all that is past. Even the times have changed. There is a real eagerness now among the people of America to know more about China, and the market is open for Chinese writers, even in translation.

I know that this statement will bewilder some Chinese writers who have tried in vain to get their work published in this country, but I think it is true, nevertheless. The market is here and it is ready, but that is not to say that anything a Chinese writes will find publication. We all know that in order to sell anything, one must consider to some extent the demands of those who want

to buy. I don't want to put literature on a commercial basis, by any means, but unfortunately what editors and publishers put into their magazines and books has to seem to them, at least, what their readers will want and enjoy. For this reason I will put down what I think is essential for Chinese writers to know, who want American readers.

1. The casual, subjective, informal essay type of writing, which delights Chinese intellectuals, finds little interest here. I do not know why this is so. But it is true that the informal essay is almost non-existent in this country. Americans are not much interested in the internal workings of the writer's mind, nor in his opinions and vague thoughts, especially if these are tinged with a sort of pretentious melancholy. Americans are an extremely realistic people. They like their literature realistic and human. They are non-intellectual, and much of the material sent here by Chinese intellectuals does not interest them. American intellectual writing, too, finds little publication.

2. A good deal of the modern Chinese writing is derivative. Modern plays which may seem original to a Chinese audience unversed in Western Literature do not seem so to an American audience who recognize the source of the inspiration. I have in mind a Chinese play I have recently read, which achieved great fame in China, I hear, but which would be impossible to present on the American stage, because obviously it is modeled after the plays of our own Eugene O'Neill.

   This brings me to another point, which is that the whole attitude toward literary influence is different in China and America. In China it is quite permissible, through long tradition, to write "after the manner" of some great master but here it is simply called plagiarism or imitation and is rejected. Originality is our most highly prized quality in writing.

   If a young writer is called imitative, it is the most damning thing that can be said about him. It means his own creative genius is weak. It is extremely important, therefore, that Chinese writers create out of their own material and in Chinese ways, not in the least reminiscent of western literature. The western flavor at once makes the American reader feel that the writing is not fresh and good.

3. Another difference between us is that Chinese quite willingly tolerate stories and novels which have no plot, but just begin and go on and then stop. Not so in this country. Americans like their stories with some complication and with some clear conclusion. They like their characters clearly defined, not vague and romantically cloudy, not sighing and weeping and over-intellectualized. If a man weeps, as often happens in a Chinese story, Americans are shocked at the weakness. Men do weep, I suppose, in America, but if they do, it is behind a closed door, and nobody wants to hear about it! Let us say that strong men, such as are heroes in stories, ought not to weep! Clearness in story structure, clearness in character development, are essential to American enjoyment.

4. Americans enjoy humor very much. Even in very tragic works they enjoy a touch of humor in some character put in for contrast. Tragedy unrelieved is not much read. Least liked of all is the sentimental *Sorrows of Werther* type of thing.

5. The form which writing can take, except for the informal essay, can be almost anything. There is a wide market for short stories, and if these are accepted by popular magazines, they bring good prices. Articles have also a good market, and many publishers would like to have novels, especially if they deal with the modern scene. Good translations are also welcomed. The market for poetry exists but is small. Short stories are usually about forty-five hundred words in length, but may be as little as one thousand. Two and three part stories may also be acceptable, if material and technique are good. By *good*, I mean human and living and naturalistic in mood.

   I do think that American writers work harder than the Chinese writers do at a given piece of writing. Chinese writers "dash" something off—so I am told. But an American will write and re-write, endeavoring to have his work the best of which he is capable. Writing is a serious and difficult job—not at all an easy or casual one. Only the writer long accustomed to his work can, like a painter, know just where his strokes should lie in order to make the coordinated whole. A good deal of the writing now sent to us from China seems to us, if I may venture to say so, done too quickly and casually.

To sum up, I should say that Americans enjoy realistic, clear writing. They like good character delineation, they dislike sentimentality and most of all they dislike intellectualization, especially the sort which seems to be an intellectual pose. Affectation of any kind the American despises.

One thing which Chinese writers might wish to know in dealing with western editors and publishers is not to be personally offended if their work is rejected or if it is severely cut or criticized, and changes suggested. American editors are accustomed to editing all writing, and American writers are accustomed to this, without any personal feelings of loss of face, etc. One reason for Lin Yutang's great success in this country is his utter disregard of his own "face." He accepts criticism and suggestion with good humor and a genuine desire to do a job the best he can, without hurt feelings.

I may say that there is no writer in the United States who can expect always to have his material accepted as he writes it, unless actually it does fit the editorial demands of the magazine to which he submits it. At the same time, of course, no true writer will consent to write at the dictation of any one else. The final judge is the writer, but the real writer wants to know how his work can be improved.

In closing this overlong letter, I might say on the constructive side that any one writing about China in a true, human way will find an audience today in America. Americans are much interested in how the real Chinese think and feel and live. They are not interested in intellectual gymnastics, in false pretentious writing, in imitative writing, nor in writing obviously for sale. But the writer who can dig deep into the real Chinese mind and heart and reveal its essential humanity, without propaganda and without pose, can succeed with American readers.

One more word; the propaganda plays and stories and poems which have performed a real service in China during the war will not be read here. Such writing has also been done on a large scale in Russia, and is equally unpopular in this country. Americans feel they do not have the need for such propaganda and have no interest in it.

I feel that there is a great opportunity for Chinese writers to make their people known now to our people. In honesty and simplicity this should be done, without false shame. The Chinese people are so great. After ten years in my own country, I still feel that the Chinese people are perhaps the greatest on earth—I mean, the Chinese common man and woman, the ninety-eight percent of any nation. Their strength, their humor, their goodness, their reality, will win Americans to China, if they can only be made plain to us. And no one can do this as Chinese writers can. I send them all my good wishes, and would like to say that if, in my humble way I can do anything to be of service in getting their works published here, I shall do it gladly.

Yours cordially,

PEARL S. BUCK

Dr. T. L. Yuan,
Kings Crown Hotel,
420 West 116th Street,
New York City, N.Y.

(Copy in CU/H)

APPENDIX IV

American Specialists Sent to China on the CU Program

Name	*Specialty*	*Ministry or Other Assignment*
George Alexanderson *New York Times*	News photography	Information
Omar C. Bagwell International Telephone & Telegraph Company	Long distance telephone engineering	Communications
Willis C. Barrett Dept. of Agriculture	Hydraulic engineer	Agriculture and forestry
Frank N. M. Brown Univ. of Notre Dame	Aeronautical engineer	Education
Frank T. Buchner Wright Aeronautical Corporation	News rewriting	Information
George B. Cressey Syracuse University	Geology and geography	Visiting prof.
Richard C. Darnell Washington, D.C.	Laboratory and scientific equipment	Education
Theodore P. Dykstra Dept. of Agriculture	Potato breeding Plant pathologist	Agriculture and forestry
Paul B. Eaton Lafayette College	Prof. of mechanical engineering	Education
George H. Grim *Star-Journal & Tribune* Minneapolis	Radio news	Information
Capt. Wallace Haworth U.S. Navy	Radiology	National Health Administration
Horace H. F. Jayne Metropolitan Museum of Art	Archeology	Education
Ray G. Johnson, Ph. D. Oregon State College	Animal husbandry	Education

Name	*Specialty*	*Ministry or Other Assignment*
JOHN L. KEENAN Charlestown (Mass.) Navy Yard	Steel specialist	Economic affairs
WILLIAM W. KINTNER Timken Roller Bearing Co.	Mechanical engineering	Economic affairs
HAROLD H. LOUCKS, M.D. Baltimore, Maryland (private practice)	Military surgery	Education
WALTER C. LOWDERMILK Soil Conservation Service Dept. of Agriculture Washington, D.C.	Flood control and soil conservation	Agriculture and forestry
JOHN R. LYMAN Fouke Fur Company St. Louis, Missouri	Accounting	Chinese industrial cooperatives
FRED O. MCMILLAN Oregon State College	Electrical engineering	Education, economic affairs, communications
ARTHUR B. MORRILL U.S. Public Health Serv.	Sanitary engineering	National Health Administration
NATHANIEL PEFFER Prof. of Government Columbia University	International relations	Education
RALPH W. PHILLIPS Bureau of Animal Industry Agricultural Research Adm. Beltsville, Maryland	Animal breeding	Agriculture and forestry
DICKSON RECK War Production Board	Industrial standards	National Resources Commission
JOHN L. SAVAGE Bureau of Reclamation Department of Interior	Dam construction and irrigation engineering	National Resources Commission
DONALD V. SHUHART 2910 Lipscomb Street Fort Worth, Texas	Control of soil erosion	Agriculture and forestry
EDWIN K. SMITH U.S. Army	Metallurgy	National Resources Commission

Name	*Specialty*	*Ministry or Other Assignment*
W. MACKENZIE STEVENS University of Maryland	Industrial cooperatives	Chinese industrial cooperatives
FLOYD TAYLOR New York *World Telegram*	Ed[illegible]ews	Information
JOHN T. TRIPP Michigan Dept. of Health	Biologic products	National Health Administration
EVERETT A. TUNNICLIFF Montana State College	Veterinary science	Agriculture and forestry

(Copy in CU/H)

APPENDIX V

Chinese Educators and Artists Invited to the U.S.A. on the CU Program

1943–1947

Name	*Position 1943–1944*	*Field of Specialization*
CHANG, CH'I-YUN	Prof., Univ. of Chekiang	Geography
CHIN, YUEH-L'IN	Prof., Southwest Associated Univ.	Philosophy
HSIAO, TSO-L'IANG	Prof., Szechwan Univ.	Political science
FEI, HSIAO-T'UNG	Prof., Yenching Univ.	Sociology
LIU, NAI-CHEN	Prof., Wuhan Univ.	Political science
TSAI, CH'IAO	Head of Dept. Medical College, National Central Univ.	Medicine
	1944–1945	
CH'EN, HSU-CHING	Prof., Nankai Univ.	Sociology
CH'EN, YU-KUANG	President, Univ. of Nanking	Educational administration
SAH, PEN-TUNG	President, National Univ. of Amoy	Educational administration
WANG, GING-HSI	Director, Inst. of Psychology, Academia Sinica	Psychology
YANG, CHEN-SHENG	Prof. of Chinese Literature, Southwest Associated Univ.	Literature
YUNG, CHI-TUNG	Prof., Lingnan Univ.	Plant science

Name	*Position 1945–1946*	*Field of Specialization*
CHENG, TSO-HSIN	Dean, Fukien Christian College	Biology
LIN, TUNG-CHI	Prof., National Fuhtan Univ.	Political science
MEI, Y. P. (YI-PAO)	President, Yenching Univ.	Educational administration
NY, TSI-ZE	Director, Inst. of Physics, Nat'l Academy of Peiping	Physics
TAO, L. K. (MENG-HO)	Director of the Inst. of Social Sciences, Academia Sinica	Social science
YUAN, THOMAS LI	Dean & Prof. of Health and Physical Education, Northwest Teachers College, Lanchow	Physical education
	1946–1947	
CHANG, HSIAO-CH'IEN	Director, Hsiang Ya Medical College, Changsha	Medicine
HOU, PAO-CHANG	Dean, College of Medicine, Cheloo Univ., Tsinan	Medicine
JAW, JEOU-JANG	Acting Director, Inst. of Meteorology, Academia Sinica, Nanking	Meteorology
LIU, CHENG-CHAO	Prof. of Biology, West China Union Univ.	Biology
LIU, EN-LAN	Head of Geography Dept., Ginling College	Geography
SHU, SHEH-YU (pen name: Lao Sheh)	Novelist, Executive Director, Chinese Writers Association	Literature
WAN, CHIA-PAO (pen name: Ts'ao Yu)	Dramatist	Drama
YEH, CHIEN-YU	Painter, cartoonist	Fine arts

(Copy in CU/H)

APPENDIX VI

Fellowships Awarded to Chinese Students

Two-year fellowships awarded by Department of State for advanced study in the United States under the administration of the China Institute in America

*Name**	*Field*	*University*
YAT-SAN CHUNG	Literature and drama	Yale
CHIH-CHIEN WU	Literature	Yale
FU-NING LI	Literature	Yale
CHING-TSUN LOO	Mathematics	Brown
HAO WANG	Philosophy	Brown
SHIANG-HAW WANG	Mathematics	Brown
KWAN-WAI SO	American Government and history	Wisconsin
SHU-CHIN YANG	Economics	Wisconsin
CHEN-HWA YANG	Surgery	Michigan
ZAU FOO	Education	Colorado
LIANG HSU	Library science	Denver
PO-CHEN LIN	Literature	Wesleyan
CHING-HSI CHAO	Economics	Washington
SUNG-CHIAO CHAO	Geography	Clark
KUAN-HEN LIN	Surgery	Long Island College of Medicine
LAN-CHANG CHIANG	Surgery and radiology	Long Island College of Medicine
SHOU-CHENG FU	Chemistry	Johns Hopkins
HUA-KANG CHOU	Pediatrics	Minnesota
CHIH-LUNG PU	Entomology	Minnesota
TSENG-YIN YAO	Economics	Minnesota
TIEN-CHIH CHEN	Chemistry	Louisiana State
KHIP-HUEY TSAI	Chemistry	Ohio State

* Listed with surname last from *The Record*, CU *Monthly Report*, Vol. II, No. 10, Oct. 1946, p. 28.

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APPENDIX VII

Chinese Travel Grantees to the U.S.A. on the CU Program

1945–1946

Name	*Position*	*Field of Specialization*
CHEN, DING-BAI	Judicial Yuan official	Law
CHENG, TIEN-HSI	Entomologist Lingnan Univ.	Entomology
DJU, YU-BAO	Dean of Women Nanking Univ.	Labor
HSU, W. SIANG	Chekiang Univ.	Biology
HSU, Y. T.	Prof. of Pathology Hsiang-Ya Medical College	Pathology
LEE, SHU-CHING	Prof. of Sociology Southwest Associated Univ.	Sociology
SHIH, KUO-HENG	Lecturer on Sociology Yunnan Univ.	Sociology
TS'IN, HSUEH-SHENG	Graduate student, West China Frontier Research Inst.	Anthropology

1946–1947

FAN, HAO	Commissioner of Customs Shanghai	Government official
HUANG, JEN-JO	Vice Director, National Inst. of Health, Nanking	Medicine
HSIAO, SIDNEY CHIH-TI	Prof. of Biology, Central China College	Biology
KUNG, LI-HUA	Staff, Wuhan Univ.	Biology
MA, SHIH-TSUN	Prof., Southwest Associated Univ.	

1946–1947—Continued

Name	*Position*	*Field of Specialization*
TSIANG, SHO-MIN T.G.	Prof. of Mathematics, Southwest Associated Univ.	Mathematics
YEN, WEN-YU	Librarian, Nat'l Library of Peiping	Library science
YU, FU-CHUN	Physicist, Southwest Associated Univ.	Physics
YU, JANE DA-YUEH	Prof. of foreign languages, Central Univ.	Literature
YU, SHIH-YU	Prof., West China Union Univ.	Library science

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APPENDIX VIII

China Fulbright Program American Grantees, August 1948–September 1949

Visiting Professors	*U.S. institutions*	*Chinese institutions*	*Field of study*	*Arrival date on grant*	*Departure date*	*Comments*
Paul A. Grieder	Montana State	Lingnan Univ.	English literature	8–24–48	8–17–49	
George Kennedy	Yale	College of Chinese Studies	Chinese linguistics	Awarded in China 8–1–48	11–24–48	
Howard H. Preston	Univ. of Washington	Hangchow Christian Col., Yenching Univ., Lingnan Univ.	Business administration	9–20–48	3–13–49	At Yenching 2 mos. Lingnan 1 mo.
Robert Redfield	Chicago	Tsinghua Univ., Lingnan Univ.	Anthropology	10–25–48	1–31–49	Mid-December and January in Canton
Research Fellows						
Knight Biggerstaff	Cornell	In Nanking	Chinese modern history	3–15–49	9–24–49	
Derk Bodde	Pennsylvania	Tsinghua Univ.	Chinese philosophy	8–21–48	8–24–49	
Gordon F. Ferris	Stanford	Lingnan Univ.	Biology Entomology	10–17–48	5–23–49	
Hurbert Freyn		St. John's Univ., Lingnan Univ.	Chinese social thought	Awarded in China Dec. 1948	Aug. 1949	Then moved to Taiwan

Margaret Portia Mickey	Harvard	W. China Union Univ.	Miao tribe anthropology	10–10–48	Autumn 1949?	
Richard C. Rudolph	UCLA	College of Chinese Studies, W. China Union Univ.	Chinese language and archeology	10–17–48	6–2–49	
H. Arthur Steiner	UCLA	Cheng-Chi Univ.	Chinese politics	9–17–48	3–2–49	
Graduate Students						
W. Theodore de Bary	Columbia	Yenching Univ., Lingnan Univ.	Chinese history and literature	Awarded in China	5–20–49	
Frank B. Bessac	College of the Pacific	Fujen Univ., W. China Union Univ.	Chinese and Mongol anthropology	In China	March 1950	Via Tibet and India
Richard Edwards	Princeton Harvard	Szechwan Univ., W. China Union Univ.	Chinese art	12–29–48	Autumn 1950	
David Gidman	Wesleyan Columbia	College of Chinese Studies, W. China Union Univ.	Chinese language	10–24–48		
Alfred Harding	Cornell B.A. 1948	College of Chinese Studies, Peking Univ.	Chinese language and history	In China	April 1950	
Esther Haviland	Swarthmore Columbia	College of Chinese Studies, Tsinghua Univ.	Chinese archeology	In China	1950	
Arthur Link	Univ. of California	College of Chinese Studies	Chinese Buddhism	10–3–48		
Harriet Mills	Wellesley Columbia	College of Chinese Studies, Peking Univ.	Modern Chinese literature: Lu Hsun	In China	1955	Imprisoned July 1951 to 1955
Frederick Mote	Harvard	Univ. of Nanking	Ming history	In China	April 1950	

Graduate Students—Continued	*U.S. institutions*	*Chinese institutions*	*Field of study*	*Arrival date on grant*	*Departure date*	*Comments*
James Parsons	Univ. of California	College of Chinese Studies, Peking Univ.	Modern Chinese history	10–3–48		
Frederick Rein	Carnegie Inst. of Tech.	Shanghai Municipal Drama Academy	Chinese drama	12–3–48	5–3–49	
Adele Rickett	Pennsylvania	College of Chinese Studies, Tsinghua Univ.	Chinese poetry	10–12–48	2–27–55	Imprisoned Sept. 1952 to Feb. 1955
Walter Allyn Rickett	Pennsylvania	College of Chinese Studies, Tsinghua Univ.	Chinese political theory: Kuan-Tzu	10–12–48	9–11–55	Imprisoned July 1951 to Sept. 1955
Michael Rogers	Univ. of California	College of Chinese Studies, Peking Univ.	Chinese Buddhism	10–3–48	Sept. 1949	
Edward Ryan	Claremont	W. China Union Univ., Peking Univ., Hangchow Christian College	Chinese socio-economic history	9–48	May 1949	
Donald Toussaint	Stanford	Yenching Univ.	Sino-American relations	In China	Sept. 1949	

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